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ABSTRACT
Developing countries are converging in their Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policies.
This reflects not just the external pressure to liberalise economic policies but also the growing
realisation that Multi National Corporations (MNCs) have played and will continue to playa
leading role in transnational investment. This is particularly so when it comes to the
exploration for and development of oil and gas resources. The role of MNCs In the
explorations and development of petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia since the 1930s has
indeed been significant. Saudi Arabia has been seeking economic diversification since the
1970s. It dec~ded to change its development strategy so as to become less dependent on oil
revenues. The Kingdom thus embarked upon various legal and policy reforms to improve the
investment climate in the country. This subject is highly important to foreign investors in
Saudi Arabia because of the potential returns offered by what is becoming a more attractive
investment environment.
A key issue for foreign investors is the availability of an adequate legal framework for
foreign investment which facilitates the establishment and operation of their business in
Saudi Arabia and provides them with adequate protection for their investments. However,
there are concerns which have arisen amongst foreign investors. These concerns mainly stem
from a sense of legal uncertainty and unpredictability of the laws and dispute settlement
systems relating to FDI in Saudi Arabia, including where relevant Shari'a which is
fundamental to the Saudi legal system.
This study is therefore concerned with the identification and analysis of these legal
problems - both existing and perceived - in the laws of Saudi Arabia as well as the stability
of investment agreements under Shari' a which is necessary for conducting business there.
As the title of this study indicates, its primary objective is to examine the legal security
and protection ofFDI in Saudi Arabia. The examination of this topic will be conducted in the
light of the rules relating to FDI which are designed to provide effective protection for
foreign investment. Since Shari'a is the main source oflaw within the Saudi legal system, the
relevant Shari'a principles will also be addressed in this study. The study also examines the
mechanisms available for the settlement of foreign investments disputes in Saudi and asks
whether or not these mechanisms provide independent and impartial bodies capable of
settling such disputes. The study is intended to make an original contribution to current and
prospective foreign investors' understanding as well as to inform proposals for action on the
part of the Saudi government.
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INTRODUCTION
Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Arabian Peninsula and about 65% of its
landmass is comprised of deserts. The Empty Quarter represents a great part of this desert
which is one of the most oil-rich regions of the world.' The country is rich in petroleum
resources, which account for much of the nation's prosperity. Petroleum thus dominates
the economy of Saudi Arabia.i Oil was first discovered in the country at the beginning of
the 1930s, but commercial production only started in 1938. During the 1960s Saudi's oil
wealth contributed to rapid economic development, a process which accelerated in the
1970s.3 Today, oil still plays an important role in the economy as it accounts for more than
90% of the country's exports and nearly 75% of government revenues; the proven reserves
are estimated to be 260 billion barrels, which amounts to about one-quarter of world oil
reserves." Today, more than 95% of all Saudi oil is produced by Saudi ARAMCO (Arabian
American Oil Company) on behalf of the Saudi Government. S
I The country comprises about 80 percent of the Arabian peninsula bordered by Jordan and Kuwait to the north,
the Red Sea and Yemen to the west and south, Oman to the south, and the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf
Coast to the east. For more discussion on background and development of Saudi Arabia see generally, Al-Farsy,
F., Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation, Channel Islands: Knight Communications Ltd, (2003).
2 The importance of Saudi oil to the development of an international industry and the success of the major oil
companies has been recognised since the introduction of the first concession in 1933 to California Arabian
Standard Oil Company (CASOC) who later changed their name to Arabian American Oil Company
(ARAMCO). For an historical account of the beginnings of the oil industry, its growth and importance
throughout the world, the Middle East and in Saudi Arabia, see the ARAMCO Handbook, Oil and the Middle
East, Arabian American Oil Company, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, (1968). See also Obaid, N., The Oil Kingdom at
100,Washington, DC. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (2000).
3 For an in depth history of the oil industry of Saudi Arabia, see Yergin, D., The Prize, New York: Free Press,
(2003), pp. 283-292. The Prize is widely known as the definitive work on the subject of oil and the major
contribution to history and politics of oil. See also Twitchell, K., Saudi Arabia with an Account of the
Development of Its Natural Resources, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, (1953).
4 Saudi Embassy Washington, ARAMCO CEO's lecture on energy at Rice University, Texas, available at:
http://www.saudiembassy.netlarchive/200 5/speeches/page 14.aspx.
S For information on the current status and technical details on oil and gas activities in the country, seethe
website of Saudi ARAMCO at: http://www.saudiaramco.com/bvsmlJSPlhome.jsp (23/12/06). For in depth
discussion of the role of ARAMCO and its evolution see Chapter 4 infra.
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The contribution of the oil industry has made Saudi one of the richest countries in the
world and an attractive environment for investment. In the aftermath of the 1973-4 rise in oil
prices, as the largest oil exporter of the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries) group, Saudi Arabia accumulated enormous financial surpluses and subsequently
increased its international economic power. However, despite being one of the major oil
exporting countries with an overwhelming dependence on the export of crude oil, it also
became a major capital importing country with an increasing reliance on foreign investment
in the oil sector. With that over-dependence on oil wealth there is also a realisation that oil
reserves may be depleted in the future. At the same time other factors are also becoming
important for the Saudi government to deal with, such as growing pressure on the Saudi
national budget, the problem of international debt, the development of other sectors such as
agriculture along with the importance of water to economic survival and an increasing
dependence on foreign labour. Thus, the country is now facing the daunting task of
transforming its economy into a diversified industrial economy.f Many commentators7
suggest that the Saudi economic reform programme should at least address six distinct
elements that would reduce government expenditure, increase its revenues and stimulate
investment. Those elements are decreasing defence spending, reducing government subsidies,
expanding privatisation, stimulating foreign investment, reducing dependence on foreign
workers and encouraging natural gas development.8
6 See Cordesman, A., Saudi Arabia. Guarding the Desert Kingdom, Westview Press, (1997), pp. 47- 76 for an
explanation of economic and social issues in Saudi Arabia.
7 Such as Champion, D., The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability within Stability. Middle East
Review of International Affairs, VOL 3, No.4 - (December, 1999).
8 For an in depth discussion of each of these elements, see Enav, P., The Saudi Oil Dilemma, London: Financial
Times Energy, (2000), pp.9l-l02.
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The government has introduced recent changes to its policy, legislative and regulatory
framework to attract foreign private investment into the country." Such efforts to increase
private participation generally may well spill over into the oil and gas industry and thereby
increase the rate of private participation therein. On 5 June 2000, a foreign investment act
entitled the "Foreign Investment Law" came into force in Saudi Arabia. 10 The purpose of this
act was to promote foreign investment in Saudi Arabia and to ensure that licensed foreign
investment projects would enjoy the same benefits, incentives, and guarantees enjoyed under
Saudi Arabian law by wholly Saudi-owned companies. The Foreign Investment Law provides
for the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) to issue licenses for foreign
capital investment in any investment activity in Saudi Arabia. I I Further government action to
promote foreign investment includes the adoption of regulations and formal incentives.V In
June 2005, King Abdullah, who chairs the Supreme Economic Council (SEC) in charge of
economic reforms, approved the implementation of seventeen agreements':' to encourage
9 See SAG lA, The Legal Background to Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia General Investment
Authority (SAGIA), (2003).
10 Foreign Investment Law (as enacted by Royal Decree No. Mil dated 5/111421 H / 10 April 2000). See copy
of the text at: http://www.sagia.gov.sa/innerpage.asp?ContentID=85&Lang=en (07/07/05).
11 See Article 2. Article 5 provides that foreign investments licensed under the provisions of this Act, may be in
either of the following forms: facilities owned by a national and a foreign investor; and facilities wholly owned
by a foreign investor. The legal form of the facility shall be determined according to regulations and directives.
The Act also states that investments related to the foreign investor shall not be confiscated wholly or partially
without a court order and that it may not be subject to expropriation wholly or partially except for public interest
against an equitable compensation according to Regulations and Directives.
12 The Original Regulations were enacted by the Board of Directors of the General Investment Authority
Resolution No.2 dated 1515/1421 H / 15 August 2000 (the "Original Regulations") and were subsequently
revised by Board of Directors of the General Investment Authority Resolution No. 1120 dated 13/4/1423 H / 24
June 2002 (the "New Regulations").
13 The agreements were made between the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) and relevant
government departments to make Saudi Arabia more investment-friendly. The intention of the agreements is to
encourage the private sector to set up specialised universities and colleges in conjunction with renowned world
universities, foster industrial projects by giving exemptions on customs tariffs, and granting facilities such as
entry visas to foreign investors. Further measures aim to streamline the judicial procedures to resolve trade
disputes, strengthen guarantees for investors, promote women's input in investment and speed up the process of
collecting imports from entry ports. Other measures include special incentives to locals and foreigners who
invest in less developed areas of the vast Kingdom or who add to the operational capacity of Saudi ports. For
more details see supra note 4, Political, Economic and Social Initiatives the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, available
at: http://www.saudiembassy.netlfi!esIPDFlReports/200SReportslReform Report MayOS.pdf.
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foreign investment.l" It is generally accepted that these government activities in respect of
foreign investment are conducive to allowing non-Saudi nationals to invest in the economic
activities of the country. IS
This section, which introduces the pertinent issues concerning the role of foreign
investment in the Saudi economy, will serve as the basic foundation for a subsequent and
fuller analysis in the following chapters of the roles of government and the private sector in
the economy. This analysis will also involve an examination of the position of international
law relating to foreign investment and an examination of the national legal framework in
Saudi Arabia. 16
Conceptual Definition of Foreign Investment
Various definitions of "Foreign Investment" have been developed by different
scholars, governments and organisations. They range from the simple 'investment made by a
foreigner' 17 to more complex explanations that foreign investment is usually defined in terms
of the scope of investment agreements through key terms, such as 'investment' and 'investor'
14 Ibid. The mechanisms to improve the Kingdom's investment climate were prepared with the support of a
number of government agencies. They are: Ministry of Defence and Aviation, Ministry of Municipal and Rural
Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Planning and Economy, Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of
Labour, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Water and Electricity as well as the
Communication and IT Agency, the Court of Grievances, King Abdul Aziz City of Science and Technology and
an Experts Committee at Cabinet.
IS Bahgat G., Foreign Investment In Saudi Arabia's Energy Sector, , Middle East Economic Survey, VOL.
XLVII, No. 34, (23-August-2004).
16 The Basic Law allows for international treaties (which Saudi has signed) to supersede domestic rules
including Shari'a mandatory rules. Thus, domestic courts are allowed to disregard stringent domestic rules and
interpret international treaty provisions in harmony with international trends. Hence, international arbitration
agreements entered into by the State or one of its agencies would subordinate the Saudi legal system to the rules
of the arbitral tribunals. The two Constitutional articles, according to Hanbali school of thought - see chapter 1
of thesis - are in harmony with the spirit of Shari'a on the grounds of the rationale behind the existence of
Shari'a, which is the welfare and protection of the vital interests of people. See also AI-Shareef, Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia: Grounds for Refusal Under Article (V) of the New York Convention
Of 1958, PhD Thesis, University of Dundee, (2000), p. 65
1 See Eshiekh, F., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, Cambridge
University Press, (2003), p26.
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and the assets and nature of the obligations of the parties involved.l'' The Saudi Foreign
Investment Law of 2000 Article 1 defines foreign investment as 'investment of foreign
capital in an activity licensed by this Law'. We will explore this definition in our examination
of the national legal framework of Saudi Arabia. For the purposes of the thesis, we will
adopt the most commonly acceptable definition of foreign investment namely that suggested
by Sornarajah who states that foreign investment involves 'the transfer of tangible or
intangible assets from one country into another for the purpose of use in that country to
generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the assets'. 19 In other words,
foreign investment involves a transfer of funds or materials from the capital exporting
country to the host country in return for a direct or indirect participation in the earnings of
that enterprise.i" A specific definition of direct investment can be obtained from the
International Monetary Fund where foreign investment is defined as 'investment that is made
to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in any economy other than that of an
investor, the investor's purpose being to have an effective choice in the management of the
enterprise' .21 All these definitions involve three basic elements namely the capital exporting
country from which the investment comes, the foreign investor who is a national of the
capital exporting country and the capital importing country as the location for the investment.
In most cases, however, it is large International Oil Companies'f (hereafter
referred to as "IOCs") that undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries.
18 See UNCT AD Series on issues of international investment agreements, Scope and Definition, New York:
United Nations Publication, UNCT AD/ITEIIIT/ll (Vol. II), (1999).
19 Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge University Press, (2004), p.4.
20 Ibid.
21 IMF, Balance of Payments Manual, (1980), paraA08 cited in Somarajah, Ibid.
22 FDI is also defined as "an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and
control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident
in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign
affiliate)"; see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and
Development, United Nations Publication, (2007), p. 245. This general definition of FDI is based on OECD,
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Attracting FDI from these large IOCs is a priority in economic policy for most countries with
emerging economies. Therefore, it is important for these developing countries to identify
factors and policies that can influence the IOCs in choosing specific locations. These factors
range from market size, to taxes, red-tape alleviation, regulations, laws, infrastructure,
political stability, and investment promotion. The debate is still open on what combination of
factors is the most effective for attracting FDI, especially in small developing countries who
have become more dependent on foreign aid and who wish to reduce their dependency on it.23
In order to exert their control over their investments, IOCs increasingly demand that their
investments are adequately protected by the host country. IOCs claim that this need for
protection is necessary in order to provide them with some certainty as regards the safety and
integrity of their capital investment and projected return on it so that they are able to make a
meaningful contribution to the economy ofthe host country.i"
A- Objective of the thesis:
This study endeavours to identify and analyse the legal guarantees and dispute
resolution mechanisms needed for the protection of FDI in Saudi Arabia. It addresses the
security of foreign investments under Saudi law (including the relevant principles of Islamic
law), bilateral and international investment agreements to which Saudi Arabia is a party and
investment contracts between foreign investors and their Saudi partners. The guarantees of
foreign investment in Saudi Arabia against non-commercial risks25 as well as the appropriate
methods of dispute settlements are also addressed in this thesis. Reviewing such issues is
Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 3rd Ed., DECO, (1996) and International
Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Manual, 5th Ed., IMF, (1993).
23 See Estrin and Meyer (eds.), Investment Strategies in Emerging Markets, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, (2004).
24 For more discussion see chapter 5 infra.
2S Non-commercial risks refer to risks other than commercial factors such as war, internal turbulence and
governmental interference as well as political risks. For more discussion on these issues see Moosa, I., Foreign
Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, (2002), PP. 131-160.
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crucial in clarifying the correct balance between safeguarding and controlling the national
wealth of the host state on the one hand, and recognising the need for foreign investors by
providing them with the stability and security needed on the other. The purpose of such
review is to demonstrate the need for stability and the types of risks that foreign investors are
exposed to. Understanding such risks is important in assessing the legal effectiveness and
techniques used to avoid those risks.
B- Statement of the problem:
A foreign investor needs to be confident that there is a legal regime in place that secures
his investment. What comes immediately to the mind of a foreign investor'" is whether the
legal regime addresses his concerns in relation to the potential conflict of laws between
Shari'a (Islamic Law) which forms the basis of the Saudi legal system and judicial system on
the one hand, and the conventional common law system which is the usual law chosen by
parties to govern their FDI contracts. Similarly, a foreign investor will want to know what
importance the Saudi legal system attaches to the rule of law and how and whether the
traditional law doctrine of pacta sunt servanda,27 the contractual umbrella clause28 is
recognised, understood and applied in Saudi Arabia. Finally, he will want to know whether
Saudi Arabia will agree to submit investment disputes to an independent international dispute
resolution mechanism.
26 This may be because of the great threat that arises from subjecting the agreement to the domestic law of the
host state. Therefore, IOCs, for example which invest in developing countries have never been comfortable
with the idea that the domestic law of the host state should apply to their contracts with host states or state
entities. See Delaume, G., The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State Contracts, in Carbonneau, T., (ed), Lex
Marcatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant, Boston, Mass: Kluwer Law International,
(1998), pp. 111-116.
27 A traditional International Law doctrine translated as "Every Treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith". See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
1969 http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treatfra.htm
28 The so-called "umbrella clause" a provision found in many BITs that imposes a requirement on each
Contracting State to observe all investment obligations entered into with investors from the other Contracting
State. See generally Salacuse, J & P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L. J. 67, 67 (2005).
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c- Significance of the thesis:
Analysis of the protection of FDI in Saudi Arabia is crucial, not only to academics,
capital exporting countries, foreign investors, and international organisations with an interest
in Saudi, but also to the Saudi government itself and those individuals that may have an
influence in shaping the future direction of foreign investment in the country. It will
contribute to clearer understanding of the cultural and legal framework for the conduct of
business by non-Saudi investors within Saudi Arabia and to a better appreciation of where the
actual difficulties lie. It is important both to the Saudi Government and to the international
investor to know whether or not a legal framework exists which provides some degree of
protection for investment in the country and whether or not such a framework is enforced
vigorously and effectively.
D- Methods of the thesis:
This study is both analytical and comparative. It combines an examination of the
issues of international law on foreign investment and national law, and applies these to the
situation in Saudi Arabia. The thesis will investigate and examine the relevant international
treaties concerning foreign investment which apply to Saudi Arabia. The methodology further
adopts an analytical approach to investigate the status and protection of foreign investment in
Saudi Arabia under national and international law. It also examines the applicable rules
(national and international) to foreign investment and investigates whether they are effective,
and if not why they are not. It goes on to analyse what could be done to ensure that these
rules are adhered to by the authorities to ensure that investment is adequately protected.
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Saudi government policy regarding FDI will be analysed to examine issues relating to
the security of FDI. This examination will also highlight the rules applicable in Saudi and
directly question and contribute to an ongoing debate that promotes greater transparency in
Saudi's investment climate. Another limited comparative approach is pursued in some parts
of this study without any intention to have a full and detailed comparative study. This is
necessary to cover the shortage in Saudi materials and to support certain ideas. Research
material and data. will be gathered from primary sources of Shari'a, statutes, official
regulations, texts of international treaties, text books and online articles and journals. In
addition to an examination and review of published literature, the researcher made use of
qualitative research methods whereby interviews were conducted, though without following
any specific format or system. This method of empirical work and data collection was
conducted over a period of three months (October, November and December 2005) at SAGIA
in Riyadh. The idea of this empirical method was to sample the opinions of those holding
influential positions in the Saudi government whose activities are related to the issue of
foreign investment which intended only to serve as background to the thesis. For instance,
questions were put concerning the effect of government laws and policies on foreign
investors, the effect of the Kingdom's Islamic system on foreign investment, administrative
policy of foreign investment, visas, incentives policies, labour policy, financial policy and the
resolution of investment disputes. The answers to such questions helped the researcher to
further his understanding of the issues, an understanding which has, in tum, informed the
recommendations made at the end of this thesis.
E-Thesis gap:
The motive behind carrying out this research stems from the absence of a recent and
comprehensive work that addresses the subject. There are very few legal studies on foreign
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investment in Saudi Arabia. Most research conducted hitherto has been on the oil industry,
and what is published is mainly descriptive. Moreover, these studies do not take into account
the non-oil sector. However, there are two studies concerning foreign investment in Saudi
Arabia.i" Although these two studies are relevant to the current study they do not cover major
developments which have taken place since. In other words, these studies were completed
prior to the implementation of the Foreign Investment Law in 2000 which itself replaced the
1979 Foreign Capital Investment Code (FCIC) which was the major applicable legal
instrument in this area. This thesis is thus intended to fill the gap left by these two studies
which were confined to the oil and gas industry. In contrast this thesis has a wider scope.
Furthermore, it is hoped that this work will provide the legal community interested in foreign
investment in Saudi with an overall legal perspective on foreign investment, which may help
to solve investment disputes in the future. Undoubtedly, legal problems do exist in several
areas of foreign investment in Saudi and it is also hoped that the study will contribute to the
development of more effective regulations related to foreign investment in the Kingdom in
order to provide better solutions for these problems. It should be made clear that in many
areas of foreign investment in Saudi the problem is more of a misunderstanding or
misconception than a reality and that a tool, such as this work, in giving greater insight into
the subject, may help allay apprehension felt by foreign investors wishing to invest in the
country.
29 1- AI-Samaan Y., The Legal Security of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, PhD thesis,
(unpublished), University of Dundee, CEPMLP, (1993).
2- AI-Saleh M., A Study of the Foreign Investment regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Law and Policy,
Phd thesis, (unpublished), University of Warwick, (1994).
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F- Structure of the thesis:
The study consists of seven chapters. The objectives of the study, its significance,
scope and methodology have already been delineated here in the introduction. Chapter 1
examines the Saudi legal system, looking particularly at the aspects of the legal system
relevant to regulation and protection of foreign investment. This examination includes the
elucidation of the principal sources of the basic law of the country, the jurisdiction of Saudi
courts including the Shari'a courts and the Board of Grievances which plays a major role in
settling foreign investment disputes.
The security and sanctity, under law, of investment agreements signed by the Saudi
government is the topic examined in chapter 2. Chapter 3 investigates the dispute settlement
system and applicable law in the Kingdom and how international dispute resolution measures
are applied. The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the available mechanisms for the
settlement of investment disputes including litigation, arbitration and the provisions of
international instruments. It also explores arbitration under Islamic law and the attitude of the
Saudi government towards arbitration.
Chapter 4 introduces the evolution of the contractual relationship between Saudi
Arabia and ARAMCO. The aim of this chapter is twofold: First, it demonstrates the
commitment of the Saudi government to its agreements with ARAMCO by showing that the
Saudi Government avoided resorting to unilateral action such as nationalisation. This is
crucial evidence of the general policy of the Saudi Government towards the protection of
foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. The second aim of the chapter is to introduce the
government's general policy on privatisation of the economy in order to provide foreign
investors with an attractive investment environment.
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Chapter 5 investigates the issue of protection of foreign investment under Saudi law,
Islamic law and international law. This investigation looks at the state's right to regulate
foreign investment within its territorial boundaries. This includes the two positions of host
state regulation and home state control over foreign investors. The purpose of this chapter is
to demonstrate the treatment of foreign investors, particularly the "minimum standard" of
treatment put forward by the developed world and the "national treatment" standard argued
for by developing countries.
Chapter 6 discusses the licensing of foreign investment and the legal incentives
offered to foreign investors in the Kingdom. Efforts are made here to show whether or not the
incentives offered to foreign investors are suitable in the light of limited comparison with
incentives offered by other host countries. Finally, chapter 7 formulates general conclusions
and suggested legal reforms.
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(1) THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA
Introduction
This chapter sets out the general framework of Islamic or Shari'a Law and looks at the
ways in which it addresses the important analytical issues relating to Islamic law, foreign
investment and state participation and ownership over the oil and gas resources in Saudi
Arabia. It will also briefly highlight the importance of international law in relation to the
treatment of foreign investment in a country like Saudi Arabia. Islamic Law forms the basic
foundation for the law systems of all the Arab countries, thus creating a lot of similarities in
the approaches of these countries to foreign investment and the oil industry. The oil and gas
resources are of profound importance in Islam. Like water they are considered a blessing
from God.I However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to explore theological issues in any
detail but rather to refer to the main principles that are derived from the Islamic legal
framework pertaining to oil and gas issues and to discuss how Saudi Arabia, as a country
with an Islamic constitution, can abide by these principles whilst encouraging foreign
investment in the oil and gas industry. The chapter will therefore analyse two models of law.
The first is the set of theologically based Islamic law principles as they pertain to legal
aspects of oil and gas. Having established these principles, it will then examine the
I The Quran is the primary source for Islamic values. Muslims believe that it is the exact word of Allah
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) through the Angel Gabriel. While the Quran does contain some
specific prescriptions that rank as legal, primarily it establishes a general set of moral guidelines - a compass for
Muslims to use in following an Islamic way of life. The Quran says of itself that "Here is a plain statement to
men, a guidance and instruction to those who fear Allah." (Chapter 3: Verse 138).
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application of Islamic law in Saudi Arabia in order to examine the specific Saudi model of
law that is derived from the larger umbrella of Islamic law.2 This chapter provides' the context
for the thesis, since it is necessary to understand the scope of the implementation and
adaptation of Islamic law by the Saudi Government. From that point it will be a more
straightforward task to differentiate between the Saudi Law system and Islamic Law. Hence,
whenever any comparison is made with any other legal system(s), there should be no
confusion between these two related but different systems of law. The important distinction
being that although Saudi law is derived from Islamic law and its principles, it is a distinct
system in its own right.' and it is this Saudi system that is of concern in terms of arriving at a
framework for dealing with foreign investment in the oil and gas industry.
1.1 The legal system of Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy with the King as the religious leader, 'Imam' and the
source of political power in the country." His power and duties are defined in Islamic law,
according to which he must serve for the good of the people, and he has been given full
authority to issue or approve any law provided that it does not contradict Islamic law.s
Article 1 of the Basic Law" states that "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab
Islamic state with Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's
2 See Saudi information at http://www.saudinf.com!(12/12/06).
3 Ibid.
4 Some of the important laws of the Saudi Government are the Constitution or Basic Law of Government
(1993), the Consultative Council Establishment Act (1993), the Consultative Council Statute (1993), the
Consultative Council Membership Statute (1993), the Consultative Council Sanctions Statute (1993), the
Consultative Council Finances Statute (1993), the Council of Ministers Statute (1993) and the Regional
Authorities Establishment Act (1993). The texts of these legislative instruments can be seen at
http://www.oefre.unibe.chlIaw/icl/sa indx.html (12 Dec 2005).
5 It is narrated that the prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) said: "It is necessary upon a Muslim to listen to and obey the
ruler, as long as one is not ordered to carry out a sin." (Sahih al-Bukhari, no 2796). See also Al-Saleh, M.,
Foreign Investment Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Law and Policy, PhD Thesis, (unpublished),
University of Warwick, (1994) p.3.
6 The Basic Law (Constitution) of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1993 was officially adopted by Royal decree of
King Fahd, Oct 1993. See text at: http://www.oefre.unibe.chllaw/icllsaOOOOO.html(10 Dec. 2007).
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prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution, Arabic is its language and Riyadh is its
capital."
Saudi Arabia is one of the most traditionalist Islamic legal systems in the world today.
Constitutionally, Islamic law is the law of the land, and the general jurisdiction is exercised
by judges trained in Shari'a jurisprudence. In common with other theologically based
jurisprudential system, different philosophical and legal schools developed during Islam's
history. In Saudi Arabia, the judges primarily apply the Shari'a according to the teaching of
the Hanbali7 Juristic School. Western laws and legal concepts are frequently applied in day-
to-day commercial practice and practical solutions provided by Shari'a are often similar or
even identical to those known to Western jurisdictions. 8
Saudi Arabian society underwent a significant number of changes due to the oil boom
of the 1970s, and these changes in the wider economic, social and political cultures have
affected the legal system. As a result, Saudi Arabia has created legal institutions that appear
modem and similar to many that exist in the West. In particular the promulgation of
numerous regulations and decree laws, as well as the creation of a number of judicial and
quasi-judicial bodies to deal with issues arising under the new "legislation", marked a
transformation of the Saudi legal system. The Saudi legal system is a legal system sui
generis, in that it resembles the system of neither civil law nor common law countries. This is
due to the fact that Saudi law is based on the principles of the Shari'a, mainly in accordance
with the teaching of the Hanbali School, and not on a codification of laws as in civil law
jurisdictions or case law in common law jurisdictions.
7 An explanation of the four Juristic Schools will be dealt with later on in this chapter.
8 For more discussion, see chapter 2.
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The legal system of Saudi Arabia is based on two types oflaw, 'Shari'a' or Islamic Law
on the one hand and Decree Law on the other hand. Shari' a is based on the Quran and the
sayings of the Prophet Mohammed. Decree laws are issued to regulate industrial and
commercial affairs, such as company law, the mining code, foreign treaties, oil and mineral
concessions and foreign capital investment regulations. The Decree laws require the King's
approval to be promulgated as Royal Decrees", such as the main law that regulates foreign
investment, namely the 1979 Foreign Capital Investment Code (FCIC), which will be
examined below in the chapter.
According to some scholars, Islamic law is the 'law that governs adherents of the
Muslim religion' in that it 'provides rules to cover all aspects of a person's life, within a
complete moral and ethical code of conduct' .10 As far as foreign investment is concerned,
Islamic law provides the necessary protection to foreign investors in that the taking of private
property by the state is not allowed except in the case of a contractual breach by the
investor. I I Additionally the 'state has the right of intervention and unilateral cancellation if
the investor uses the property to the detriment of the state.12 We will highlight practical
examples of such cases relating to the oil and gas industry in a chapter on dispute resolution.
The word "Shari'a" is the name given to the totality of God's commandments, which
are constituted of the principles in the holy book Quran and the sayings and doings of the
prophet. Shari'a consists of four sources: first and foremost is Quran, then Sunnah,
Consensus (1jma 'a) and Analogy (Quiyas). Quran is the holy book of Islam. It consists of
6237 verses and constitutes God's ordinances to the people, which the prophet Muhammad
9 See Saudi Consulting House, Basic facts about the Kingdom the Country and its People. 7th ed. in A Guide to
Industrial Investment, Riyadh, (1986), pp.3-17.
10 See El-Malik, W., Minerals Investment under the Sharia Law, London: Graham & Tortman, (1993) p.3.
II Article II of Foreign Investment Law of2000.
12 Ibid.
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received from God over a period of twenty three years. However, this is not to say that Quran
addresses every aspect or situation which may arise at any future point in history in specific
terms, but it offers general guidance which is interpreted in the light of other sources. Quran
means, in Arabic, "reading" and it is considered by Muslims to be the ultimate authority in
legal and religious matters.
1.2 A closer look at Islamic Law
An important staring point is to look at the opinions of the scholars that shaped the
Islamic legal tradition about 1300 years ago for their opinions on what Islamic law is all
about. According to Malik,13 Islamic law is the 'law that governs adherents of the Muslim's
religion in that it provides rules to cover all aspects of a person's life, within a complete
moral and ethical code of conduct'. 14Hence morality is equal to legality or, to put it another
way, whenever immorality arises there is also illegality. The Quran remains the word of God
and the basic foundation of the Islamic religion, as it contains the general principles of
Islamic law. These principles include the principle of sovereignty and of economic
fundamentals, as well as political principles and the establishment of the Consultative
Council (Shurah). The Council of Ministers is the main decision-making and governing body
of the state. I S The presentation of the Islamic perspective on foreign investment in the oil and
13 Imam Malik is one of the greatest scholars in the Islamic History. He lived in Maddinah and was known as
the leader and the founder of school of Haddith (prophet speech), which means that he has the strongest
knowledge of the Islamic legal system as he directly took the haddith from the followers of the prophet's
companions. Therefore his statements are still highly influential in Saudi Arabia.
14 See Vogel, F., Islamic law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia, Leiden, Brill, (2000), p. 3. See also
EI-Malik, W., supra note 10, p.3. Islamic Law does deal with temporal life as well as the hereafter.
Therefore, whatever action we take in this life will have an effect on the afterlife.
15 Shurah is refers to the assembly of a group of representative people who decide the policy and decisions of
the government, which can now be called Parliament, it should be noted, however, that members of the council
are appointed by the king, see Consultative Council Membership Statute (1993) Article 1. See also Zaidan, A,
Alwajiz fi Usul Al-Fiqh_(Summery in the Islamic Jurisprudents), Beirut: Muassasatu Ar-Risalah, (1996), pp.
378-385.
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gas industry or any other issue must be based upon these sources.16 The reason is that they are
considered as the main sources of Sharia, inviolable for Muslims and they contain the
economic and sovereignty principles for the government to use.
Both Quran and Sunnab are known as the basis of religion and Islamic Law, and
originally, no other sources of Islam were accepted. However, after the death of the prophet
in 632 A.D., the second stage of Islam began under the guidance of the followers of the
prophet. They continued to decide cases in accordance with the primary source, Quran and
Sunnah. However, if these sources made no specific reference to the matter in question, the
companions reached a consensus or resorted to analogy. Consensus means the agreement of
Muslim jurists, in any particular age, on a rule of law. Consensus and analogy are the third
and fourth sources which were not used until the secondHijrahl7 century.
The following section highlights both the Quran and Sunnah as the main sources of
Saudi law which are relevant to our main research area of foreign investment in the oil
industry of Saudi Arabia.
1.2.1 Quran and Sunnah as the main sources
While the Quran is the main source and guide for Muslims, containing the revelation of
Allah, the Sunnahl8 reflects what the Prophet said, did, or tacitly approved. In Islam,
following the example of the Prophet is given great importance because the Quran instructs
16 Therefore, to be consistent with all legitimate discussions of Islam, quotes from both the Quran and the
Sunnah are included in this chapter wherever appropriate.
17 The Hijrah refers to the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Madinah. This journey took place in the twelfth
year of his mission (622 C.E).It is the beginning of the Muslim calendar. The word hijrah means to leave a place
to seek sanctuary or freedom from persecution or freedom of religion or any other purpose. Hijrah can also
mean to leave a bad way of life for a good or more righteous way.
18 'Sunnah means the way, custom and habit of life and also the utterances of the prophet, Haddith. The
principle based on the 'Sunnah' includes the authentic sayings and deeds of the prophet Mohammed as it is
stated in the Quran, 'Who so obeys the messenger, obeys Allah. (4:80).
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Muslims to follow him: "0 ye who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Apostle. 19 For Muslims,
the Prophet is the perfect human role model and leader and the society he built around him is
the model for a caring, equitable society. The degree of importance attached to the Prophet in
Islam is unparalleled in any other religion. If the Quran is a compass for Muslims, the
Sunnah - the sayings and doings of the prophet Muhammad or those things which were
allowed by the prophet (Pbuh) to be done by his companions in his time - is a more detailed
map for the human journey on earth. It includes the silence of the Prophet (Pbuh) on some
matters which happened or some actions done in front of him. Moreover, as far as the Hadith
- the oral traditions relating to the sayings and deeds of the Prophet (Pbuh) - natures is
concerned, some of them are binding on Muslims while some are only factors to take into
account.
For example, the prophet did not approve the sale of water except for its supply and
for distribution services. For water allocation and equal distribution, the Prophet (Pbuh)
insisted on equal water distribution among the companions. The Sunnah is the second source
of Islamic Law/Shari'a. What is the most important here is that those incidents, their natures
and occurrences at different times, have led Muslim Scholars to find different opinions about
water distribution itself and how to develop them in our lifetime. The reasoning behind this is
that the actions of the Prophet (Pbuh) and those who lived with him are followed for as long
as they are suitable for our time. This is what the Islamic jurisprudence says about it i.e. we
pursue the actions which are the most suitable for our lifetime, but at the same time we will
base our actions on the general principles and guidelines that the Prophet provided for us. So,
as current conditions are different from those prevalent in the Prophet's time, we have our
own problems which are different from those of that time. Therefore we address our
19 The Holy Quran (4:59)
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problems and changes through a combination of the Prophet's guidelines and our own current
issues. It explains the Quran and interprets its general provisions. The Quran is the text and
the hadith are its commentaries.j''
1.2.2 The inviolability of Quran and Sunnah.
The Quran and Sunnah are pr.esented to us protected and unaltered. Some of the
Sahaba, or companions of the Prophet, memorised and wrote down what the Prophet said or
did. These documented narrations are called hadith, and they were later checked for
authenticity based upon such factors as independent confirmation, soundness of the chain of
narration, credibility of narrators in the chain, and consistency with other hadith and the
Quran.21 In specific cases, known as hadith qudsi, Muslims believe that the Prophet's sayings
are the revelation of Allah, expressed in the Prophet's own words, but only in relation to the
matters of laws and regulations to the community. Otherwise, Muslims consider the Prophet
as a normal human being.
There are six sources, which are considered to be the most accurate and reliable, those
of Imam AI-Bukhari,22 Imam Muslim, Imam AI-Tirmidhi,23 Imam Malik,24 Imam Abu-
Dawood,25 and Imam Ibn Majah.26 Importantly, in addition to the Quran and the Sunnah,
Ijtihad can be used to make rulings that address new questions related to changing conditions.
20 The above two sources are primary sources, whereas the second category is composed of auxiliary sources
called the Ijma (consensus) and Qiyas (analogy). For more discussion see Vogel, F., supra note 14 pp.36, 40 &
56. See also Lombardini, M., The international Islamic Court of Justice: Towards an International Islamic
Legal System? Leiden Journal ofInternational Law, V. 14 (2001), P. 675.
21 See Zaidan, A., Supra, note 14, p. 382.
22 Born in 194 H, and died in 256 H. See Islam web for details,
http://www.islamweb.net!ver2/archive/readArt.php?lang=A&id= 16729 (14/12/06).
23 Born in 207H,died in 279H. See ibid.
24 Born in 93H,died in 179H. See ibid.
2S Died in 275H. See http://www.islamweb.net!ver2/FatwaiShowFatwa.php (15/12/06).
26 Died in 273. See ibid.
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Essentially, Ijtihad is the development of Shari'a from its sources i.e. the Quran and the
sunnah. The five tools used to carry out Ijtihad are Quiyas (analogy), Ijma (unanimous
agreement of jurists), Istihsan (juristic preference), Maslaha or Istislah (public interest or
human welfare), and Istishab (continuity or permanencej.f Although some forms of inquiry
are indeed prohibited in Islam, such as questioning key articles of Islamic faith (for example,
the oneness of God) - there is an increasing need for multidisciplinary" creative inquiry into
new problems and questions arising in today's society, following the guidelines already
established by the Quran and Sunnah.29
1.2.3 Economic and sovereignty principles in Quran and Sunnah
The Islamic interpretation of the principle of sovereignty is that God is the only true
sovereign. God delegates to mankind the power to rule the Earth and the issues of sovereignty
therefore pass to the government, whose duty is to administer to the people in the way that is
prescribed by the Quran and Sunnah. As far as the Muslim community (Ummah) is
concerned, they should use this power, delegated from God, to conduct the worldly affairs of
their nations, and should not abuse this position.l'' Thus, the importance of these principles of
sovereignty is that Muslims obey their system of law as something of divine origin, and not
merely the will of the majority of the leaders of the country.l' At the same time, there is
always some scope left to make decisions and to change the nature of the rules and
regulations when the times demand it, so as to have an updated and modernised system of
27 For more in-depth analysis see Vogel, F., supra note 14, chapter 1, "ljtihad as Law", pp. 3-32. See also
Faruqui, N. and Al-Jayyousi, 0., Water Management in Is/am, United Nations University Press, (2001).
28 For more details supported by examples, see chapter two in stability of investment agreements under Shari'a.
29 See Zaidan, A., Supra note 17 p. 382.
30 This principle of sovereignty is explained by AI-Maududi "no doubt the Islamic state is a sovereign state
in the real sense of his term vis-A-vis the other states of the world, but if it tries to assert its sovereignty vis-a-
vis the command of God and his messenger this would amount to the clear negation of its Islamic character"
Al-Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, Lahore: Islamic Publications, (1960) p. 249, also see El-Malik,
W., supra note 10, p.10.
31 Ibid
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law. Meanwhile, political powers under the principles of sovereignty include the rule that
consultation - Shurah - is the basis of government in particular issues and legislation. The
Shurah is a forum for discussion with a view to reaching a decision based on agreement and
general support. The Quran refers to "those who harked to their lord, and establish regular
prayers, who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation't.V
For the purposes of our examination of foreign investment in the oil industry, it would
also be useful to outline some of the economic principles found under Islamic law. These
principles dictate that Islam is broadly opposed to the intervention of the state in economic
activities, with the right of private property being guaranteed. Thus, there is no provision for
the taking of private property unless that property is being used contrary to the teachings of
Islam," or if the owner of the property fails to fulfil his obligations under a specified
contract." Obviously, these related principles are important with regard to the treatment of
foreign investment in Saudi's oil and gas industry. On the one hand, Islamic Law would seem
to suggest that it is the government's role - under the principle of sovereignty - to administer
this and other economic sectors in the best interests of the people.35 However, it might also be
argued that public interest would be best served by the introduction of private investment in a
32 Quran: (42:38).
33 The inviolability of property has been also asserted in the teachings of the jurists of schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. However, Shari'a prohibits investments in activities which are contrary to it such as illicit drugs,
alcohol and gambling. All these matters have direct connection to Islamic jurisprudence on public policy, and
public interests. Also the principles of the necessity (Darura) under the Islamic legal maxim are always applied.
In other words, if the right of ownership comes into conflict with the public interest, the latter prevails. See
Coulson, N., The State and the Individual In Islamic Law, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 6,
Issue 1, Jan. 1957, pp. 49-60.
34 The obligations are that the companies and the private sector should act faithfully as should the public sector.
Accordingly, the expropriation of private property is also justified against the payment of just compensation and
the execution of a judgement against a debtor's property. This is to promote good life quality for the people. It
should be noted in this context that compensation for lost potential profits and the obligation to pay interests on
overdue payments are prohibited under Shari'a. See AI-Samman, Y., The Legal Protection Of Foreign
Investment In The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia, Dar Al Andalus for Pub. & Dist. Hail, Saudi Arabia, (2000), pp.
58-59.
35 El-Malik, W., State Ownership of Minerals Under Islamic Law, Journal of Energy and Natural Resources
Law, Vo1.l4 No.3, (1996), p. 316.
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particular sector. Under the economic principles of Islamic law, which are broadly opposed to
government intervention, .foreign investment would appear to be justified so long as it
continues to serve the interests of the public. Furthermore, Islamic teaching would appear to
accept investment in the oil industry even if it comes from outside the country, with the
Quran stating that "there is no compulsion in religion'r" meaning that it is the duty of
Muslims to allow non-Muslims to live according to their respective laws, within the
limitations of public morality and security. After all, all human beings are regarded as equal
and should be treated as such.37 Additionally, the political view of government to foreign
investment is based on Islamic law which includes the rule of consultation (Shurah) as the
basis of government (i.e. 'discussion with a view to reaching a decision based on agreement
and general support')."
The above are some of the important principles on which the Saudi legal system is
based, and they are referred to again in the following section and chapters on foreign
investment in the oil and gas industry of Saudi Arabia. Up to this point, then, we have
examined the general background of the Quran and Sunnah as the main sources for Islamic
Law, and have explored matters within these sources related specifically to economic and
political sovereignty under Islamic Law. The above background sets the context for the next
section, which concentrates on the approach of the Saudi Courts to foreign investment.
36 See Verse (2:256) which states that all humans are the stewards of common resources that belong to the
community.
37 See also Quran verse 17:70 which states that 'we have made the children of Adam respectable' and also
49:13.
38 The Quran (42:38) refers to "those who harked to their lord, and establish regular prayers, who conduct their
affairs by mutual consultation".
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1.3 Jurisdiction of the Saudi Courts concerningforeign investment
According to Saudi Constitutional law, the authorities of the state consist of the
judiciary, executive and the regulatory authority.i" These authorities cooperate with each
other in the performance of their duties, in accordance with this and other laws. The King is
the head of all these authorities." The Saudi judicial system consists of both general courts
and specialised tribunals." The courts, which are of general jurisdiction in Saudi Arabia are
Shari'a courts administered by the Ministry of Justice according to the Judicial Code of
1975.42 Shari'a Courts have g~neral jurisdiction over all disputes except those excluded from
their jurisdiction by special codes.43 In particular, they have exclusive jurisdiction over civil,
criminal cases and matters of personal status.44
The legal basis for the courts in Saudi is the Basic Law and the Holy Quran." The
judiciary is an independent authority and there is no political control over judges in the
dispensation of their judgments except in the case of the Islamic Shari' a.46 The Constitution
further provides for the right to litigation, which is guaranteed to all citizens and residents of
the Kingdom on an equal basis." These issues are important to the subsequent discussion
39SeeChapter 6 The Authorities of the State, Article 44 of the Basic Law.
40Ibid.
41The courts and tribunals may consist of a combination of judges and non-judges. Decisions may be given
quickly or may take some time and in some cases, decisions may be appealed. See Info-Prod Research (Middle
East), Saudi Arabia, http://www.infoprod.co.illcountrylsaudiaza.htm and http://www.infoprod.co.il/article/24
(517106).
42Royal Decree No. M/64 dated 14/7/1395 H. (July 23, 1975), as amended by Royal Decree No. M176 dated
14/10/1395 H, (19/10/1975); Royal Decree No. M14 dated 113/1401 H. (6/0111981)
43Article 9 & 25 of the Law of the Judiciary. See also AI-Samaan, Y., supra note 33, p220.
44 Royal Decree No. M176 of 1975. Shari'a Courts consist of Summary Courts, Ordinary Courts and Courts of
Appeal.
45Article 45 of the Constitution states that the sources of the deliverance of fatwa in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia are God's Book (Holy Quran) and the Sunnah of His Messenger. In tum, this law defines the
composition of the senior ulema body, the administration of scientific research, deliverance of fatwa and its
(body of senior ulema's) functions.
46Article 46.
47 Article 47. In terms of Article 48, the courts are under an obligation to apply the rules of the Islamic Shari'a in
all the cases that are brought before them. The judgments are carried out in accordance with what is indicated in
the Quran and the Sunnah, and regulations decreed by the Ruler which do not contradict the Quran or the
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which highlights the treatment of foreign investment in the oil industry and also some of the
examples of dispute resolution in chapter three.
The King appoints judges on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council
(SJC), which is composed of 11 senior jurists also appointed by the King. Judges, including
those who sit on the SJC, are appointed for life. Although appointed by the king, judges are
subject only to the provisions of Shari'a and the law." Article 1 of the 1975 code provides:
"Judges are independent and not subject to any authority in rendering judgment except as that
provided in Shari'a and applicable regulations. No person shall have the right to interfere in
the judicial process. Accordingly, judges are required to conduct their functions
independently and impartially"." Under Article 58,Judges are prohibited from engaging in
commercial activities and from performing any other work incompatible with the dignity of
judicial office and the principle of judicial independence.
To maintain independence, disciplinary matters concerning members of the judiciary
are handled by a special committee of the Ministry of Justice. The SJC appoints members of
this special committee. The members are chosen from the ranks of jurists of the Court of
Appeals and general courts. The 1975 Judicial Law provides for disciplinary trials to be held
in public, unless the special committee decides otherwise.50
Sunnah. Another function of the courts is to arbitrate in all disputes and crimes. Finally the King or his deputy is
responsible for the implementation of judicial rulings (Article 50).
48 See Article 45 of the Constitution.
49 Article 1 of the Law of the Judiciary. See also AI-Samaan, Y., The Legal Security of Private Foreign
Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Unpublished PhD Thesis, CEPMLP., University of Dundee, (1993),
p 249.
so Article 33 of the Law of the Judiciary. See also Lerrick, A. & Mian, J., Saudi Business and Labour Law,
Graham & Trotman, (1987), p. 200.
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An understanding of the roles and functions of the different courts is important in our
examination of the legal system of Saudi Arabia, which will also shed light on matters
concerning the treatment of foreign investment in the oil and gas sector mentioned in the next
chapter. The following section therefore provides a necessary overview of the different types
of courts and other judicial bodies in Saudi Arabia.
1.3.1 Shari'a Court
The Shari'a Courts form the largest court system in Saudi Arabia". As a general rule,
the Shari'a courts have jurisdiction over all matters except where a special committee has
expressly granted exclusive jurisdiction to another judicial authority.52 Whilst the Shari'a
courts try cases involving civil, criminal, family, personal injury and personal property
matters, they do not hear commercial cases.53 The Shari'a courts apply only Islamic Law.54
Expediency is an important feature of the Shari' a Courts. The time between hearings is
usually no more than a few weeks, and a final judgement is typically rendered within a few
months. Until recently, most judgements rendered by Shari'a courts were not published, but a
new decision regarding the publication of judicial decisions was issued by the Council of
Ministers in 2003.55
51 Different types of courts are established under the Constitution of the country (see the Royal Decree No. Ml76
of 1975). In October 2007 Shari'a Courts were reorganised into several categories: Courts of the First Instance
(Summary and General Courts), Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. See Saudi embassy website in
Washington at: http://www.saudiembassy.netlaboutlcountry-
information/governmentllegal and judicial structure.aspx. 13/11/09. See also Article 9 of the Law of the
Judiciary.
52Al-Samaan, Y., supra note 33, p. 220.
53 Commercial courts will oversee disputes that had previously been addressed by special Ministry of Commerce
and Industry committees, see Saudi Embassy website at:
http://www.saudiembassy.netlarchive/2007/news/page 152.aspx. Accessed on 13/11/09.
54 Royal Decree No. Ml76 of 1975.
55 Article 21 of the Law of the Board of Grievances.
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The judicial system of the Shari'a Courts consists of four tiers. The first level consists
of Summary Courts, empowered to hear civil and criminal cases. Summary court jurisdiction
in civil cases is limited to claims of up to SR 20,000, excluding property matters. Criminal
jurisdiction extends to all offences not reserved for General Court review, which may be
referred to as petty offences. In the second level are the General Courts, which are the courts
of first instance in matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Summary Courts. The General
Courts also include the Grand Shari'a courts that sit in major cities. The jurisdiction of the
General Courts extends over matters concerning amounts in dispute in excess of SR 20,000
and serious criminal offences. The Court of Appeal, located in Riyadh, is the third level of
court. Appeals are usually on issues of law, with a great deal of discretion given to the court
of first instance on issues of fact. For most matters, the Court of Appeal is the final court of
appeal. The SJC, the supreme instance in the land, is not truly a court, but a body which
issues opinions at the request of the King or the Minister of Justice. The SJC does, however,
have final jurisdiction over capital cases, in which the King is the final point of appeal, with
power to grant pardons.
1.3.2 Board of Grievances
Since 22 June 1987, the Board of Grievances has become the competent judicial body
to adjudicate on commercial disputes involving the government or any of its agencies with
investors.i" To meet the growing needs of government administration, the government of
Saudi Arabia has adopted the concept of Mazalim to resolve disputes to which the
government, or any of its agencies, is a party. Thus, Article 19 of the Council of Ministers
Code of 1954 provides for the establishment of the Board of Grievances (Diwan al-
S6 The concept of grievances has its roots in the early Islamic period and was practiced by the prophet and later
by the caliphs who appointed judges to hear grievances and resolve them using their knowledge of the Islamic
Shari 'a.
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Mazalim)57 as an institution attached to the Council of Ministers." The Board was re-
organised in 1955 and became an independent institution headed by a president who was
directly responsible to the King.59 The Board is the exclusive forum for disputes between the
Saudi government and private contractors. The Board of Grievances also has jurisdiction over
distributorship, commercial agency and maritime disputes, and those involving company
regulation and all other purely commercial matters, except for those related to banking which
are dealt with by the Commercial Paper Committee.f?
The Board of Grievances is divided into three circuits, corresponding to the field of
administrative law, commercial law and criminal cases mostly related to commercial
dealings," which is the third circuit. Each circuit has two levels, the circuit level (Court of
first instance) and the appellate panel, which renders final decisions on appea1.62 In relation to
the former, the lack of satisfactory definition of what constitutes a commercial dispute is a
source of uncertainty. A major problem stems from the separation between the Board and the
Shari'a courts because there is a grey area around the definition of "commercial disputes",
the term that determines the conflict and, therefore, the competent court involved for
resolving the dispute. In general, foreign investors prefer cases to be heard before the Board
57 The term "Grievances" in Arabic Mazalim means to exceed the defined limits, as well as injustice and
oppression. Diwan is the place where grievances are dealt with. See Ulian, S., Qada AI-Mazalim fi Al-Islam,
(The Grievances' Rule in Islam), 2nd ed. Riyadh: Dar AI-Rasheed for Publications & Distributions, 1980), p. 49,
(in Arabic).
58 AbdulJawad, M., AI-Tattawwur al-Tashrye Fi al Mamlaka aI-Arabia al-Saudiya, (Judicial Evolution in the
KSA) Egypt: 1397 H. (1977), p. 155 (In Arabic) cited by AI- Samman, Y., supra note 10, p. 222.
59 Royal Decree No. Ml13/8759 dated 17/9/1374 H. (1955).
60 Commercial Paper Committee will be highlighted shortly in this chapter.
61 A number of different acts have been ,passed in which certain crimes and their respective punishments are
specified. According to the 1983 Act, the Board may try five types of penal cases, namely, 1) Bribery 2) Forgery
3) Crimes listed in Royal Decree No. 43 of 19564) Crimes specified in the Managing Public Finance Act and 5)
Crimes defined in different Acts referred to the Board by orders from the President of the Council of Ministers.
See Clause 1 (f) of Article 8 of the Board 1983 Act.
61 It should be noted however, that the legal reforms of 2007 has changed the BG to be solely an administrative
court consists of Supreme Administrative Court, Administrative Courts of Appeal, and Administrative Courts.
See Article 8 of the Law of the Board of Grievances. See also generally, Law Office of Hassan Mahassni and
White & Case LLP, General Description of the Current Legal System and Dispute Resolution in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, (2000).
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rather than the Shari'a court, as the judges in the Board are generally expected to have more
knowledge and expertise in commercial law, international law and international commercial
arbitration principles.
One special feature of the Board of Grievances is that its judges may consult judicially-
appointed legal and technical experts. Thus they are able to consider cases that are more
complex in the Shari'a Courts. As with the decisions of other courts, the decisions of the
Board of Grievances remain mostly unpublished.Y
Following the economic boom of 1970s, and the extensive involvement of government
agencies in contractual relationships with private parties, the government of Saudi Arabia felt
that the Board of Grievance needed to be restructured and accorded greater judicial powers to
deal with all types of cases involving the government or any of its agencies, and private
foreign and local parties. Consequently, the Board of Grievances was restructured by the
1983 Code.64
Although the Board as defined by Article 1 of the Code is an autonomous judicial body
which possesses an exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases, importantly it is under
this Article, linked directly to the King. Accordingly, the president of the Board was still
directly responsible to the King who had exclusive authority to either approve or reject the
Board's findings. This is a matter which would be automatically perceived by foreign
investors as a contradiction, due to the fact that its very autonomy is threatened by the
superior executive power of King. However, if the Board, by modifying Article 1 of the
63 SAGIA, The Legal Background to Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian General Investment
Authority, (2003).
64 The BG. Code, Royal Decree No. MIS 1 dated 171711402 H. (1983).
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Board's Code, separates from direct linkage to the King and enjoys the equitable autonomy
of the Shari' a courts, this might allay foreign investor apprehensions and thus restore
confidence in the Saudi Arbitration system.
With the growing importance of foreign investment in the country, the government
thought of restructuring the Board to give it more judicial authority to deal with all cases
where the government is involved with private foreign investors. In 1983 the Board was
restructured under a new Code to become a judicial administrative tribunal. According to
Article 8, the Board has jurisdiction over claims submitted by government civil servants
against the government, and appeals filed by interested parties from administrative decisions
on the grounds of formal defects, violations of applicable codes and their implementation
rules and abuse of power.65 The jurisdiction of the Board also includes claims for
compensation against the government, disputes concerning agreements between government
agencies and private parties; disciplinary cases involving civil servants and criminal cases
under the Anti-Bribery Code and Anti-Forgery Code."
It remains a fact, however, that the Board of Grievances has a heavy volume of cases
and as a result, the dispute resolution process before it is lengthier than in Shari'a Courts. A
case may take between one and two years before a first instance decision, without taking into
account any appeal. Although the Board is generally considered to be a fair and independent
forum for hearing disputes and has the advantage of being better equipped to hear complex
cases, one of the major disadvantages is the length of time it takes to reach a final
65 The Board, however, lacks the jurisdiction over appeals against administrative decisions of Special
Committees such as that of the Foreign Capital Investment Committee whereby a foreign investor has the right
to appeal against a decision of the Committee. See Article 10 of the 1979 Foreign Capital Investment Code
(FCIC).
66 For a detailed examination of the procedures and judgments of the Board, see AI- Samaan, Y., supra note 33,
pp.227-232.
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judgement.f" Foreign investors also take the view that local courts lack sufficient knowledge
and expertise to deal with sophisticated investment transactions. Foreign investors see the
publicity attached to local court hearings as an infringement of their confidential investment
dealings.68 It should be stated that, the actual practice of the Board is quite different to what
the Rules lay down." However, since as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the decisions of
these local courts remain mostly unpublished. There is an absence of officially published and
publically-available precedents from the Shari'a courts and the BO. Consequently, there is no
means of tracking the results of the judgements for foreign investors, thereby making it
difficult to predict in advance the result of a case based on legal precedents. Hence, due to a
lack of knowledge oflegal precedents, a judge may, for a similar case in another court, issue
a completely different judgement. This is likely to fall short of many foreign investors'
expectations, particularly for those who are familiar with western legal systems. Foreign
investors expect a certain degree of predictability on judicial decisions and the Saudi judicial
system has difficulty meeting international standards in this area. Investors also do not trust
the impartiality of local courts. It is crucial that judges should perform their duties without
any intervention; because it is an aspect of the rule of law. Some investors would therefore
prefer arbitration as the means to settle any disputes arising from their investment transaction.
I
This issue is examined in chapter six during the detailed discussion of the settlement of
investment disputes through arbitration in Saudi Arabia.
67 Shoult, A., Doing Business with Saudi Arabia, 3rd ed. London: GMB Publishing Ltd, (2006), p. 93.
68 Al-Samaan, Y., The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of Domestic Arbitration in Saudi
Arabia, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.3 (1994), pp. 217-237.
69 Article 15 of the Procedural Rules before the BG 1989 provides that the hearings of the Board must take place
in public, subject to one exception. The panel may hear the case in private if the panel concerned believes that to
hear it in public would be in breach of the accepted standards of morality and public policy. However,
regardless of whether the hearing itself is in public or in private, the pronouncement of the final decision of the
panel must be in public. This raises the question as to what constitutes morality and public policy and what does
not, because the Rules do not explain what is meant by morality and public policy. Such vague terms may lead
to the panel preventing the public (including foreign investors) from attending a hearing beyond what could be
justified on these grounds.
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1.3.3 Limited Jurisdiction Administrative Tribunals and Special
Committees
Numerous ministries and government agencies have been granted limited authority to
establish committees to hear specific categories of cases. Although these committees are all
formed under the authority of a ministry, the dispute resolution mechanism is tightly
regulated to ensure independ~nce. These specialised administrative tribunals have statutes of
limitation, and there are limited rights of appeal. However, the judgements made in all these
bodies may be appealed to the BG. To enhance our understanding of the government bodies
that allow for some settlement of disputes and commercial claims, the following is a general
overview of these government bodies.
(i) Commercial Paper Committee
The Commercial Paper Committee is also known as the Office for the Settlement of
Commercial Paper Disputes. This committee has jurisdiction to hear claims concerning bills
of exchange, promissory notes and cheques70. Its powers come from the Negotiable
Instruments Law.71
(ii) Agency Conciliation Committee
The Committee for Conciliation of Commercial Agency Disputes was established
within the Chamber of Commerce in 1992. The Committee mediates where foreign
companies experience difficulties in changing agents or distributors, due to conflicts with
former agents. If Conciliation Committee mediation should fail, the matter is referred to the
70 The Negotiable Instruments Office, within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, includes the Commercial
Paper Committee, established by the Law of Negotiable Instruments Law, Royal Decree No. M/37 (1964)
71 The Law largely reproduces the provisions of the Geneva Conventions Providing a Uniform Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes of June 7, 1930 and for Cheques of March 9, 1931, even though Saudi Arabia
has not become a party to the conventions themselves.
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Board of Grievances, but in most cases its decisions will follow recommendations of the
Conciliation Committee. There is also a Commission for Labour Disputes and a Committee
for Settlement of Banking Disputes for the purpose of settling disputes between banks and
their clients arising from contracts and transactions which do not concern commercial papers
such as bills of exchange and letter of credits.
(iii) Investment Disputes Settlement Committee
Article 26 of the Rules of Implementation under the Foreign Investment Regulations
promulgated in April 2000 provides for the General Investment Authority,72 to establish a
committee comprised of three members, one whom must be a legal advisor. Article 26
requires such a committee to amicably settle differences arising between the parties referred
to in Article 26 of the Foreign Investment Regulations. The differences referred to in Article
26 include both differences between the government and foreign investors=' and the
differences between a foreign investor and its Saudi partner, if any. In both cases, the effect
of Article 26 is that if any such difference is not settled amicably before the Investment
Disputes Settlement Committee, the relevant parties the dispute shall be settled through
arbitration according to the Arbitration Act and its executive rules issued by Royal Decree
No. (46) Dated 12.7.1403 H.74 In the case of unresolved differences between the government
and a foreign investor, such litigation would be within the jurisdiction of an Administrative
Division of the Board of Grievances. Unresolved differences between the foreign investor
72 The General Investment Authority reports to the Supreme Economic Council, which was established pursuant
to the Supreme Economic Council Regulations promulgated under Royal Decree No. Al111 dated 28/08/1999.
The General Investment Authority, was itself established pursuant to the Regulations of the General Investment
Authority promulgated under Council of Ministers Resolution N. 2 dated 10/04/2000, administers the Foreign
Investment Regulations.
73 It is not yet clear whether disputes arising out of noncompliance with the terms of an investment license
issued under the new Foreign Investment Regulations will be required to be referred to the new committee,
before being dealt with by the Board of Grievances.
74 See Article 26 of the Executive Rules of Foreign Investment Act 2000, available in SAGIA website at:
http://www.sagia.gov.sa!Documents/Foreign Investment Act.pdf. Accessed on 14/1112009.
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and its Saudi partner would come under the jurisdiction of a Commercial Division of the
Board of Grievances.
The application of international law by the Saudi Courts is based on Article 81 of the
Constitution that adopts a monist approach" to international law. The national courts are
therefore allowed to overrule the domestic rules and interpret international treaty provisions,
which have been approved by the Saudi government, in harmony with international practice.
This raises the further question of the relationship between the Saudi legal system and
that of international law as far as it concerns foreign investment. The following discussion
highlights international legal perspective to illustrate the legal effects of international treaties
relating to foreign investment in the Saudi domestic legal system. In other words it addresses
the question of to what extent international treaties have an influence on the position of
foreign investment in Saudi Arabia.
1.4 Legal effects of international treaties in domestic law
Saudi Arabia has entered into and ratified many international and regional conventions
and protocols. These conventions are sources of international law which are applied by the
International Court of Justice. These international conventions are establishing rules
expressly recognised by the contesting States." Other sources of international law are
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and the general
75 Monism/dualism debate is highlighted later on in this chapter.
76 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note, 8. The Court may also decide a case
ex aequo et bono (according to what is just and good), if the parties agree thereto. Furthermore, in terms of
Article 59, the decision of the Court is only binding between the parties and in respect of that particular case.
For the management and peaceful resolution through the IeJ, see Peck C and Lee R (eds.), Increasing the
effectiveness of the international court of justice: Proceedings of the ICJIUNITAR Colloquium to celebrate the
5(jh Anniversary of the Court, Martinus NijhoffPublishers, (1997). See also Singh, N., The Rule and Record of
the International Court of Justice, Martinus NijhoffPublishers, (1989), p. 376.
34
principles of law recognised by civilised nations. These are supported by subsidiary sources
for the determination of rules of law by highly qualified publicists of the various nations and
judicial decisions."
Any discussion of the relationship between international and municipal law involves the
controversy that exists between the theories of monism and dualism. Monism implies that
international law in the form of a treaty may, without legislation, become part of domestic
law once such treaty has been concluded in accordance with the constitution and has come
into force." Dualism, on the other hand, means that international law is separate from
municipal law and that a treaty has no special status in domestic law unless specific
legislation is in force to give effect to such treaty." This controversy between the two
theories has divided international lawyers over many years. This distinction is most relevant
when considering whether a national court should apply a rule of international law. The main
issue is whether international law and national law are two separate legal orders, existing
independently of one another, and if so, on what basis it be said that either is superior to the
other (dualist view); or whether they are both part of the same order (monist view).8o
Although these systems may in some cases come into conflict, thus giving rise to problems of
conflict of law, each country has its own conflict rules whereby it settles such problems
77 For an examination of international law and States, international organisations and regimes and individuals
see chapter 4 on International Personality in Wallace R, International Law, 4th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell,
(2002). See also Janis M, An Introduction to International Law, 2nd edition, Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, (1993). For a recent study of the United Nations Legal Order (UNLO) see Joyner C (ed.), The United
Nation and International Law, The American Society ofInternational Law (ASIL), Cambridge University Press,
(1997).
78 See Aust A, Modern Treaty Law in Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2000), p.l43, and his
discussion of the group of countries which include France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia and
Switzerland with a monist approach to international law.
79 Ibid, p. 150 - countries with a dualist approach include the United Kingdom and most commonwealth
countries.
80 Fitzmaurice stated that "the controversy is unreal, artificial and strictly beside the point, because there is no
common field in which the two legal systems simultaneously have their spheres of activity". See Harris D, Cases
and Materials on International Law, 5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, (1998), p.68. Thus, the general view is that
there cannot be conflict between rules belonging to different judicial orders, and consequently, in particular
between international and national law.
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arising before its own courts. Therefore, there can be no conflict between the two systems in
the domestic field, for any conflict will be settled by domestic conflict rules and any conflict
between them in the international field, would be resolved by international law, because in
that field international law is not only supreme, but in effect the only system there is.
Domestic law does not apply in the international field: the supremacy of international law
exists because of the field of operation, not because of the inherent supremacy of
international law."
The recognition of international law is given in Article 70 of the 1993 Saudi Arabia
Constitution, which states that 'International treaties, agreements, regulations and
concessions are approved and amended by Royal decree'. Furthermore, this is emphasised in
Chapter 9 of the Constitution's General Provisions, where Article 81 states that 'The
implementation of law will not prejudice the treaties and agreements signed by the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia with international bodies and organisations'rf Saudi therefore adopted a
monist approach to the application of international law , which is in line with the general rules
of international law that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed in good faith.s3 Therefore a treaty which has been ratified by the State and which
has entered into force internationally automatically becomes part of the law of the State,
without any separate act of incorporation or transformation."
81 Ibid.
82 The international treatises and conventions can be seen the right mechanisms to create universal laws which
can govern the relation between the different ideologies or legal systems. For more discussion see
Maniruzzaman, A., Choice of Law in International Contracts - Some Fundamental Conflict of Laws Issues,
iournal of international arbitration, (1999) pp.141-172.
3 The fundamental principle of the law of treaties: pacta sunt servanda laid down in Article 26 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See text in 63 AJIL, (1969), p. 875.
84 See Brownlie, I., Principles of Public international law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1998). See also
Brownlie, I., Basic Documents in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1995); Franck, T.,
Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford University Press, (1995). On the examination of
international law in Islamic countries see, Shaheen, Gender and human rights in Islam and international law :
equal before Allah, unequal before man?, Kluwer Law International, (2000).
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On the basis of Article 81 international treaties have a direct effect and replace
conflicting domestic laws and regulations.P In addition, Article 67 states that 'the regulatory
authority (the consultative council) lays down regulations and motions to meet the interests of
the State or remove what is bad in its affairs, in accordance with the Islamic Shari'a. On the
basis of the above, the domestic courts are allowed to disregard stringent domestic rules and
interpret international treaty provisions in harmony with international practice. Thus,
according to Al-Shareef, international arbitration agreements entered into by the State or one
of its agencies would subordinate the Saudi legal system to the rules of the arbitral
tribunals.86
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the main sources of law. We' have seen that a Muslim Ruler
(Imam) can legislate new solutions for new problems from both the principles of Shari 'a and
considerations of public interests. The chapter also considered the Shari'a courts and their
status as courts of general jurisdiction, and that Shari'a law remains the fundamental basis of
the legal system. It has been stated that the Board of Grievances, with all its shortcomings,
has the exclusive power to decide disputes over Saudi government contracts and also some
types of commercial and investment disputes. It may be useful if the Board is encouraged to'
enhance and develop the use of outside well accredited technical and legal experts to assist in
deciding some complex cases where foreign investment is an issue." Saudi Arabia is a party
to a number of international conventions and their effects on domestic law has been noted.
8S Article 81 of the Basic Law stipulates that "The implementation of this law will not prejudice the treaties and
agreements signed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with international bodies and organisations",
86 AI-Shareef, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia: Grounds for Refusal under Article (V)
of the New York Convention of 1958, PhD Thesis, CEMPLP, University of Dundee, (2000), p. 65.
87 According to Article 24 of the Procedural Rules, the Board has the power to examine and adjudicate technical
and legal issues. In practice, however, the Board refers questions about governmental contracts to the Saudi
House for Consultative Services (SHCS). Mahassni argues that international standards of fair trial and due
process would suggest that as long as the SHCS is owned and their staff are paid by the government, the Board
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In conclusion, it has to be stated that although the legal framework in Saudi Arabia has
gone through a series of changes over the ten years (Foreign Investment Law in 2000 and
judicial reforms in 2007) which has brought improvements to the legal system, the changes in
the Saudi judicial system are not yet complete. From a foreign investor's perspective, the
government has not yet gone far enough in its reform efforts. In most cases, although these
changes have brought improvements they have also created a greater sense of legal
uncertainty for both foreign investors and Saudis alike. Often, there is a long delay between
the adoption of a regulation and the implementation of its rules making it difficult for foreign
investors to judge how certain commercial disputes would be addressed under Saudi law. In
addition, the lack of any published, and easily accessible, system of legal 'precedent and the
great degree of discretion that government officials can frequently exercise in interpreting
and applying regulations usually makes it difficult to apply clearly established rules to a
particular situation. That is why a clear national legal system and a transparent judicial
system are so important for foreign investment. In the absence of clear rules on investment
protection, capital-exporting states have found it desirable that they should give as much
protection as possible to their investors by insisting on international treaties with a mandatory
arbitration clause as protection to their nationals. Thus, the next chapter will examine the
efforts of the Saudi government in the protection of foreign investment under Saudi domestic
law, relevant international law and through bilateral and multilateral conventions on the
promotion and protection of foreign investments In Saudi Arabia.
should not refer any case to it. Mahassni, H., & Grenley, N., Public Sector Dispute Resolutions in Saudi Arabia:
Procedures and Practices of Saudi Arabia's Administrative Court, International Lawyer, Vol. 21, (Summer
1987), p. 840.
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(2) THE STABILITY OF INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS UNDER SAUDI LAW
Introduction
An investment agreement! is capable of being an effective instrument for the protection
of foreign investment. It provides the eventual basis for the parties' legal status, and therefore
offers legal security for their investment. Good governance, transparency, stability and
predictability are indispensable foundations for FDI. If these basic political and legal features
are lacking, other factors such as abundant natural resources, low taxes, or low labour costs
will not be as effective as they could be. Legal instability and inadequate security in a country
disrupt most foreign and domestic investments. Stability of key investment conditions is at
the heart of investor concerns, and therefore at the centre of negotiations for a specific
contractual regime or the proper design of a standard regulatory regime. This is particularly
so for natural resources and energy projects where the duration of the investment is
particularly long.' The neutralisation of the power of the state to change the contract is seen
as essential to the stability of foreign investment contracts.' The stability of such agreements
under Saudi law and under internationally accepted norms governing FDI is thus of great
importance to foreign investors.
1 The terms "contract" and "agreement" are used in this study interchangeably without distinguishing between
them. Contractual practice in the field suggests their interchangeability.
2 Walde, T., Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law versus Contract
Interpretations, CEPMLP, (1994), p. 5.
3 Somarajah, M., infra note 88, p. 417.
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This chapter is in three parts. The first examines the fundamental principles of Shari'a
in the field of contract and international business transactions. The. second will explain the
differences in theory and practice between Shari'a and western legal systems in order to
prove that similarities exist along with the differences. The final part of the chapter will
examine the concept of mineral ownership under Shari' a in Saudi Arabia. This is followed by
an examination of the Saudi government's legal reforms in respect of title to mineral and
investment laws.
The first two parts of this chapter are divided into 4 sections. The first section focuses
on the importance of understanding the nature of Shari'a in respect of the contractual
relationship and how Islamic contracts developed historically. The various types of Islamic
contracts, including the concept of the 'Nominated' and 'Non-nominated' contracts, are
highlighted along with the important principle of freedom of contract. Section 2 examines the
fundamental principles lying at the root of contractual relations in Shari'a which come from
its Islamic historical heritage. These are likely to continue, for the foreseeable future, to
influence the attitudes of foreign investors towards commercial partnership with the
government of Saudi Arabia. The chapter will also argue that, although the rules of the holy
Quran are seen by Muslims as eternal and immutable, they can be interpreted to suit new
situations, allowing Muslim states to legislate and regulate their worldly affairs in harmony
with other states and in harmony with Shari'a. Therefore, it follows that questions should be
asked as to the capacity of Shari'a to develop and adapt itself to the exigencies of time and
place to meet modem requirements. An analysis of concession agreements and their
characteristics with a description of production sharing, service, non-risk and risk service
agreements and the combination of production sharing risk service contracts then follows.
Section 3 is an overview of the fundamental similarities and differences between Shari'a and
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western contract laws. The final section is an examination of the reality of the situation. It
seeks to establish whether there remains a problem in Islamic contractual practice, or if the
problem is more of a misconception and misunderstanding because conventional businesses
think that there are no specific rules or structured laws in Islamic law to regulate modem
businesses.
2.1 The Nature of Contract Law
The law of contract is at the heart of all legal systems including that of Islam.4 Some
knowledge of legal history is vital for a proper understanding of Islamic contract law, as it is
for any other legal system. The main focus of this chapter is a survey of the historical and
theoretical issues regarding Islamic contract law and its influence on the legal and policy
arrangements for foreign investments in Saudi Arabia. Agreements are required for the
administration and regulation of international transactions. That confluence of legal systems
and concepts in international commercial agreements is an inevitable consequence of
globalisation and represents a challenge to Islamic legal systems as they seek to open up for
FDI. Therefore, this part of the thesis is concerned with the analysis and examination of the
principles of commercial contracts under Shari'a.
Coulson emphasises the fact that. international commercial transactions in the Islamic
legal system have a long history of remarkable success in part due to the flexibility and
validity of Shari'a law.s Just as Western systems have some historical links with religion and
4 Fox, W., International Commercial Agreements, 3rded., Kluwer Law Inti, (1998), p. 35. See also Coulson, N.,
infra note 5, pp. 17,27-31.
S Coulson, N., Commercial Law in the Gulf States, the Islamic Legal Tradition, London: Graham & Tortman,
(1984), p. 9. He also stressed that contract in Islamic law is in no sense the precise equivalent of the technical
term contract in Western jurisprudence, which involves, certainly at the common law, the two basic essentials of
agreement and consideration, p, 18.
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religious practices", legal systems in Muslim countries are similar as they are based on
Shari'a.7 However, due to the influence of globalisation, international commercial
agreements are becoming increasingly crucial, and these require aspects of law from western
legal systems including rules on contracts for the sale of goods or services. Parties to any
agreements are free to make any arrangements they choose as regards transportation, risk and
other elements of the transaction.
In the West, commercial law is generally described as "that branch of law which is
concerned with rights and duties arising from supply of goods and services in the way of
trade".8 As discussed in Chapter 2, the growth of commerce in countries with legal systems
based on Islamic law in recent decades has created a pressing need to develop new codes of
law that remain in harmony with the mandatory principles of Shari'a but which at the same
time, are more suited to the commercial realities of cross border trade and investment. Shari'a
must co-exist with western and secular legal systems.
2.2 The Nature of Contract under Shari 'a
I
In order to demonstrate the principle of freedom of contract under Shari' a in
contemporary commercial contracts, it is necessary to consider firstly its development from
the fundamental principles of Islamic contractual law through to the actual practice within
commercial life in Islamic countries today. First, we look at the fundamental principles of the
meaning of contract in Islam, how it developed into commercial contracts and a survey of the
various types of contracts most commonly found in both systems, and their characteristics.
6 Fox, W., supra note 4, p. 35. .
1 It should be noted, however, that not all predominantly Muslim countries employ strict Shari'a law - e.g.
Turkey and some Mediterranean and Central Asian countries - have legal systems which are more secular in
character. Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most "purely" Shari'a based but there is a huge range of variety that
meant obviously not to contradict with Shari'a. In other words, the Saudi legal system is derived from different
sources oflaw but these sources are all subject and subservient to Shari'a.
8 Goode, R, Commercial Law Text. Cases and Materials. 2nd ed. Viking, (1982), pp. 8-9.
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The traditional Shari'a rules of contractual obligations were expounded in their definitive
formulation in a number of legal manuals composed by jurists during the period of the tenth
and eleventh century. One of their early tasks was to define the meaning of contract.
2.2.1 Fundamental Principles of Contract under Shari'a
In common law, the essence of contract lies not in the simple fact of agreement but in
the 'promise' expressed by the parties in the contract." Generally speaking, a contract in
Shari'a is basically a legally recognised undertaking, similar to the meaning in the western
legal systems. The Arabic word for contract is 'Aqd ', It comes from the root verb 'Aqada'
which means to tie or bind. It denotes the tying of the twin elements of offer and acceptance
of contracting parties. 10 The codification of the general principles of contracts under Shari'a
took place in 1877 and became known as AI-Majallah.11 It comprised rules from the Hanafi
School of Islamic Jurisprudence. Contract is defined in Articles 103 and 104 of the Al-
Majallah as follows:
"I03- What the parties bind themselves and undertake to do with reference to a particular
matter. It is composed of the combination of offer and acceptance.
I 04.., The conclusion of a contract consists of connecting offer and acceptance together
legally in such a manner that the result may be perfectly clear ".12
9 Zweigert, K. & H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. Vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
(1987), p. 7. See also footnote 24 infra.
10 Al-Samman, Y., The Legal Security of Private Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, PhD
thesis, Dundee University, CEPMLP, (1993), p. 128.
II Al-Majallah or Majallat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah (Journal of Justice Rulings) issued in the late nineteenth
century by the Ottoman government to standardise the rules operative in courts of law throughout the Ottoman
Empire. The 99 rules stated in its preamble explain basic principles of Islamic law. They are expressed in
concise form. Placing them in a special subject was very apt. The codification has influenced the later
regulations ofIslamic countries including Saudi Arabia. See Vogel, F., Islamic law and Legal System: Studies of
Saudi Arabia, Leiden, Brill, (2000), pp. 284-285.
12 English text of Al-Majallab's rules available at: http://www.ummah.net!Al adaab/fiqhlmajaIIaiindex.html.
Accessed on 07/03/09.
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Shari' a, however, allows for exceptions to the application of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda, where the performance of the obligation in the contract becomes impossible or
unbearably difficult to one of the parties due to the occurrence of supervening or unforeseen
circumstances.P or where it declares forbidden that which is allowed or declares allowed that
which is forbidden under the law." On the other hand, the traditional position of English
common law is that contracts are absolute. IS However, in English common law, the doctrine
of frustration 16 was devised to deal with situations involving impossibility of performance, It
can be viewed as an exception to the general principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements
should be kept), which is basic to both civil law and common law jurisdictions.l"
Although in secular law imprevision may be an exception to the general rule, the
Shari'a takes a rather different view. The late Professor Coulson pointed this out with his
usual brilliance: 18
In English law the sanctity of contract means that the promise endures despite
the normal vicissitudes of fortune. It is right that the promise should be kept
'for better or for worse', 'through thick and thin', because this in line with the
13 Civil codes of the most GCC countries have incorporated what is referred as the Theory of imp revision by
which the courts are empowered to intervene in exceptional cases to offer a distressed party to a contract "at
least a measure of relief from the rigours of the rule that pacta sunt servanda". See generally. Ballantyne, W.,
Secular Law and the Shari 'a: Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Theory of Imprevision, in Essays and Addresses on
Arab Laws, Surrey: Curzon Press (2000), pp. 236-241.
14 Hadith, "All the conditions agreed upon by the Muslims are upheld, except a condition which allows what is
prohibited or prohibits what is lawful".
IS Woolman, S., Contract, Edinburgh: Sweet & Maxwell, (1994), p. 195. See also generally Treitel, G., infra
note 16.
16 "Among the circumstances which will frustrate a contract are: destruction of the subject matter, supervening
illegality, supervening impossibility through government interference, inability to produce a necessary consent
of a third party ... , and a fundamental change in the basis of the contract". For more discussion on these issues
see generally, Atiyah, P., An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Oxford: University Press, (2006), pp. 229-
244. See also Treitel, G., Frustration and Force Majeure, London: Sweet & Maxwell, (2004), Chapter seven.
17 De Cruz, P., Comparative Law in a Changing World, 3,d ed. London: Routledge-Cavendish, (2007), p. 326.
For more analysis of the issue "frustration of contract, impossibility and supervening events" under civil and
common laws, see the same publication at pp. 324-327.
18 Ballantyne, W., Construction Contracts in Arab Jurisdictions, in Essays and Addresses on Arab Laws,
Surrey: Curzon Press (2000), p. 274.
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popular belief that tenacity of purpose to some degree controls events and that
the human will determines the future. The promise must dominate the
circumstances. For Islam precisely the converse is true. Circumstances
dominate the promise. Future circumstances are neither predictable nor
controllable but lie entirely in the hands of the Almighty .... If the tide of
affairs turns then the promise naturally floats out with it.19
The legal concept of good faith is largely a moral concept comprised of notions of
fairness. The moral aspect of good faith necessarily leads to uncertainty regarding the
meaning of good faith because moral standards differ based on the people, the context and the
circumstances involved.'? The doctrine of good faith has long been recognised by continental
law. Recently, it has been gradually absorbed by a number of common law jurisdictions.
English law has hitherto declined to adopt a general principle of good faith but was able to
offer specific solutions to a wide range of issues which involve the question of unfairness."
Even it is accepted that good faith provides a more secure conceptual foundation for the rule,
it is not an argument in favour of a change in the present substantive law. Rather, it is an
argument which relates to the way in which we organise or classify the existing rules. The
point of the argument is that the principal reason for the refusal of English law to recognise
the doctrine is not to be found in its likely substantive effects. It has more to do with the
approach which English law adopts to the recognition of general principles than to the
content of the law itself_22As for international foreign investment law, among the general
19 Coulson, N., supra note 4, p. 81. Also cited by ibid p. 274.
20 Barnes, N., Good Faith under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: a Struggle
for Meaning. available at: http://www.dundee.ac.uklcepmlp/carihtmllCAR9 ARTICLEI4.pdf. Accessed on
15/03/09. It should be noted that good faith is an important feature in Convention contracts such as Vienna
Convention, the UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract Law (Article 2.301).
21 Beatson, 1., & D., Friedmann, Goodfaith andfault in contract law, Oxford University Press, (1997), pp. 14-
15.
22 McKendrick, E., Good Faith: A matter of Principle? in Forte, A, Good Faith in Contract and Property Law,
Oxford: Hart Publishing, (1999), p.44.
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principles with a broad scope of application, the requirement to observe the rule of good faith
is especially pertinent to the law of foreign investment, and investment tribunals have had
recourse to this principle. In part, this emphasis on good faith reflects the fundamental
significance of the concept for the understanding of all obligations in intemationallaw. 23
The above dispensation as exhibited by Shari'a is a reflection of the principle of 'good
faith' required of Muslims in all they do, and particularly in matters affecting the rights of
others. The Quran, in saying, 4(0ye, who believe, perform all contractual obligations ",24
commands Muslims to perform conscientiously all promises or agreements they make or
enter into. Accordingly, Muslims are required to fulfil their promises by performing their
agreements and obligations not just as a matter of technicality, but more as a matter of duty
required by their belief-system.f The equality principle is also of great importance in the
theory of Islamic contracts, in that all contracting parties are regarded as equal partners. This
was not the case in the early concessions which were weighted heavily towards the foreign
oil companies as discussed earlier." The above attempt to balance the imperatives of
contractual stability shows the capability of Shari'a in providing rules applicable to modern
investment agreements. The above also examines the concept of contracts under Shari'a and
other legal systems as well as Shari'a's basic principles relevant to foreign investmerit
agreements which are dealt with in this chapter.
23 Dolzer, R., & Schreuer, C., Principles of International Investment Law, Oxford: University Press, (2008), p.
5, see particularly note 10 for examples of investment tribunals. See, e.g., Article 31 (1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
r.urpose", cited at note 11.
4 Holy Quran, 5: 1.
25 For a discussion of the doctrine of good faith and its requirement under Shari'a especially in commercial
transactions, see Majeed, N., Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from Shari 'a, Arbitration International.
Vol. 20, No.1, (2004), pp. 97-112.
26 For more discussion see chapter 4 infra. See also Cattan, H., The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East
and North Africa, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., (1967), p.I26.
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2.2.2 Development of Commercial Contracts under Shari'a
The purpose of this chapter is to address concerns expressed by foreign investors about
the certainty and clarity of rules and decision making under Shari'a in the context of making
and securing FDI. Therefore, an explanation of the fundamental principles of Shari'a in the
field of agreements and business transactions is necessary. These concerns are due to the fact
that foreign investors are naturally more interested in whether or not a contract or an
agreement under Shari'a suits and secures their investment activities in Saudi Arabia.
Advocating the significance of the formative elements of a valid contract in their
treatment of the conditions of substantive areas of the law, Muslim scholars, through the
concept of '!jtihad',27 have analysed the constituent elements of contracts that formed the
basic foundations by which a contract is validly concluded. These elements are called 'Arkan '
(pillars), of which the five most important for any nominate contracr" are as followsr"
(i) Agreemen t
An agreement is made between a seller who sells and delivers the product to the buyer
who purchases, receives and pays for the product or services on terms and conditions set
forth. There must be mutual agreement between the parties with an unambiguous offer -
'!jab' - and an unequivocal acceptance - 'Qabul'. The term 'agreement' has a variety of
meanings. However, in this context, it may be used to acknowledge the existence of a legally
binding contract'" that can be enforceable in a court of law.
27 For terminology of Ijtihad see chapter 1 of the thesis supra, pp. 20-21.
28 Nominate contracts "Uqood Musammat" are contracts that are widely known by specific names - e.g.
Mudarabah, Ijarah, Murabaha .. etc - see the forgoing discussion of the chapter.
29 Rayner, S., The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law, l" ed. Springer, (1991), p.1 04.
30 Contrast this with the classic definition of contract in Anglo-American Jurisprudence thus: a contract is any
"promise or set of promises made by one party to another for the breach of which the law provides a remedy, or
the performance of which the law in some way recognises as a duty". The promise or promises may be
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(ii) Consent and Intention to Contract
Consent has two common meanings. One is a general agreement among the members of
a given group or community. The other is as a theory and practice of getting such
agreements." There must be a mutual agreement between the parties with an unambiguous
offer and an unequivocal acceptance, the Quran states:
"0 ye who believe, squander not your wealth among yourselves in vanity, except it be trade
by mutual consent". 32
Theoretically, offer and acceptance are expressed and must demonstrate a definite and
present intention to contract. The parties to a contract should enter into it of their own free
will and must not be subject to coercion or duress. In addition, Shari'a encourages parties to
record their agreements in writing which could be considered not only as a proof of the
contract but also as an evidence of consent. The Quran states:
"0 you who believe whenever you contract a debt,33 for a stated 'timeperiod, then do it in
writing".34
expressed - either written or oral - or may be implied from circumstances. Typically, the remedy for breach of
contract is an award of money damages intended to restore the injured party to the economic position the he or
she expected to from performance of the promise or promises (known as "expectation measure" of damages).
Occasionally, a court will order a party to perform his or her promise (an order of "specific performance" or
"quantum meruit"), but this remedy is unusual. In civil law, contracts are considered to be part of the general
law of obligation. See Fox, W., supra note 4, pp. 48-9.
31 The process of achieving consensus involves serious treatment of every group member's considered opinion,
and a collective trust in each member's discretion in follow-up action. In an ideal case, those who wish to take
some action want to hear those who oppose it because they count on the fact that the ensuing debate will
improve the consensus. In theory, action without resolution of considered opposition will be rare, and done with
attention to minimize damage to relationships.
32 Holy Quran, 4:29.
33 It should be noted that the word "debt" mentioned in the verse includes all types of transactions, including
contracts.
34 Holy Quran, 2:282. The Quran is one of the four main sources which form the basis of Islam. The second
source is the Sunnah of the Prophet (the acts and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed "pbuh "). What makes the
Quran different from the Sunnah is primarily its form. Unlike the Sunnah, the Quran is quite literally the Word
of Allah, whereas the Sunnah was inspired by Allah but the wording and actions are the Prophet's. The Quran
has not been expressed using any human's words. Its wording is litter for litter fixed by no one but Allah. The
other two sources are Ijma' (consensus of opinion) and Quiyas (reasoning by analogy). For more discussion on
these sources of Islamic law, see chapter 1 supra.
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However, Islamic contract law recognises both express contracts as well as what has
been described in common law as contract by conduct. It presupposes the making of a
contract either orally or by writing or by conduct.P Similarly, common law does not require
that contracts be in writing. Certain statutory provisions in each jurisdiction, however, require
that certain contracts be in writing or that they be evidenced by a written memorandum or
note. Where a contract does not comply, it is usually rendered unenforceable, rather than
void."
(iii) Capacity of Contracting Parties to Agreement
Generally speaking, under western legal systems of contract laws based on a 'Common
Law system' and 'Civil Law system' both parties must have the capacity to understand the
terms of the agreement they are entering into, and the consequences of the promises they
make. For example, minors and mentally disabled individuals do not have the capacity to
form a contract, and any contracts with them will be considered void or voidable.V Although
corporations are technically legal fictions, they are considered persons under the law, and are
fit to engage in contracts. For adults, most jurisdictions have statutes declaring that the
capacity of parties to a contract is presumed. This means that anyone who is resisting
enforcement of a contract on grounds that a party lacked the capacity to be bound bears the
burden of proof on the issue of capacity. The position in Saudi Arabia concerning the above
is based on the following extract from the Quran:
35 Ramadan, H., infra note 58, at p. 105.
36 Gillies, P., Business Law, 12th ed., Australia: Federation Press, (2004), p. 3'85.
37 For example: In common law, a minor is an individual who is under 21 years of age. The common law
definition of age has been replaced by statutory definitions in most provinces. The reason for this rule is that
minors are presumed to be naive, inexperienced and easily taken advantage of, so some protection is required.
Olivo, M., Fundamentals of Contract Law, Emond Montgomery Publication, (2005), p. 46. Another example of
Civil law is that under Spanish contract law, parties must have the capacity to enter into contractual relationship,
Civil Code, Article. 1263 (1996).
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"Test the orphans [in your charge] until they reach a marriageable age; then, if you find
them to be mature of mind, hand over to them their possessions". 38
The two important factors in this regard are majority and prudence which constitute the
maturity of mind. In Saudi Arabia, in order to have the capacity to enter into binding
contracts an individual must have reached the age of 18 years for legal purposes. In a
commercial contracting context 'prudence' may be interpreted as sound commercial sense
and securing commercial efficacy.
(iv) Object of Sale and Valid Cause
According to the Hadith, "do not sell what is not with you". It is one of the essential
conditions for the validity of a sale contract in Shari'a that the commodity must be in the
physical or constructive possession of the seller. This condition has three elements:
Firstly, the commodity must be in existencer'" therefore, a commodity which does not exist at
the time of sale cannot be sold. Secondly, the seller should have acquired the ownership of
that commodity. Hence, if the commodity exists, but the seller does not own it, he cannot sell
it to anybody. Thirdly, full ownership is not enough, it should have come into the possession
of the seller, either physically or constructively. If the seller owns a commodity, but he or she
has not taken its delivery himself or through an agent, he cannot sell it.4o However, there is an
argument amongst Islamic scholars as to the validity of the contract when the commodity of
38 Holy Quran 4:6
39 The two exceptions of this - when the commodity comes after signing a contract - are the two types of sale
which are Salam and Istisna 'a contracts. Those will be discussed shortly.
40 Usmani, M., An Introduction to Islamic Finance, Kluwer Law International, (2002), p. 60.
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sale is non-existent i.e. a fanner's crop coming into fruition at a later date." A similar
initiative is petroleum products which will be discussed shortly.
As will be discussed below, contract of sale is essentially understood as the
unconditional and immediate transfer of ownership of an existing and determined object of
legal value. This is for a fixed price which may be payable immediately, or later or even in
installments over a fixed period.42 Therefore, an overwhelming majority of traditional
scholars have nullified contracts whose object of sale is non-existent when they are
concluded. It was obvious to them that what is non-existent involves necessarily a strong
element of uncertainty - 'Gharar' - for it is uncertain whether the non-existent object would
ever materialise, or in what condition and state it would eventually materialise.V According
to Ibn Rushd (Averroes) of the Mali/a School, Gharar is to be found in contracts of sale when
the seller suffers disadvantage causing damage, as a result of his ignorance of the price of the
article or of the indispensable criteria relating to the contract or to its object."
41 Muslim scholars have held different views on their respective perceptions of gharar. Whereas al-Shafi
considered gharar (uncertainty) in the sale of absent goods (bai al-ghaib) to be excessive, Imam Malik viewed it
to be negligible. Abu Hanifah on the other hand held that there was no issue over gharar so long as the buyer
was granted the option of viewing (khiyar al-ruyah). There is also some difference of opinion over the validity
of sale of the non-existent goods (bai al-madum). According to Kamali, M., the view that there a general
consensus (ijma) on the prohibition of this sale among the leading scholars, is incorrect. Many scholars
including Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, and al-Sanhuri, among others, have departed from the earlier position and
maintained that there was no evidence in the sources to proscribe sale of a non-existent object. They are
particularly critical of prohibition of that variety of sale of the non-existent in which, although the object of sale
was non-existent at the time of contract, it was certain to come into being in the future. Following this approach,
the author seems to disagree with the prohibitive judgment of modem scholars on futures trading based on its
similarity with sale of non-existent products. As he asserts, "the market realities and the clearinghouse
procedures tend to preclude any serious doubt/uncertainty over the existence and delivery prospects of the
subject matter of sale". Kamali, M., Uncertainty and Risk Taking (Gharar) in Islamic Law, Paper presented at
the International Conference on Takafull Islamic Insurance, (2-3 July 1999).
42 Coulson, N., supra note 5, p. 19-20.
43 Saleh, N., Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Proftt in Shari 'a, Cambridge University Press, (1986), p. 66.
44 Cornair-Obeid, N., The Law of Business Contracts in the Arab Middle East, London: Kluwer Law
International, (1996), p. 58.
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However, this legal problem prompted Ibn Qayyim AI-Jawziyya45 to denounce the
confusion between uncertainty and non-existence. He stated that:
"There is no mention either in the Quran or in the Sunnah or in the Companions' tradition of
anything to the effect that the sale of what is non-existent is prohibited. What is in the Sunnah
is the prohibition of selling certain articles which are non-existent as there is a prohibition of
selling other articles which actually exist. The motive behind the prohibition is not the
existence or the non-existence but, as in the Sunnah, the sale producing uncertainty and that
is what the vendor is not in a position to deliver, whether or not it exists. The vendor's
obligation is to deliver the object of sale; if he is not in a position to do so, this amounts to
gharar, risk and gambling ... the prohibition of non-existence is not prompted by non-
existence itselfbut by gharar't."
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the issue is not about the existence or non-existence of the
subject matter but about risk, or Gharar, and it is impossible to deliver the subject matter
whether it is existent or not.47 Some scholars maintained that "do not sell what is not with
you" means not to sell what one does not own at the time of sale." For others it applies only
to the sale of specified objects (al-ayan) and not to fungible goods. A third group maintained
that it means the sale of what is not present and what the seller cannot deliver." Finally, some
contemporary scholars take into consideration the changes of the market in the present
circumstances compared to the time of the Prophet. so It is therefore submitted that the
conventional forward contract has great benefits, which are especially obvious in the field of
the exploitation and production of commodities such as petroleum with inherent supply and
price uncertainties. It can be accommodated in Islamic law either under the general theory of
contract and conditions or by analogy to Salam and Istisna since it does not involve Riba or
4S He was a well-known Islamistjurist during the 7thCentury of the Islamic Calendar.
46 Ibn Qayyim, Al-Jawziyyah., /'lam Al-Muwaqi'in, Vol. I, pp. 357-61. Cited in Comair-Obeid, N., supra note
44.
47 Ibn al-Qayyim, I'lam al-Muwaqqi'in,vol. 1, p. 219. .
48 Muhammad Ibn Isma 'il al-San'ani, Subul al-Salam Sharh Bulugh al- Maram, 4th ed. Cairo: al-Maktabah al-
Tijariyyah, vol.3, (1379H), p.17.
49al-Baghawi, Abu Muhammad al-Husayn, Sharh al-Sunnah ,al-Maktab al-Islami, Damscus, Vol. 8, pp. 140-
141.
so For further details, see Kamali, M., Islamic Commercial Law, An Analysis of Futures, The American Journal
ofIslamic Social Sciences, Vol. 13, No.2, (Summer, 1996), pp. 205-7.
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Gharar. It is not included in the prohibited forms of sale of debt and does not oppose the
principle "do not sell what is not with you".
It must also be noted that there are two exceptions to the principle of the existence of
the object of sale at the time of concluding the contract. One is 'Salam' which is a sale
whereby the seller undertakes to supply some specific goods to the buyer at a future date, in
exchange for an advance price fully paid at consensus ad idem. The other is 'Istisna', both
will be discussed further later on.
(v) Consideration
Consideration for goods and services in Shari'a is not restricted to a monetary price, but
may be in the form of another commodity. Islamic prohibition against uncertainty requires
that the price must be in existence and determined at the time of the contract and cannot be
fixed at a later date with reference to the market price, nor can it be left subject to
determination by a third party" It should be noted that, unlike in English law,52 the existence
and determination of the price cannot be left to be determined later on even through a price
determination mechanism that is identified at the time of the contract.
2.2.3 The main Characteristics of a Contract in Shari'a Law
This section discusses the main characteristics of an Islamic contract in order to clarify
the position of a foreign investor in such agreement. Firstly, the notion of equality of footing
is discussed, followed by general principles found in both Quran and Sunnah, These
principles advocate fulfilment of promises and performance of an obligation followed by a
description of the various elements included in government contracts today. It is worth
51 Rayner, S., supra note 25, p. 141.
52 SaGA 1979, Hatmet Ltd v Herbert (t/a LMS Lift Consultants) [2005] EWHC 3529 (TCC).
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mentioning that contracts under Shari'a fall into two major categories: nominate contracts
which are the contracts mentioned in the treatises of the scholars of the school of Islamic
jurisprudence that were known in their time. In contrast, non-nominate contracts are those
which are not mentioned in the doctrinal writings of the classical Muslim scholars and which
emerge from time to time as a result of the growing needs of the community. These later
contracts are considered to be a sign of the flexibility and responsiveness of Shari'a. These
contracts are also thought to open the doors for all types of contracts as long as they are in
harmony with the mandatory rules of Islamic Law. It is worth mentioning that there are in
principle no significant distinctions between nominated and non-nominated contracts in
Islamic Jurisprudence, as both forms of contracts possess the same degree of sanctity and
binding force. 53 Furthermore, no distinction is drawn between treaties, state contracts and
private contracts. All these contracts were viewed by the early Muslim jurists equally as
agreements that have to be observed in good faith. The contracts were regarded as such by
the Arbitration Tribunal in the ARAMCO case which considered the ARAMCO Concession
Agreement as a non-nominated contract under Shari'a.54
From the perspective of a comparison with most western concepts of contract law, the
most difficult Shari'a concepts are those principles which underpin commercial contracts.
The fundamental principles of Shari' a in business transactions can be summarised thus: every
Islamic contract requires equality of contracting parties, which means that all parties should
be placed on an equal footing. Such a provision ensures the equality of treatment of both
parties in respect of the economic balance of the contract. This arrangement may not be faced
53 Saleh, N., Origins of the Sanctity of Contracts in Islamic Law, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.3 (1998), pp.
252-264.
54 Saudi Arabia v Aramco, decision of23 August 1958, reprinted in (1963) 27 ILR 117, p. 165. See also AI-
Samaan, Y., The Evolution of Contractual Relationship between the Government of Saudi Arabia and
ARAMCO, Masters Dissertation, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, University of Dundee, (1990),
p. 109. See also chapter 4 infra.
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with any problems when both contracting parties are on an equal footing, i.e. when an IOC
enters into contract with a privati sed state enterprise which is detached from the state as a
commercial entity with separate legal status, It is advisable that the parties provide in their
contract that no economic equilibrium of the contract can be invoked by the party whose act
or omission disturbs it.55 An Islamic contract does not discriminate between different parties
or notably against foreigners or non-Muslims. Once a contract is validly concluded, all
parties to it occupy the same position. 56 The reason for mentioning this is to counter the
misconception that Shari'a discriminates between parties on the basis of religion.
In the Quran, justice is a concept which has to be maintained under any circumstances,
even towards those who are enemies of Muslims. The Quran states: "0' ye who believe!
Show integrity for the sake of Allah, bearing witness with justice. And be not driven by hatred
of any people to unjust action, to act justly is closer to piety ".57 A number of principles in the
Quran and Sunnah caution Muslims to abide by their promises and obligations and extend the
protections of the Shari'a to both Muslims and non-Muslims. According to Fox, this Quranic
principle suggests that an elaborate document freely consented to by the parties will go a long
way toward preserving an agreement. 58
The main issues are that parties must be capable of entering into a contract and must
have given their free consent; consent, that is, without any duress, fraud or misrepresentation.
Also, as the prohibition of usury - Riba is a key and defining concept of Islamic law, any
contract which includes a provision as to interest 'Riba' will render the contract invalid under
55 Muniruzzaman, A, The Pursuit of Stability in International Energy Investment Contracts: A Critical
Appraisal of the Emerging Trends, Journal of World Energy Law & Business, Vol. I, No.2, (June, 2008), pp.
121-157.
56 Al-Samaan, Y., The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Dar Al Andalus
for Pub. & Dist. Hail, Saudi Arabia, (2000), p. 118
57 Holy Quran, 5: 11, [Emphasise added].
58 Fox, W., supra note 4, p. 34.
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Shari'a. Finally, the product or subject-matter of the contract must be lawful. Most major
contracts in the past have essentially been contracts signed with the government as one of the
parties and therefore should embrace the following special elements'":
The contract complies with current laws and decrees.
The legal obligations provided for in the contract comply with the interests of the state
on the grounds of public policy.
The procedures required to execute the contract are specified in final form in the
contract. 60
Although contracts which are not in conformity with Shari'a principles are prohibited
and declared invalid by Muslim jurists, economic necessity and public interest
justified the recognition of certain contracts which would not otherwise be
permissible. An example of this is the 'Bai-Al-Wafa .61, which is similar to the concept
of mortgage with conditional sale of common law. Bai-Al- Wafa is a contract whereby
the owner of an estate sells it, with a condition that he will have it back once he
returns its price to the buyer. The reason given for this departure is that the contract
has been in customary use and there is need for it because of the economic necessity
of the state.f
The principle of sanctity of contract under Shari'a is applicable to all types of
agreement. Shari'a does not discriminate between types of agreements and the parties
59 It has to be stated that some of these elements are requirement of all contracts whether the government is
£arty or not.
o Ballantyne, W., Commercial Law in the Arab Middle East: The Gulf States, Lloyd's of London Press, (1986),
p.92.
61 Coulson, N., supra note 5, p. 21. 'Bai-bil-Wafa', is a sale, apparently originating in the Ith century, in which
the vendor retains the right of redemption of the property and may repay the purchaser by instalments over a
fixed period. It's believed that this institution, when used to create what is in effect the modem type of
mortgage for property, provides a method of circumventing the strict prohibition of any interest on a capital loan
transaction.
62 El-Malik, W., Aspects of Natural Resources, Contract, Investment and Finance at Shari 'a and Arab Secular
Laws -A Comparative Study, PhD thesis, CEPMLP, Dundee University, (1997), pp. 185-187.
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to them. This will be discussed further below. Shari'a also recognises the principle of
sanctity of contract, which is affirmed by the following verses:
"Successful indeed are the believers who faithfully observe their trust and their
covenants ".63
"And fulfil the covenant. Surely the covenant will be asked about (in the hereafter). 64
A sale contract comprising an illegal object is 'prima facie' void.
These characteristics can be taken as clear evidence of the security and stability of
investment agreements under Shari'a and for both foreign investors and their counterparts.
2.2.4 The Principle of Freedom of Contract under Shari'a
As a general rule, the right to conclude contracts is a civil right which is guaranteed
under Shari' a. It should be stated that all types of agreements, which are not precisely
prohibited by divine law, are permitted. The jurist Ibn Taimiya pointed that:
"All contracts entered into, or conditions attached thereto, are permissible unless prohibited
by the religious texts, the Quran and the Sunnah65 ",
The freedom of contract in Islamic law cannot be so simply denied due to the fact that
the concept of freedom of contract operates as it does in common law. An exception is that
autonomy of will is modified by the requirement to comply with limits set by Islam. Within
these limits one is free to enter into a contract with whomever one wishes." The main limit is
that the subject matter of a contract must not conflict with Shari'a. In this regard the
following points should be noted. Firstly, Shari'a permits all types of contracts that are
required by the increasing necessities of the society, and which are classified, as already
63 Holy Quran, 23:8.
64 Holy Quran, 17:34.
6S Ibn Taimiya, Majmuat Fatawah, vol.II, (1908), p.326, cited in EI-Malik, W., supra note 61.
66 Ramadan, H., Understanding Islamic Law, Rowan Altamira, (2006), p. 103.
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mentioned, as non-nominated contracts.V Secondly, apart from the prohibition of usury -
'Riba', Shari' a provides wide scope for the conclusion of various types of contracts."
Thirdly, the restriction on some features of contracts is found in almost all legal systems.
Contracts, for instance, which violate public order or policy, are void in many legal systems
worldwide. In countries such as Saudi Arabia where religious belief shapes public policy,
contracts which permit acts that contravene what are believed to be divine commands will
therefore be void on public policy grounds.
2.3 The Influence of Shari 'a Law of Contract on Foreign
Investment Agreements
This section will explain how Shari'a has been adapted to meet the needs of
contemporary contracts for foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. To achieve this adaptation, in
April 2000, the government approved changes in the law and policy governing foreign
investment by granting the same rights to foreign investors as enjoyed by Saudi nationala/"
In order to evaluate Shari'a's ability to meet foreign investors' needs in an FDI context,
the capacity of Shari'a Law of Contract to meet modem contractual requirements will be
assessed. The contractual aspects of Shari'a relating to natural resources and legal nature of
petroleum exploration will be examined as well as production sharing agreements, along with
concession agreements. The main features of Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) will be
considered as well as the two main types of service contracts used in the FDI in the oil sector.
67 For more analysis see generally Amin, S., Islamic Law and its Implication for the Modern World, Glasgow:
Rpyston, (1989), p. 41.
68 Noor, M., Principles of Islamic Contract Law, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 6, No.1 (1988), pp. 115-
130.
69 Arab News Newspaper, at http://www.arab.netJSaudiisashariabiz.htm. last visited on 07/06/08
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This section will end with an examination of the attitude of Shari'a towards these contractual
arrangements.
2.3.1 Development of the Law
The mercantile nature of international commercial law has, generally encouraged the
law to be a responsive subject which facilitates the commercial practices of the business
community. As those practices often change and develop to accommodate new technology,
the contents of a commercial legal system may change and develop with them. Islamic
systems are based on religious concepts, but nevertheless Islamic countries have the power to
legislate in harmony with the Islamic _Doctrinal base "the law changes for change of
circumstances'Y' which Muslims have applied since the demise of the prophet. This is
evidence that change and development have occurred. Today, most Islamic countries have
adopted a flexible Islamic system that has developed in harmony with both Shari'a and also
current commercial realities.71
As stated earlier, despite the fact that the rules of the Quran are believed by Muslims to
be eternal and immutable, the principle of freedom of contracts under Shari'a is distinct. It
can be interpreted to regulate current circumstances so Islamic countries have the power to
legislate so that internationally agreed standards can be implemented where necessary to
70 The doctrine is also known as tajdid (renewal or revival). The purpose of tajdid is to implement this ideal
model in Muslims' lives, wherever and whenever Muslim society exists. This purpose implies that tajdid is a
continuous effort by Muslims always to explain Islam and make it applicable in continually changing situations
without violating its principles. Mawdudi - a very well-known Muslim scholar (1903-1979) - argued that all of
the great Mujaddids (revivers or reformers) - i.e. the founders of the four Schools of Sunni thought, Al-Gazzali,
Ibn Taimiyah and others - were distinguished for their insight into problems before Muslims, for their reform of
religious practices, for initiating an intellectual revolution and defending Islam in the political sphere, for
establishing the primacy of Shari'a, and for their opposition to the ostensibly orthodox practices of the ulema
(Muslim scholars). Mawdudi, S., Islamic Law and Constitution, Karachi, (1955), pp. 203-204, cited by Nasr, S.,
Mawdudi and the making of Islamic revivalism, Oxford University Press, (1996), p. 136. See also footnote 66
supra and note 73 infra.
71 Ballantyne, W,. Arab Comparative and Commercial Law. The International Approach. Vol. 1. The Shari'a
and its relevance to modem transnational transactions. The settlement of disputes through arbitration joint
ventures. Graham & Trotman. International Bar Association (publisher). First Arab Regional conference, Cairo
15-19 February, (1987), paper 1, the Shari'a and its Relevance to Modem Transnational Transactions, at p. 6.
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achieve greater harmony in cross border commercial practice. Further discussion of this issue
now follows.
2.3.2 The Capacity of Shari'a to meet Modern Contractual
Requirements
As stated earlier, it is a general rule in Shari'a that any agreement, regardless of its form
or procedure, which is based on justice and equity and free from impediments of constraint,
uncertainty, or misrepresentation and deceit is lawful. This is embodied in the Holy Quran:
"And eat up not one another's property unjustly, nor give bribery to the rulers that you may
knowingly eat up a part of the property of others sinfuU/2 ",
This is one of the vital principles guiding Islamic trade and commercial systems. With
increasing international business activities in the Gulf region, the states face the question of
the suitability of Shari'a to govern international commercial agreements. However, before
discussing the development of contractual arrangements and the efforts of the Arabian Gulf
States and Saudi Arabia in particular, it is noteworthy to reiterate that the option for change
and flexibility is crucial. The doctrinal base of "the law changes for change of
circumstances'Y' allows for such development.
Concluding commercial contracts between parties from countries with legal systems
based on Islamic law was rather an easy matter, due to the awareness of the contracting
parties of Shari 'a contractual principles. However, it was a different case on an international
72 Holy Quran 11:29.
73 Or "The law must change over the times". Some contemporary Islamic scholars argue that Shari'a should be
interpreted in the light of necessity - 'AI-Darurah' - which should be considered as a source of Islamic
jurisprudence in order bring solutions to overcome emerging problems caused by change in time and
circumstances. For instance, Ibrahim Shihata argued that the prohibition of usury - 'Riba' - should be restricted
to obvious cases of exploitation and unjust enrichment. See Shihata, I., Some Observations on the Question of
Riba and the Challenges Facing Banking, CEPMLP Online Journal, Article 7, available at:
http://www.dundee.ac.uk!cepmlp/joumallhtmVvoI7/article7-7.html. Accessed on 12/02/2009.
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scale. The oil producing countries of the Gulf region had to face economic challenges as a
result of the nature of concession agreements that were imposed on them by foreign occupiers
unaware of Shari 'a as, well as a domestic lack of the capital, expertise and technology needed
in the field. This raises the question of whether the implementation of the main types of
exploration and production agreements could possibly be recognised under Shari 'a.
Answering this question will entail firstly analysing the legal nature of Islamic natural
resources, followed by a similar close scrutiny of the legal nature of the concession
agreements and finally examining their equity.
2.3.3 Contractual Aspects of Islamic Law on Natural Resources
Historically, Islamic concession agreements were first applied in the early period of
Islam for both agricultural and mineral purposes when the Prophet gave Iqta (piece of land)
to Abu-Baker, one of his companions, in Madinah and to the Abu-Rafis people.i" In Shari'a,
this share-cropping agreement is based on the precedent of the prophet's actions with the
people of Khyber. He gave them state-owned lands to work on, in return for which they were
to retain half of what it produced and bestow the other half of the crop to the Islamic state7S•
Therefore, Iqta, in Shari'a, is defined as "the right of the ruler to grant any individual an
exclusive right over a certain area of land."
74 EI-Malik, W., supra note 61, p. 69.
75 AI-Qaradawi, Y., The lawful and Prohibited in Islam, ATP, (1994), p. 279.:6 Al-Sobaie, M., Ishtirakiat Al-Islam, (1960), p. 90, (in Arabic). What has to be stressed is that the exploitation
of natural resources, including petroleum, is a matter of public concern all over the world. The public interest
element in petroleum contracts sets these contracts apart from ordinary commercial contracts. Under the various
families of modem legal systems, the state can, by an exercise of its sovereign legislative power, alter or
abrogate its contractual obligations, if this is so required by the public interest accompanied by a fair
compensation to the private party when its rights are affected adversely by the state action. Riad, T., Host
Countries and Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and Protection of Foreign Investors: Some
Reflections on the Recent Kuwait/Aminoil Arbitration Case, 39 Revue Egiptienne de Droit International, (1983),
pp. 35-99. See generally Kolo, A. & Walde, T., Renegotiation and Contract Adaptation in International
Investment Projects - Applicable Legal Principles and Industry Practices, 1 J World Invest. & Trade, (2000),
pp. 5-59. Muniruzzaman, A., State Contracts with Aliens - The Question of Unilateral Change by the State in
Contemporary International Law, 7 J. Int. Arb., (1992), pp. 141-171.
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The Islamic contract of Iqta enters into the category of public contracts, and is therefore
more accessible to renegotiation and termination by the government than normal commercial
contracts. In addition, the Imam (ruler) has the right to terminate agreements entered into
with other parties ahead of time if he found that its terms were harmful to the interest of the
Islamic community. This is with the provision that an adequate prior notification is sent to the
other party informing them of his intention to terminate the agreement. The other party is of
course entitled, under Islamic law, to compensation for its 10ss.77
2.4 Legal Nature of Petroleum Exploration and Production
Agreements
Until the 2nd World War, many developing countries found themselves in a similar
position. They had given total control over their most valuable resources to foreign
companies through concessions covering huge areas for very long periods. A wind of change
began to blow during and after the 2nd World War. The main purpose of these changes was to
alter the provision of the old concession agreements into more reasonable and fair
arrangements. In order to understand the legal nature of such joint ventures 78 as international
petroleum exploration and production agreements, we will analyse their legal nature in order
to establish whether they would be acceptable under Shari'a, There are three types of
petroleum exploration and production agreements:
Concession Agreement;
77 Al-Qurashi, Z., Investment Protection under International Petroleum Agreement: An Analysis of the Pertinent
Arbitral Jurisprudence, PhD thesis, CEPMLP, Dundee University, (2004), p. 255.
78 For more discussion on the historical and definitions of these agreements see chapter 4 of the thesis infra.
While the objectives of each joint venture are the same, the terms and conditions vary from one agreement to
another. In January 2004 the Saudi national oil company, Saudi ARAMCO, announced that it will be partnering
with Russian oil company Lukoil to find and develop gas reservoirs, as part of the Kingdom's Gas Initiative. To
explore the contract area, Lukoil and ARAMCO will establish an exploration and producing company, with
ARAMCO 20% shareholder. The Kingdom concluded a similar deal with the Chinese oil and petrochemical
company Sinopec and another deal with a consortium of Italian company ENI and Spanish oil company Repsol.
No further information about the deals was announced by the parties. The latter information was obtained from
the website ofSAGIA at: http://www.sagia.gov.sa and ARAMCO's website at: http://www.saudiaramco.com.
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Production sharing contracts; and
Service contracts.
2.4.1 Concession Agreement
(i) Traditional Concession Agreement
The old-style concession system was clearly one-sided. The agreements were granted
by sovereign states with sometimes little power to participate in the management of
petroleum investment because of foreign political domination.i" Also, the countries
concerned were at that time at a low stage of development, sometimes still nomadic to a large
extent, and in no case possessed a legal framework'" which could govern such things as
petroleum operations.I' A concession agreement in petroleum exploration is described as:
"An agreement between a company and government that grants the company the right to
explore, develop, produce, transport and market hydrocarbons or minerals within fixed area
for specific amount of time. The concession and production and sale of hydrocarbons from
the concession are then subject to rentals, royalties, bonuses and taxes. Under a
concessionary agreement, the company would have the title to resources that are
d d" 82pro uce .
79 Blinn, K., & others., International Petroleum Exploration & Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and
Policy Aspects, New York: Barrows Company Inc, (1986), p. 60.
80 See examples of countries, in particular, the case of Saudi Arabia, more discussion at chapter 4 infra.
81 Suleiman, A., The Oil Experience of the United Arab Emirates and its Legal Framework, 6 J.E.N.R.L.,
(1984), p. 1-3.
82 Johnston, D., International Petroleum Fiscal System and Production Sharing Contracts, Oklahoma:
PennWell Publishing Company Tulsa, (1994), p. 296.
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'.
Generally speaking, the old-style concessions were quite simple. They defined the area
and the duration of the concession, the payment to be made by the concessionaire and, mostly
in general terms, the mutual rights and obligations of the parties. They were then ratified by a
law or a decree where the law of the country required such ratification.P
(ii) The Modern Concession Agreements
As already indicated, developing countries were dissatisfied with the early form of
concession agreements, particularly where the host state was excluded from participating in
any decision relating to operations within the concession area. This had the effect of reducing
government revenues throughout the duration of the concession. Subsequently the demand
from producing countries for a greater share of oil revenues appeared in the early 1940s, and
Venezuela was the first state to secure a larger government take.84 Today, such old style
concession agreements are rarely applied. They were replaced with a variety of arrangements
including production sharing agreements, participation and service contracts which offer
greater fairness and therefore a more sustainable relationship between the parties. Crucially,
such contracts allowed the state much greater control of its resources."
2.4.1 The Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs)
PSCs were first introduced in Indonesia in 1966. After independence, nationalist feeling
was running high and foreign companies and their concessions became the target of
83 Cattan, H., supra note 26, (1967), p. 2.
84 For more details see chapter 4 of the thesis, infra. This was the starting point where the host state realised that
they were missing out on many areas of revenue collection as well as control of their own affairs, so changes
were made resulting in a structure of old concession agreements breaking the link between ownership, control
and financial risks and rewards. New forms of concession agreements emerged in addition to production sharing
and service contracts.
85 Saba, A., The International Commercial Contracts, the Petroleum Contracts, (1988), p. 32, (in Arabic).
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increasing criticism and hostility.l" PSCs are considered as disguised concession agreements.
Some, however, consider it as an agreement which retains the basic legal format of the
traditional concession, with significant modifications to the features of its prototype, which
nonetheless still worked to the disadvantage of the producing country.V However, PSCs are
favoured by states because they offered a new model to reject the 'Mineral Concession's
which was seen as colonialist. PSCs can be attractive to nationalistic sentiments in producing
countries, as they seem to give the symbolic function of ownership and control to the
nation.88
Under the PSCs the foreign company is granted a contractual right to explore and
develop a specified area in exchange for the opportunity to recover its costs and a specified
profit. In Shari'a, the Islamic practice of share cropping forms the basis of the PSCs, so it
does automatically prima facie lend legitimacy'" to mineral development." Hence, PSCs are
based on the concept that ownership of oil is always with the state and that it alone has the
right to its disposal, a reflection of the notion contained in the principle, discussed above, of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources." The contemporary pattern of PSCs consists
of the issuance of licences by the host government pursuant to a national economic
development plan. An outgrowth of this practice has been the promulgation of investment
86 Bindermann, K., Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis, Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, (1999), p. l.
87 Gao, Z., International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions, Graham & Trotman Ltd.
(1994), p. 29.
88 Walde, T., Editorial, Production-Sharing Contracts, OGEL, Vol. III, Issue, I, (March, 2005), available at;
http://www.oge1.org/artic1e.asp?kev=I723. accessed on 07/02/2009.
89 More discussion and analysis will be carried out later on in this chapter.
90 Al-Sobaie, M., supra note 65, p. 90.
91 Somarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, (2004), p. 134.
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laws which enable host countries to exercise more effective control over international
corporations.f
2.4.2 Service Contracts
Risk Service contracts and Non-Risk Service Contracts are widely used standard
contracts. Service contracts became more widely popular in the late 1960swhen Iran and Iraq
in particular concluded several such agreements. It was once believed that there was a natural
transition from concession over joint venture to service contract.93 A service contract is a
legal relationship between a foreign company and a host country whereby the company is
considered to be working as a contractor for the state, not as a partner of the state. The
foreign company is not a concession holder, but merely a hired firm. The host state is the sole
titular holder of the area under agreement, and all petroleum discovered and produced is the
property of the host state." There are two types of service contract which developed under
this category of petroleum agreements:
(i) The Non-Risk Service Contracts
Under this type of agreement, the contractor has no ownership interest in the
petroleum resources. The host government involves the contractor on an ad hoc basis, usually
paying him a flat fee for his service.9s The contractor's services may include providing
equipment and training employees to operate the petroleum facilities. In return, the company
will be compensated for the expenses in addition to a fixed fee, which is usually in the form
92 Fabrikant, R., Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia, Legal Aspects of Production Sharing
Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (1973), p. 157.
93 Walde, T., Investment Policies in the International Petroleum Industry - Responses to the Current Crisis, in
Beredjeck, N., and T. Walde, (eds.), Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries, Graham &
Trotman, (1988), p.13.
94 Zakariyah, H., New Directions in the Search for and Development of Petroleum Resources in Developing
Countries, 9 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. (1976), p. 545.
9S Cameron, P., Petroleum Licensing, A Comparative Study, London: Financial Times Business Information Ltd,
(1984), p. 12.
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of an agreed amount of crude oil. This type of petroleum arrangement is found in Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. 96
(ii) The Risk Service Contracts
In these types of agreements, the host state would contract with a foreign company to
explore and exploit a specified area and evaluate potential explorations at its own risk. If no
discovery is made, the contract ceases to exist.97 In the event of discovery, the company
recovers its expenses for exploration. Despite the high risk associated with this type of
contract, and that petroleum exploration is highly speculative, it can also bring large rewards
for both parties if successful. 98
However, it has to be noted that there are several elements of both types of service
contracts which do not comply with Shari'a. First, in the Risk Service Contracts, the risks are
borne solely by the contractor who provides capital for exploration and if no discovery is
made, the contract ceases to exist. In addition, this type of service contracts seems to
disregard the principle of equity and that parties should be placed on an equal footing.
Second, the contract may contain an element of usury - 'Riba' - if the state's share of the
costs is paid with interests. However, if the parties agreed on a certain percentage of the
discovered petroleum's revenues to pay the cost of recovery, then this percentage repays the
expenses by sale until after some agreed time. In other words, the parties are sharing the
benefits and costs on a percentage basis, and there is no existence of any elements of usury
'Riba'. In this case, the two types of service contracts would be recognised under Islamic law
of Contract.
96 Blinn, K., supra note 76, p. 97.
97 Cameron, P., supra note 92, p. 13.
98 Ibid., p. 13.
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2.5 Legitimacy of Contractual Arrangements under Shari'a
The question now arises as to the extent to which Shari'a accommodates the various
contractual arrangements. This is addressed in the following subsection.
2.5.1 Concession Agreements
The old concession agreements represent a clear exploitation of public property of the
host state, as it places the foreign company in a stronger position than that of the host state.
As a result, this obviously contradicts, inter alia, the fundamental principle of Islamic
contract law, that contracting parties should be placed on an equal footing. Therefore, not
surprisingly, Muslim oil producing countries considered concession agreements for
exportation of their natural resources as "an encroachment on national sovereignty and an
instrument of foreign domination over national economic development". 99
Accordingly, such agreements have been gradually terminated by the Saudi
government.l'" and many other Islamic countries have done the same, particularly with the
increase of the power of OPEC since the early 1960s. There has also been an introduction of
national oil companies, usually with technical assistance obtained through a joint venture
with foreign oil companies.
99 Al-Samaan, Y., Evolution of the Contractual Relationship Between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO, JENRL,
Vol. 12, No.2, (1994), p. 257.
100 For more discussion on this see chapter 4 of the thesis, infra.
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2.5.2 Production Sharing and Service Contracts
Currently, production sharing agreements are used by a majority of Muslim countries
for upstream petroleum arrangements but many Islamic scholars are cautious regarding the
fiscal design of PSCs. They may not be consistent with Islamic legal principles in their
present form as they not only contain an element of interest/usury but also an element of
uncertainty, which is also forbidden under Islamic legal thinking.l''' In fact, legal problems
exist in this area of commerce which may render such PSCs untenable under Shari'a law.
However, an Islamic type of contract called Ijarah102 (Hire) could be considered the
closest in nature to PSCs in Islamic commercial practice, because of the similarities they
share. It should be noted, however, that PSCs could be compatible with Shari'a as long as
they adhere to the requirements of the validity of contract under Shari'a principles explained
earlier and summarised here:
The existence of a job which is of permissible nature to be carried out;
The offer and acceptance with a view to reach consensual agreement;
The determination of the contract's duration.
On the other hand, in order to find out whether or not PSCs contain elements of usury -
'Riba " it should be always remembered that most of the Islamic banking and financial
institutions are using 'Murabaha' which is also known as "cost plus financing". Murabaha is
101 Karim, M., Oil, Islamism and International Petroleum Industry Legal, Economic, Political and Cultural
Issues, LLM Dissertation, CEPMLP, Dundee University, (2000), available at:
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/joumaVhtmVdev4.html. last visited 18/06/08.
102 Ijarah means "giving something on rent". In Islamic jurisprudence, the term Ijarah is used for two different
situations. Firstly, it means to employ the services of a person on wages given to him as a consideration for his
hired services. The second type of Ijarah relates to the usufruct of assets and properties which means
"transferring the usufruct of a particular property to another person in exchange for a rent claimed from him. In
this case, the term Ijarah is analogous to English term 'Leasing'. A vast majority of Islamic Scholars have
settled for Ijarah being a binding contract. Both elements of this contract, the usufruct and the rent payment,
must be specified precisely, or else uncertainty - 'Gharar' - renders the contract invalid. See Ballantyne, W.,
Islamic Law and Finance: Introduction: Islamic Law and Financial Transactions in Contemporary Perspective,
(CIMEL), SOAS, at: http://www.soas.ac.uk/cimeVrnaterials/islawfiniislfinintro. accessed on 12/05/08.
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a contract whereby the seller is disclosing his true costs. After discussing the true costs, a
profit margin may be agreed either on a percentage of cost basis or as a fixed amount. It is
very important to remember that the amount of profit earned in this transaction is not a
reward for the use of the financier's money. In other words, a financier cannot take money if
he/she does not perform any service other than the use of hislher money for the transaction.
Such an occurrence would cause this type of deal to resemble the charging of interest. 103
Similarly, in PSCs the contractor, in the event of commercial production, charges the host
country the cost he has incurred plus profits.
To sum up, Saudi law does not include a civil code or any comparable legal code.
Therefore, the sources of law for its body of contract law come from the principles of Shari' a,
as interpreted by the Hanbali School. The moral and ethical precepts instituted by Shari'a
underpin the Islamic law of obligations, with the principal object of rejecting unjustified
enrichment - RibalO\ speculative transactions (e.g. those dependent on uncertainty), and
ensuring that equal bargaining power exists between the contracting parties. A result of this
system is that parties are generally free to conclude contracts, on any terms they wish,
provided that such terms do not contravene the provisions of Shari' a. As discussed above,
103 See Chowdhry, S., An Overview of the Basicsfor Businesses Who Want to Confirm to Islamic Principles of
Financing. available at: http://www.dinarstandard.comlfinance/financereviewIOOI04.htm. last visited
21/06/08.
104 Article 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Regulation, (Royal Decree of 1963), provides that "The stipulation of
interest in a bill of exchange is null and void", In a more general manner, Article 6 of the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Authority (SAMA) Regulations - now known as Charter of SAMA - states that "SAMA shall not, in
its dealings, contravene the traditions of Islam and may neither grant nor receive interest". Available at:
http://www.sama.gov.salsites/SAMAEN/RulesRegulationIBankingSystemlPageslBankingSystemFD01.aspx
The Banking Control Law of 24/06/1966 does not, however, address the issue of interest. Available at:
http://www.sama.gov.salsites/SAMAEN/RulesRegulationIBankingSystemlPageslBankingSystemFD03.aspx.It
is interesting to note that despite this restriction, commercial business is still transacted in Saudi Arabia where
the banks and financial institutions have instituted alternative procedures to replace interest in common financial
transactions. Banks in Saudi Arabia grant loans and charge their customers a fee that is comparable to
international banks rates on commercial loans. However, this issue is out of the scope of this study and will not
be dealt with. For more discussion of this issue see generally, Abdeen, A., & Shook, D., The Saudi Financial
System. in the Context of Western and Islamic Finance. California: Willy, (1984). See also Saeed, A., Islamic
Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and Its Contemporary Interpretation, Published by
Brill, (1999). See also Saleh, N., Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar and
Islamic Banking. Cambridge University Press, (1986).
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Islamic jurists have established four main conditions regarding the object of the contract,
namely that (1) the object of the contract must exist at the time of conclusion of the contract,
(2) it must be possible, (3) it must be lawful and (4) its genus, species, quality and value must
be clearly determined.
In addition to the discussion above, it is interesting to note that concessions of an
extremely simple form were known to early Islamic communities. There are numerous
instances of the Prophet (Pbuh) in the capacity of the leader of the Muslim community
granting concessions to various individuals. lOS Although, the principles of ownership can be
clearly located in Islamic law, as will be seen below, it is extremely difficult to find any
specific guidelines in the major sources of Shari' a on the issue of petroleum exploitation
agreements. However, the above discussion shows that using the Quran and the Sunnah as
the guiding principles, one can find rules that regulate even modem day complex petroleum
agreements. The next part of the chapter examines the issue of mineral ownership under
Shari'a since a key concern of any FDI agreement concluded with regard to exploitation of
mineral rights must be establishing the ownership of those rights beyond doubt or legal
challenge.
2.6 Mineral Ownership under Shari 'a
2.6.1 Title to Minerals under Shari'a and Saudi Law
Everywhere in the world petroleum excites political sensitivities. It is both a scarce
resource and a basic economic necessity. It produces enormous revenues and yet employs
relatively few people. In those countries which have petroleum reserves, the reserves are
lOS Toriguian, S., Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in theMiddle East, Beirut: Hamaskaine Press, (1972), p. 99.
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regarded as part of the national wealth, and there is suspicion of those who obtain - or wish
to obtain - rights to exploit these resources. As a result, it is usual to find a high level of
government interest, particularly in the upstream industry where it is found. This can
manifest itself in different forms such as state ownership of petroleum resources,
establishment of national oil companies and a substantial government take either in money or
in kind. The legal title to minerals depends in some countries upon the legal status of the
land. Whatever the case may be, it is important to any investor to have knowledge on how to
gain access to the land required for mining without excessive procedural delays and cost.
With regard to ownership of minerals both solid and liquid, a major conceptual difference
exists between Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and other legal systems found all over
the world and crucial to our study. As Shari'a in Saudi Arabia is most strictly adhered to, the
question of the governance of the ownership of minerals is a significant issue. As pointed out
in the previous chapters, the law that governs the ownership of minerals in Saudi Arabia is
Shari'a.106
Islamic Law is based, as previously stated in chapter two, on Shari'a which is divine in
origin, revealed to mankind by God (Allah). While the divine rules themselves are regarded
as immutable, their understanding and interpretation are permissible and have found their
expression in several sources. There are two primary. sources, the Quran, comprised of the
actual words said by God and the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammad (Pbuh) - i.e. his own
words and deeds. They can be interpreted through two secondary sources, the Ijma
(consensus reached by the jurists) and the Quiyas (deductive reasoning applied by a single
jurist. In addition, due to the international importance of the subject of ownership over natural
106 See, the "Basic Law of Saudi Arabia" (constitution), Article 14 which will be dealt with in this chapter.
Available at: http://www.mideastinfo.comldocuments/SaudiArabiaBasicLaw.htm.
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resources rights, the United Nations played a crucial role in this regard by adopting a number
of resolutions through the General Assembly as will been seen in this chapter.107
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to examine the concept of mineral ownership
under Shari'a in Saudi Arabia. This will be followed by an examination of the Saudi
Government's legal reforms regarding title to minerals and investment laws, then a
comparison with that of non-Islamic countries in order to examine:
Whether or not the impact of mineral ownership legislation (Saudi Mining Law)
represents a true obstacle to the foreign investors.
Whether there are similarities or differences between Saudi Mining Law and that of
some Western countries.
There are different views of ownership of natural resources based on different
interpretations of Islamic Law. This diversity of views may cause some kinds of uncertainty
for potential investors, so the importance of the issue of ownership is the focus of the last part
of this chapter. In this part of the chapter, the legal problem is demonstrated. We will explore
the attitude of Muslim scholars to title to various minerals both above and below the ground,
and that the Hanbali school of interpretation prevalent in Saudi Arabia makes distinctions
between both solid and liquid minerals and where they are found. The issue of the ownership
of minerals will also be examined both in Saudi and at an international level.
107 These are the United Nations Resolutions relating to the issue of Ownership Applicable to Natural;
Resources, which include: Resolution No. 626 (VII), 1952 - Right to exploit freely natural wealth and
resources; Resolution No. 1803 (XVII), 1962 - permanent sovereignty over natural resources; Resolution No.
3281 (XXIX), 1974 - Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. For text of Resolutions, see
http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htmlat accessed 1711012008.
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2.6.2 The legal concept of land ownership practice and title to
subsoil minerals in Shari'a and the different views of the four
Islamic schools.
This section explains the legal problem of land ownership practice and title to subsoil
minerals in Shari'a, taking into account the various views of the four Islamic schools of
thought. It discusses the views of Muslim scholars as to Shari'a principles governing
ownership rights of minerals both above and below the ground. An understanding of the
nature of the ownership rights to minerals in law is needed to fully evaluate and understand
the stability of investment agreements in Saudi Arabia. As explained in chapter 2 Saudi
Arabia largely follows the teachings of Hanbali School of thought. However, from time to
time rules from within the other three schools of thought are used in preference to a Hanbali
rule where this is considered to be in the public interest. So in relation to rights of mineral
ownership, the Saudi government follows the Maliki view in preference to the Hanbali
School. This holds that minerals, both subsurface and open, cannot fall into private ownership
because of the authority of the Prophet (Pbuh) expressed in his Hadith "People are partners in
three commodities, water, fire and green herbage", except in land which has not yet had any
state or private ownership. Neither in privately or state-owned land may minerals, subsoil or
above the surface, be granted in private ownership because of a fear of monopoly. lOS
108 Ibn Qudamah, states that: "Minerals are free, he who finds a mineral is entitled to take his need thereof by
priority to others, after which he must go away to let others satisfy also their needs, he cannot appropriate the
vein or mine of deposit except with and as a result of his appropriation of the grounds where such mines or vein
or deposit is found, this appropriation may be through an Iqta or grant from the Imam or through occupancy or
reclaiming it ifit is Mowat (dead land), which has no owner". But as to the surface minerals Ibn Qudamah said:
"According to the prevailing opinion in the Hanbali School, apparent minerals are not liable to private
appropriation either through discovery and occupancy or through Iqta or granted by the ruler (Imam)". Cited by
Cattan, H., supra note 26, p. 56. (Ibn Qudamah is a follower of the Hanbali School. He was born in Naples in
1147 and died in 1223. He is the author of 47 references mostly about principles of Fiqh. One of his most
important references is AI-Mughni in Fiqh and AI-Khilafbyna Al-Ulamaa, (The differences amongst Scholars).
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However, there is an exception to these rules in the case of ownerless land where the first-
comer may secure rights to subsoil and above the surface minerals only by first discovery. 109
The Maliki viewllo holds that petroleum belongs to the community as a whole and as
,
such should be managed by the state. It seems that the Saudi Government will often apply the
rule which best serves its public policy objectives regardless of the originating school. This
has the effect of giving the government full control and ownership of petroleum resources. In
addition, it is up to the Saudi government to carry out its exploitation itself in trust to the
people. It is also free to grant the rights of exploration and exploitation to an individual or a
company subject to appropriate taxation.
2.7 Land Ownership Practice
The issue of property rights is an age-old human problem. III The diversity of
economic systems can be traced back to the diversity of approaches to the right to property.
The issue of whether there should be absolute private ownership, or absolute state ownership,
I09Imam Malik bin Anas, Muwatta', English translation by Rahimuddin, M., 2nd ed., Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi,
India, (2006), p. 325. See also Bunter, M., An Introduction to the Islamic (Shari'a) Law and its Effects on the
Upstream Petroleum Sector, CEPMLP, University of Dundee, (2003), p. 17.
110 According to the MaUId school view, all minerals are part of the public domain - that is they belong to the
Islamic community. Therefore, even if a mineral deposit is situated in Mulk land (land that is owned by
individual), such a mineral does not belong to the owner of the land but to the community and can only be
exploited under a concession granted by the sovereign on behalf the community. In other words, the Maliki
follow the rule that ownership of minerals does not follow ownership of land. Maliki's concept of the ownership
of natural resources is based on his theory that private ownership of minerals will ultimately lead to improper
exploitation of natural resources and unfair of distribution of such wealth. However, the right of private
ownership is limited by the requirements of public necessity in order to prevent public nuisance. Toriguian, S.,
Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East, Beirut: Hamaskain press, (1972), pp. 103-104.
III The legal concept of property rights were refined by the Romans, based on the ideas of the ancient Greeks.
The Romans produced the longest-running legal system in history which influenced all legal systems of the
modem world. One of the most important components of the system is that of private property rights. This was a
key part of Roman Private Law with detailed rules for dealing among private individuals. The Roman replaced
tribal property with private property and worked out the details about how ownership should be proven and
transferred. See generally Finley M., ed., Studies in Roman Property, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
(1976); Clark, E., History of Roman Private Law, New York: Biblo and Tannen, (1965), 4 vols. Reprint of 1914
edition; Leage, R. Roman Private Law Founded in the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian London: Macmillan,
(1924); Kolbert, C. ed., Justinian, the Digest of Roman Law, Theft, Rapine, Damage and Insult, London:
Penguin, (1979).
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or something in between as in a mixed economy, or some altogether different type of
ownership, cannot be ignored.112 In pre-Islamic times, land on the Arabian Peninsula was
owned by individuals and by the community. Arabs knew all three forms of ownership at the
advent of the Prophet (Pbuh) where some wealthy Makkans possessed land in fertile towns.
When the Prophet (Pbuh) migrated to Madinah, many Madinans Muslims had their own
agricultural lands. The Prophet (Pbuh) not only confirmed their ownership, but himself set a
positive precedent by allocating land to individuals. I 13
Generally the ownership of land is heavily regulated in all Gee countries where the
state owns most of the land, and only nationals are allowed to own private property.
However, as can be seen from the following examples, most countries are now introducing
fundamental changes so that foreigners can be allowed to own property for use in
developmental projects. In Kuwait, nationals and GCe nationals can buy property for either
self-use or rent/lease. Foreign investors are allowed to rent property only for self-use.
However, foreign ownership of land is allowed for companies registered in the GCe States.
These companies are treated as Kuwaiti nationals with respect to ownership of real estate in
Kuwait for commercial and investment purposes. I 14
Ownership of land in Qatar is only open to nationals and nationals of Gce countries.
However, the government has made some provisions for foreign ownership in specific
projects. The government has issued a decree that allows non-Qataris to own real estate. The
law seeks to allow Qatari and non-Qatari to buy and own real estate of any description in any
of the following three projects: the proposed Pearl Island, West Bay Lagoon and Al-Khor
Resort, for a period of 99 years which is further extendable by another 99 years upon
112 Islahi, A., Economic Concepts of Ibn Taymiyah., The Islamic Foundation, (1988), p. 107.
113 Zaman, S., Economic Functions of an Islamic State, The Islamic Foundation, (1991), p.119.
114 Under Decree No. 74 of 1979.
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expiration. There is a provision of permanent residency and inheritance in the law for buyers.
Regulations with regard to these provisions are expected to be passed by the cabinet.
However Qatar has also enacted a law which regulates the ownership of real estate and
residential units by non-Qataris, with the aim of opening up the real estate market to wider
foreign investment. I IS
In Saudi Arabia, land is owned by the state and nationals are entitled to own their own
land and land ownership is protected under the constitution. These rights were, until recently,
not available to foreign investors. However, new changes were introduced to encourage
major international companies and property developers to enter the Saudi real estate market.
A law regulating non-Saudi Ownership of Investment and Real Estate was enacted by the
Royal Decree No. MlI5 dated 10/07/2000 (Real Estate Law of 2000). It provides for the
ownership and investment in real estate by non-Saudi nationals and entitles non-Saudi
residents to own real estate for their private residence with the permission of the Interior
Ministry and allows ownership of real estate by foreign investors to conduct their business
activities and own properties required for staff accommodation etc.116
In terms of the law foreign investors should, however, be in possession of a foreign
investment licence from SAGIA to own the property necessary for their investment project,
including the property necessary to house the investment project's employees. Further
conditions include the following: the investment project should be in the nature of property
development, the total cost of the project (including land and buildings) must be at least SR
30,000,000 and must be invested within five years from the purchase date of the land.
II~ For more details about the real estate issue in Qatar, see www.hejleh.comlcountries/gatar.html. visited
08.11.2008; and for more information of the legal system, foreign investment and insurance law, see
www.gatarlaw.comlenglishlarticles/gtr.htm
116 For an official version of the investment and real estate laws and overview, see the official website of the
Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) at www.sagia.gov.sa
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Moreover, foreigners may not purchase real property within the municipal limits of the cities
of Makkah and Madenah, although foreign Muslims may lease property in those cities for
renewable terms of no more than two years. I 17
2.8 Ownership of subsoil minerals under Shari 'a
Generally, minerals in any country can be owned in one of three different ways. Firstly,
it could be that all minerals belong to the state. Secondly, the landowner or occupier of the
land owns the minerals founded in his land or thirdly all minerals are res nullius - which
means that they may be owned by anyone. who finds them.118 In Islam, despite the
sovereignty of God, the institution of private property is lawful, sanctioned and specifically
protected. To discuss how the law affects the ownership of minerals in the surface or the
subsurface, both subsoil and visible, it is necessary to carry out a thorough analytical study to
clarify the view of Shari' a on this matter.
Historically, Roman law recognised and adopted the concept of the absolute right of
property. Shari'a does not recognise the concept of the absolute right of a person to own
property. This is because, in Shari'a, all property belongs to Allah (God) and any Muslim
holds property only in trust and is accountable to Allah for the property. Thus, absolute
ownership of property by a person is a concept alien to Islam.1I9 Claiming absolute
117 Ibid.
118 For detailed examination of the different methods of minerals ownership, see Bastida, A., Minerals Tenure
Regimes in the Context of Evolving Governance Frameworks: a case study of selected Latin American
Countries, PhD Thesis, CEPMLP, University of Dundee, (2004), pp. 30-38.
119 Siddiqi, M., Muslim Economic Thinking, a Survey of Contemporary Literature, International Centre for
Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, and Islamic Foundation, UK, (1981), p.7~
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ownership as well as rights with one's property is akin to claiming equality of status with the
Creator, and this is completely shunned in Islam.120
The Quran has also emphasised the limitations on the absolute right of ownership by
attributing the creation of economic resources to God in these verses. 121
Several Quranic verses suggest that land, among other things, is not the result or end
product of anybody's labour but is instead considered to be a precious gift from Allah s.w. t. in
which every member of the community has equal rights of possession and use. If not put into
proper use, it is considered a loss to the community and that must not be tolerated. If any
landowner neglects his duty, his land would revert or be repossessed by the state authority.
The state authority reserves the right to take or repossess anybody's land if this occurs and
give it to another who would use it better and bring benefit to the community at large.122
The interpretation and understanding of Shari'a depends on the particular school of
legal thought being considered. As will be seen from the brief survey of the main Islamic
schools of legal thought below, it appears that the intervention of the state, in one way or
another, is almost always required. Under Shari'a, petroleum ventures must therefore be
embodied in a licence with the host country.
120 See Quran, 10:55, "No doubt, surely, aff that is in the heavens and on earth belongs to Allah ", Al-Hilali, M.,
& Khan, M., The Noble Quran - English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary, King Fahd Complex
for the Printing of the Holy Quran, (1998).
121 Quran, 24:33. "And give them something (yourselves) out of the wealth of which Allah has bestowed upon
you ", Quran, 14:32-34, "Allah is He who has created the heavens and earth and sends down water (rain) from
the sky, and thereby brought forth fruits as provision for you. And he has made ships to be service to you that
they may sail through the sea by His command; and hath made rivers also to be of service to you. And He has
made the sun and moon, both constantly pursuing their courses, to be of service to you; and He has made the
night and day, to be service to you ", Quran, 67: 15, " He is the One who put the Earth at your service. Roam its
corners, and eat from His provisions. To Him is the final summoning".
122 Malinumbay, S., The Concept of Land Ownership: Islamic Perspective, Skudai: Buletin Geoinformasi, Vol.
2, No.2, pp. 285-304, (Dec. 1998), p. 287. Available at: http://eprints.utm.my/4950/l/concept.pdf. Accessed
26/02/2009.
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The main principles to be derived from a perusal of the scholars' writings regarding the
four different schools of Islamic law in relation to mineral ownership can be summarised as
follows:
According to the Hanajil23 School, mineral ownership follows land ownership.
According to the Malikil24 School, all kinds of natural resources including minerals
are state-owned.
In the Shaji ,125 and Hanbalil26 Schools, subsoil and surface minerals, with the
. . dl27 h bi f nri hiexceptions mentione , are not t e su ject 0 pnvate owners ip.
We have so far dealt with the issue of petroleum resource ownership in the ground
under Islamic law. The other important issue that reflects significantly on petroleum
agreements is ownership of petroleum on the ground. While this issue might be addressed
more specifically in the relevant written laws on petroleum of Muslim countries, it is not
clarified in Islamic law owing to its embryonic state with regard to petroleum exploitation.
Hence, Islamic law is silent on this important issue. By the use of analogy, it may be argued
that laws on ownership of oil on the surface remain the same as oil in the ground.128
123 The Hanafi School is the earliest and the greatest orthodox school in Islam and it has undoubtedly the largest
number of followers. This school was founded by Abu Hanifah. He was born in Iraq in 699 and died in 769 and
was buried in Baghdad in Iraq. In the Hanaft School, minerals found on land in private hands belong to the
owner of the land. If a mineral deposit is found in a public domain, then the mineral deposit is also a public
domain and cannot be exploited by individuals except under a concession. It is up to the state to regulate the
exploitation of mines. See Kamali, M., The Limits of Power in an Islamic State, Islamic Studies Quarterly
Journal, Vol. 28, (1989), p. 344. See alsoToriguian, S., supra note 107, pp. 101-102.
124 The founder of the second school is Malik bin Anas. He was born in 713 in Madinah and died in 795. See
supra note 104 for more description. See Imam Malik supra note 109, p. 326.
125 Imam Mohammad Ibn Edrees Al-Shafi' was the founder of the third school; he was born in Palestine in 769
and died in Egypt in 819. He was a disciple of Malik so became acquainted with the Maliki doctrines. Under the
Shaft' school approach, minerals found in the public domain, be it at the surface or in undeveloped mines, are
public property. As to those found in private lands, they are not necessarily private property and, in any event,
the authorisation of the state to prospect for, and extract, them is always required. Siddiqi, M., "Islam's
Approach to Right of Property," Some Aspects of the Islamic Economy, Islamic Publications Ltd., Lahore,
(1978), pp. 63-65. See also Blinn, K., supra note 76, p. 28.
126 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal is the founder of the fourth and last school of legal thought. He was born in Baghdad in
780 and died in 855 in Baghdad. See earlier discussion of the previous section. Siddiqi, Ibid, p. 74.
127 See supra notes 105 &106.
128 Karim, M., supra note 98, p. 19.
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The above discussion shows that the notion of the property can be said to cover both
tangible and intangible rights. No serious difficulty arises with regard to the recognition of
tangible assets whether movable or immovable. However, as broadly defined above, the
Saudi government distinguishes between ownership of the surface of the land and ownership
of its subsoil and minerals contained in it. This has been expressed in Articles 1 and 25 of the
original ARAMCO Agreement of 1933. These articles were originally stated in the Article of
Mining Code enacted by Royal Decree No. 211M of 20105/1392 A.H (1972) and extended
also to petroleum.F'
Article 1 of the Mining Regulations clearly stipulates that all natural deposits of
minerals, in any form or combination, either in soil or subsoil, belong exclusively to the state.
This includes both land and sea territories comprising the continental shelf.13o Therefore,
compensation for expropriation by the state will only be to the extent of the land and not to its
content. The reasons for which the government, by virtue of Article 1 of the Mining Code,
subjected the minerals to state ownership have been summarised very helpfully by Walied EI-
Malik as follows:
a) The state is entrusted with the public wealth and is responsible for the
preservation of the national income.
b) Ownership of minerals cannot be made dependant on land surface
ownership, because this will result in breaking up the ownership of
minerals as a result of the land surface being owned by more than one
party.
c) Private land surface ownership can lead to improper exploitation of
minerals and can even make exploitation impossible.
129 AI-Samman, Y. A., The Evolution of Contractual Relationship between the Government of Saudi Arabia and
Aramco, LL.M. Dissertation, University of Dundee, (1990), p. 18.
130 Saudi Government, TheMining Code, Article 1, Al Riyadh Government Press Office, (1964).
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d) Mineral exploitation could simply be left contingent upon the individual
owner's wish and will, but proper exploitation of minerals requires the
setting up of a general policy to exploit minerals.
e) If the Saudi government can allow minerals to be considered as wealth
without specific ownership, then that would result in weakening the
state's ability to supervise and monitor the exploitation of them.
f) Leaving the minerals without specific ownership would make it possible
for anyone who discovers them to claim their ownership regardless of
whether or not he has the skill to exploit them and regardless of whether
or not he has the necessary financial means to do SO.131
From the ongoing discussion, it can be easily inferred that although the applicable
Islamic school in Saudi Arabia is the Hanbali School (by default),132 the Saudi government
has generally adopted the Maliki concept of the state ownership of natural resources. What is
beyond doubt is that such interpretation of Shari'a has confirmed the sovereign rights of the
state to regulate minerals activities within its territory and to direct and utilise them in the
interests of the whole community.P'' In the late 1960s and 1970s, oil-exporting host
governments such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela and Kuwait, which had become
accustomed to a steady increase in the proceeds of oil sales and a resultant increase in the
revenues available to them, worked vigorously to assert sovereignty and control over their
131 EI-Malik supra note, 61, pp. 55-56.
132 See Aal Darib, S., Al-Tanzeem Al-Qadaa'ee fi Al-Mamlakah Al-Arabiyah Al-Saudiyahfi Dua' Al-Sharee'ah
Al-Islamiyah wa Nizam Al-Sultah Al-Qadaiyyah, lSI ed., AI-Ma'had AI-Ali le AI-Qadha'- University of Imam
Mohammad Ibn Saud, the Ministry of Higher Education, (1983), pp. 313-314, (in Arabic). This book
categorically states that following Saudi Basic Law (Constitution), political and legal arrangements in the
Kingdom should be based upon basic sources of Shari'a, namely the Quran and the Sunnah, as interpreted by
rrominent Hanbali jurists.
33 EI-Malik, W., State Ownership of Minerals Under Islamic Law, Journal of Energy and Natural Resources
Law, Vol.l4 No.3, (1996), p. 316.
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own national resources.P" Since petroleum was identified as a mineral, its commercial
exploitation is governed by the state rather than any private individual or commercial interest,
in both Muslim and non-Muslim states, a thriving and substantial legal practice in the field of
oil and gas law has been spawned. This attendant specialist advisory sector exists, inter alia,
to identify with whom the foreign investors should be dealing, and on the other hand, to both
safeguard the foreign investments made and secure economic development in the host
country. 135
2.9 How Saudi Arabia has implemented the principles discussed
above on the ownership of minerals into its domestic law
In Saudi Arabia all minerals belong to the state. The Saudi Constitution specifically
provides in Article 14 that:
"All God's bestowed wealth, be it under the ground, on the surface or in national
territorial waters, in the land or maritime domains under the state's control, are the
property of the state as defined by law. The law defines means of exploiting, protecting,
and developing such wealth in the interests of the state, its security and economy", 136
In addition to the constitutional provision, the concept of mineral ownership is based on
Shari'a and the Saudi Mining Code, 137 According to the Code, all mineral deposits belong to
the State. The Code defines the general provisions and conditions for exploration and mining.
The Mining Regulations were adopted in 1993 and explain the specific conditions required
134 Bunter, M. A. G., The Promotion and Licensing of Petroleum Prospective Acreage, Kluwer Law
International, (2002), p. 1.
m By the 1970s, most of the Arabian Gulf Countries, which by then were independent of British custody,
bought major shares in the subsidiary companies that worked within their borders. By the early 1990s, many of
these subsidiaries had become completely state-owned entities. They continued to employ Western experts at
the highest decision-making levels, but the local government had ultimate responsibilities and profits. Since
then, those countries had issued their mining codes and regulations. See Lowell F., Publication-State-Qatar-
August, (2001). Also see Chapter 4 of this thesis for more discussion of the nationalisation movement in Oil-
exporting Countries particularly Saudi Arabia.
136 The constitution of Saudi Arabia, adopted in March 1992, by Royal Decree of King Fahd, available at:
http://www.mideastinfo.comJdocuments/SaudiArabiaBasicLaw.htm. Accessed 21102/2009.
137 See Article 2 of the Mining Code, Royal Decree No. 47IM dated on 18/0112005. The Code is the revised
version based on the version revised on 01107/1972. The Code and the Regulations can be viewed at
www.dmmr.gov.salmining-code.php visited on 1411112008.
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by the Code.138The Mining Code and Regulations have become a comprehensive framework
that give foreign investors a full image and comprehensive picture of the legal system
governing the structuring and treatment of investment in the mining sector.
It is very important to note that the mining code, framed by the Deputy Ministry of
Mineral Resources, Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Government of Saudi
Arabia, contains policy guidelines governing private sector entry into the mining sector. The
core of the Code deals with issues of ownership of minerals, documents to be submitted by
applicants and the scope of mining rights.139 The Saudi government position on State
ownership of minerals (in line with the above mentioned constitutional provision) is set out in
Article 2, which provides that:
"All natural mineral deposits including quarry raw materials of all types, in whatever
form or composition whether in the soil or subsoil shall be considered the exclusive
property of the state. This shall also include the onshore and offshore territory of the
state; its absolute economic area and continental shelf. Title to the minerals shall
transfer from the state to the licensee, pursuant to this Code, upon extraction of such
minerals from the license area within the duration of the license. Otherwise, the state
ownership of the minerals shall be imprescriptible".
2.10 The concept of mineral ownership in non-Islamic countries
The purpose of this section is to examine whether there are any fundamental differences
between Islamic and non-Islamic countries in the field of mineral ownership. In general, most
countries have adopted a similar position to that of Saudi Arabia by adopting the position that
all minerals are owned by the State.140 This position is based, in most cases, on the
138 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Deputy Ministry of Mineral
Resources, the Mineral Resources Sector.
139 See www.ga.gov.au/geojag/jagonly/riydh.html.app
140 Even countries with minimal activities have adopted this position. An example is Denmark: The first Subsoil
Act in Denmark was established as early as 1932. It provides that raw materials in the Danish subsoil belong to
the state of Denmark. This principle is preserved in the present Subsoil Act: thus, the state is entitled to decide
how and on what conditions these resources are to be developed. The present Act of 10 June 1981 (Act No. 293)
which is one of the several aim at the complete reorganisation of resource management in Denmark both
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internationally accepted right of the state to exercise sovereignty over all the mineral
resources within its national boundaries.l'l' As will be seen, this international right of states
was adopted by the United Nations in a number of General Assembly Resolutions, notably
the principle of permanent of sovereignty over natural resources. This has been included as a
statement in most national laws concerning the development of mineral resources. Examples
include most African, Latin American, South East Asian countries.l'f However, the South
African Mining Law (Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 2002) does not
include such a provision and merely states that mineral resources are the common heritage of
all the people of South Africa and that the State is the custodian for the benefit of all the
people of South Africa, and the Minister of Minerals and Energy may grant licenses for
prospecting and mining. 143
However, there are some exceptions where the mineral belongs to the landowner upon
whose land the minerals are found. These include France,144 Chile145 and the above example
onshore and offshore. This Act is concerning the Use of the Danish Underground. It provides that petroleum in
place is the property of the Danish State. The central element of the Subsoil Act is the establishment of a
licensing system permitting private and state-owned companies to explore for the produce of hydrocarbons. See
Ronne, A., & Budtz, M., The legal Frameworkfor Exploration for and Production of Oil and National Gas in
Denmark, in JENRL, Vol. 3. (1985), p. 155; and also see Cameron, P., North Sea Oi/licensing: Comparisons
and Contracts, in 4 OGLTR, (1984/85), p. 99.
141 For more discussion on this international principle see chapter 5 infra. Neither state sovereignty not its right
to control foreign property can be questioned. See, section 3 of World Bank Guidelines II provides that the
admission of foreign investment is ultimately a matter for each state to decide upon and regulate in the exercise
of its sovereignty. See World Bank: Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment, 31 lLM (1992). Sornarajah, M, supra note 80, p. 43. See also, Wallace, C., The
Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host State Sovereignty in an Era of Economic Globalisation, The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, (2002), p. 977.
142 For detailed discussion of the mining regimes of Australia, Canada, the United States, Latin America, Africa,
Asia and South Pacific, the former Soviet Union and the European Union, see Bastida, A., Walde T. and J.,
Warden-Fernandez (eds.), International Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: Trends and Prospects, Kluwer
Law International, (2005), pp. 643-1110. This work is comprehensive and informative about the trends and
practices of mining activities in most countries. However, the work does not include mining in Muslim countries
and thus to that extent is incomplete.
143 See the Act at: http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a28-02.pdf
144 The minerals are the property of the landowner as the "accession" system in France means that the
subsurface is an accessory of the surface. See for example, Campbell, N., Principles of Mineral Ownership in
Civil Law and Common Law Systems, Vol. XXXI, Tulane Law Review, 304-310, cited in Ibid.
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of South Africa. For purposes of comparison, the United Kingdom is an example where
ownership of minerals is vested in the Crown, but with certain considerations. The following
is a brief overview of the UK system.
In the UK, English property rights derive from the Common Law, which dates from the
time of the Anglo-Saxon kings and is based on custom and precedent, together with Statute
Law, deriving from Acts passed by Parliament and given Royal assent. It stipulates that "to
whomever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depth". 146The basic legislation
in the UK is the Petroleum Act 1998, which is based fundamentally on the Petroleum
Production Act 1934, which vests all onshore petroleum deposits in the Crown. Its provisions
were extended over that part of the continental shelf to which the UK has sovereign rights by
the Continental Shelf Act 1964.147 This exclusive title is contracted out in a statutory
licensing system to oil exploration and development companies, which assume the rights
subject to, and "without infringing the Crown's exclusive power to undertake such
activities".148 Thus, virtually everywhere in the world, the importance of petroleum and gas
as a source of energy has resulted in their exploration being declared as a matter of national
interest. The end result is that all activities in this field are being increasingly controlled by
the state.
145 In Chile, the minerals such as non-metallic minerals (basic construction materials such as stone, sand and
gravel and quarry materials) are not regarded as minerals and they are regulated by common property law. See
Chilean Mining Code Article 13, at: www.cochilco.cllanmJarticlefiles/198-CDIGOD1.pdf
146 This follows the common law doctrine cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th ed. (1979), p. 341. See also Bunter, M., supra note 131, p. 40.
147 Cameron, P., supra note 92, p. 103. See Petroleum Act (PA) 1998, which under section 2(1) states as follows:
"Her Majesty has the exclusive right of searching and boring for and getting petroleum to which this section
applies". The PA is Chapter 17 of the Laws of the United Kingdom, available at:
www.hmso.gov.uklacts/acts1998!98017--b.htm
148 See Pitsas, N., Joint Operating Agreement Considerations in Dealing with a Financially Troubled Operator:
Selected Legal Issues Arising out of the Relationship between Participants in a North Sea Petroleum Joint
Venture in the Event of the Operator's Financial Distress and Formal Insolvency and the Effects thereof upon
the Operator's Co-Venturers in the Context of English Law, PhD Thesis, CEPMLP, University of Dundee,
(2005), pp. 422-426. See also, on the concept of ownership of hydrocarbons, Centre for Economic, Research
and Management (IFP-School), Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Reserves, Costs and Contracts, Paris:
Institut Francais du Petrole, (2004), pp. 171-174.
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From this briefl49 comparative study between the legal system as to the title of minerals
in the Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and those of Western countries, it is very clear
that there is no radical difference between Saudi mining law and that of the West as minerals
in both of them, as stated above, are regarded as a matter of national interest. The above
examples also show that State ownership of minerals is now regarded as an international
norm which should be accepted by foreign investors as necessary to safeguard their
investment in the mining sector. This clearly means that the Saudi Mining Law helps, rather
than hinders, foreign investments in Saudi Arabia.
2.11 United Nations Resolutions on the Ownership Concepts
Applicable to Natural Resources
Due to the importance of petroleum as a natural source of energy and as a matter of
national interest, the intervention of the UN General Assembly was important with respect to
the ownership of mineral rights. However, there was another main factor that led to the
redress of the meaning of ownership of natural resources in developing countries including
Saudi Arabia. This was the inequitable'j" situation where seven major international oil
companies controlled huge areas under long term concession contracts that only benefited
them at the expense of the large nations in which they operated.l" Consequently, the UN
General Assembly took the following action:
149 The reason for the comparative study between the law governing the title to minerals in both Islamic and
Western countries is so brief is because there are no differences to be analysed or discussed.
ISO For more discussion and analysis see chapter 4 & 5 infra.
lSI See Yargin, D., The Prize: The Epic Questfor Oil, Money and Power, Free Press, (1991), for an examination
of the history of the world oil industry, the founders, the global struggle, war and strategy, the hydrocarbon age,
the battle for world mastery including the events that led the creation of OPEC.
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On December 21, 1952, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 626 (VII)152 which
provides that:
"The right of people freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is
inherent in their sovereignty". 153
On December 14, 1962, at its Seventeenth Session, the General Assembly adopted
Resolution No. 1803 (XVII)154 entitled Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
which provided that:
"The right of people and nations to permanent sovereignty over their wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the
well-being of the people of the state concerned".
At the same time, it was declared that:
"Nationalisation, expropriation, or relinquishment shall be based on grounds or
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised as
overriding purely private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases, the
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force
in the state taking such measures in exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance
with international law't.V' .
The 1962 Resolution was reinforced in 1966 by Resolution No. 2158 (XXI) which was
even more explicit on host state rights.+" Host states were 'advised', by exercising their
permanent sovereignty, to secure the maximum exploitation of natural resources and to
achieve this by the accelerated acquisition by developing countries of full control over
production operations, managing and marketing. 157
152 See text of Resolution at UN General Assembly website: www.un.org/documents/resga.htmI5/1112008.
153 For more discussion on the issue of sovereignty, in particular, the issue of the state right to regulate its
natural resources see chapter 5 infra.
154 General Assembly website, supra note 149.
ISS Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements: A Technical Paper, New York: United Nations, (1983). See also Steven, P., infra note, 172,
p. 131 & also for the details of this Resolution, see Blinn, K., supra note 76, p. 30.
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On December 12, 1974, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 3281 (XXIX),158
entitled "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" which provided that:
a) Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including
possession, use and disposal, over all of its wealth, natural resources and economic
activities ...
b) Each state has the right: "to nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of
foreign property in which case appropriate compensation shall be paid by the state
adopting such measures, taking into account any relevant laws and regulations and
all circumstances that the state considers pertinent. In any case where the question of
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law
of the nationalising state and by its Tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed
by all states concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the
sovereign equality of states and in accordance with principle of free choice of
means". 159
The remaining crucial issue in the field of title to minerals is whether such minerals can
be transferred to a foreign or national corporation. Does the government, while retaining
ownership, transfer substantial powers of management (including the power to take critical
decisions) to the oil company?
2.12 Petroleum Operations and Ownership Rights of International
Oil Companies
In order to define the ownership rights of the petroleum resources before and after
exploration, this section will focus on analysing the ownership of petroleum in the ground (in
situ) and the ownership of petroleum at the surface, when produced. This will highlight the
position of the rights of both the states on whose territory those resources are found and the
oil companies - who undertake petroleum exploration and production in those countries.
158 UNGA website, supra note 149.
159 The above UN General Assembly's Resolutions of 1952, 1962 and 1974 are cited by Blinn, K., supra note
76, pp. 30-31.
89
2.12.1 Ownership of Petroleum in the Ground
As already explained, most of the world's petroleum resources are owned by the
governments on whose territory those resources are found. 160 Under most legal systems (with
the exception however of the private land regime in the USA or Canada and in a very few
other countries), petroleum below the surface of any land is the property of the state, even if
exploration and exploitation rights are granted by it to oil companies. The procedure for
disposal and transfer of ownership has to be decided by law. The oil companies which have
made such a discovery are usually assured of obtaining from the state the exclusive right of
exploitation. 161
2.12.2 Ownership of Petroleum at the Surface
Governments have been compelled to adopt some means of involving private
companies in the exploration for and exploitation of their petroleum resources. Obviously, it
is one which has to be advantageous to both parties. The choice has usually been some form
of licensing arrangement.Pi Although the legal form may simply be called a petroleum
licence, it may also be called a concession or a lease. In fact, the differences in terminology
1 . '1· . . b 163concea a SImI anty In su stance.
When petroleum is produced by an oil company authorised by the state under an
Exploration and Production Agreement, there is a transfer of title to petroleum produced at
the surface, because any mineral not yet produced and extracted, belongs only to the state.
160 Stickley, D., Natural Gas Negotiations and Contracts, CEPMLP, (2003), p. 12.
161 Le Leuch, H., Petroleum Exploration/Production Agreements and Taxation, Deventer: Kluwer Law, (2001),
~. 4. .
62 Cameron, P., supra note 92, p. S.
163 Ibid, p. 5.
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There is then agreement between the state and the producer in conformity with the existing
law and agreement entered into between the state and such a producer. The transfer of title
and the point of transfer take the following forms:
- Under a production sharing contract (PSC), the transfer concerns only a part of the
production and the point of transfer is generally at the outlet of the storage facilities.
Management (the power to take critical decisions) is shared between the state and the oil
company.
- Under a concession agreement (or a "licence agreement"), the transfer concerns the entirety
of the production (except when a royalty is taken in kind by the host state) and is made at the
wellhead. A substantial portion of management power is transferred to the oil company.
- Under a service contract generally no transfer of title occurs as the company only receives a
monetary compensation without any right to production (unless otherwise provided). No
management is transferred to the oil/service company. 164
In the past, the main concern of producing countries was expansion of oil production in
order to maximize their benefits. For this reason, very few concessions embodied provisions
for control or curtailment regulations of oil production - except to the extent that special
powers were envisaged in times of national emergency.165 In most countries, especially in
Europe, the Middle East and other developing countries, the reserves are, however,
considered as constituting inalienable natural resources, and the concessionaire requires the
ownership of the production at the well-head. In fact, through a subtle process, the mining
rights of the concessionaire have been converted into a mere authorisation to explore and
164 Le Leuch, H, supra note, 158, p. 4-6.
165 Cattan, H., supra note 26, p. 104.
91
produce, while the minerals remain the property of the state until produced (jus ad rem versus
•. ,I 166JUs In rem).
An early example is found in Getty's concession in 1949 in the Neutral Zone of Saudi
Arabia.167 Article 42 of the agreement provided that the company should conduct its drilling
and production operations according to all reasonable requirements, consistent with good oil
field practice. These were as may be imposed upon all other companies conducting oil
operations within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for the purpose of conserving the national
wealth. The article provided that, if by reason of any curtailment imposed upon production
the royalty payable under the agreement in any year shall be less than the minimum royalty
fixed by the same agreement and then that such a minimum royalty shall be correspondingly
reduced. 168
In Europe, the first prospecting licenses in England and Scotland under the new Act
were granted to the D'Arcy Exploration Co. Ltd., now (British Petroleum - BP), in December
1935 and covered a total of six thousand nine hundred and forty six square miles. Under the
1934 Act, as subsequently amended, the Secretary of State was awarded the power to grant a
license which entities the award holder "to search and bore for and get petroleum". Based on
the Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (PSONR), these licensing powers are
permissive rather than mandatory and therefore the government could in fact exploit its own
resources without involving private enterprise.l'"
166 Blinn, K .., supra note 76, p. 55.
167 The concession for onshore Neutral Zone production was initially secured by legendary oil tycoon J. P. Getty
in 1949 and passed to Texaco on its acquisition of Getty Oil in 1984. Chevron became the holder of the lucrative
contract following its merger with Texaco in 2001. In 15 July 2008, Chevron's Neutral Zone Concession was
extended by the Saudi Cabinet, see Arab News newspaper at:
http://www.arabnews.coml?page=I&section=O&article=I I I 822&d= I 5&m=7 &y=2008. 30/05/09.
168 Blinn, K .., supra note 76, p. 105.
169 Bunter, M., supra note 118, p. 41.
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2.12.3 State participation
As to state participation'I'' in the extractive petroleum industry, in practice, it is only
made obligatory in the context of an exclusive license granted by the host state. State
participation however, is non-obligatory if the state or a state-owned oil company is accepted
as a participant in a domestic or foreign petroleum venture by the other participants on a
voluntarily basis and for purely commercial reasons.!"
With regard to the implementation of state participation in the extractive petroleum (oil
& gas) industry in Saudi Arabia, in 1965 the government entered into a state participation
agreement with respect to acreage situated on its part of the Red Sea continental shelf. The
parties were Petrominl72 with a participating share amounting to 40%, and Auxirap'P with a
60% participating share. Auxirap was responsible for the conduct and financing of the
exploration work. As soon as a commercial discovery was made, a joint company would have
to be established and run on a commercial basis. The company was liable to pay 50% income
calculated on the basis of the price required to be posted by the company. The company had
to pay royalty at higher rates than was customary at the time, a rate of 15% increasing to 20%
di duction nerf 174depen mg on pro p rormance,
In July 1971, the 24th OPEC conference passed Resolution, XXIV 135, which called
upon all member states to "take immediate steps towards the effective implementation of the
170 For more discussion on state participation, see chapter 4 infra and previous part of this chapter.
171 Tavarne, B., Co-operative Agreements in the Extractive Petroleum Industry, London: Kluwer Law
International, (1996), p. 101.
172 Petromin is the Saudi Arabian state oil enterprise, it was not formed until November 1962, its role was
intended to be wider than most national oil companies, since it was expected to take part in various industrial
and commercial activities connected not only with petroleum, but with minerals in general, for more information
see http://www.saudinf.com!mainld21.htm
173 Auxirap is a French company subsidiary ofERAP.
174 Taveme, B., Co-operative agreements in the extractive petroleum industry, Londres: International Energy
and Resources Law & Policy Series, (1996).pp. 115-116.
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principle of participation". This was followed in September 1971 by Resolution XXV. 139
which called on members to "establish negotiation ... (to achieve) ... effective
participation".175 Generally, under modem participation agreements, the Gulf Countries,
including Saudi Arabia, have now a much greater degree of authority and control over
petroleum operations. Undoubtedly, the aim of state participation is to strike a fair balance
between supervision and control by the government to secure national policy objectives -
mainly protecting its natural resources - and the company's freedom to operate so as to secure
its corporate objectives.
2.12.4 Petroleum Operations' Information Ownership Rights
It must be noted that, in the international field of petroleum operation not only is the
ownership of natural resources a concern of the state, but also the title to the information and
data resulting from petroleum operations are very important. Petroleum Operations involve
exploring for, discovering and producing petroleum through drilling, pressure enhancement,
pumping or the like and other incidental operations. It includes transportation, storage,
handling and sales (whether for export or domestic consumption) of petroleum but does not
include transportation for purposes of export or the cost of refining or processing.
A consistent pattern of modem Petroleum International Agreements (PIAs) requires the
international oil company to furnish the host state with all available information and data.
This is indicated, for example, in a Brazilian PIA providing that " .... Any and all plans,
maps, drawings, design data, scientific and technical reports or other data and information of
any kind or nature whatsoever, relating to the Contractor's operations ... be furnished to the
175 Stevens, P., Joint Venture in Middle East Oil 1957-1975, Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants (1976),
p.138.
94
host state's national oil company". The latter one predicts this contract on the concept of
ownership of the materials. 176
Also by reviewing standard Indonesian Production Sharing Contractsl77 (PSCs) which
were a new type of petroleum development agreement in 1967, and later adopted by a
number of countries in South and South-East Asia and beyond, it is noted that the
management framework under a PSC is so designed that work programmes in each phase of
operations are drawn up by the contractor, and submitted for approval by the national
company. There is also provision for periodic reporting and submission of information. 178 A
similar approach to the ownership of material is taken by Equatorial Guinea by declaring, in
its standard Petroleum International Agreement (PIA), that the Ministry of Petroleum will
have title to all original data resulting from the petroleum operations but permits the
contractor to retain copies. The Ministry agrees not to disclose such data to third parties
without the contractor's consent during the term of the contract. 179
It appears that an awareness of the nature of the exploratory process is important in
order for a government to adopt a number of measures to safeguard its interests. It is argued
that governments should not only require that all exploration data should be furnished to it,
but also evaluations made by the companies.
176 Le Leuch, H., International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements, New York: Barrows Co.
INC. (1986), p. 158-159.
177 For more discussion on the PSC see previous part of this chapter.
178 Hossain, K., Law and Policy in Petroleum Development, London: Frances Printer Ltd, 1979, p. 140.
179 Ibid, p. 160.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been found that there are many similarities between Islamic law
and western legal systems with regard to commercial contracting. Itwas also found that many
principles similar to those in Shari' a exist or have existed in common law systems despite
some differences, such as the doctrines dealing with uncertainty and usury. It has been shown
that the principle of freedom of contract conforms to both Shari' a and the exigencies of
modem commerce. However, it should be stated that there are certain differences in ethos and
practice of different schools of Islamic law as regards principles applicable to petroleum
development. These areas have been identified in this chapter. Shari' a emphasises equality of
partnership and prohibits unfair profits through usury. This view of Shari' a is utterly different
from what is applied in western systems.
Shari'a's attitude towards the old concession agreement was also demonstrated.
Traditional concession agreements placed foreign companies in a position significantly
greater than the host state in several ways. This unbalanced partnership between foreign oil
companies and host states led the latter to act collectively through OPEC to regain control
over their natural resources. Saudi Arabia used renegotiation and state participation - at a
later stage - as a means of regaining control gradually. It is argued that Saudi Arabia
pursuing this policy provides evidence of protection of foreign investment. It should also be
mentioned that the old concession agreements have now been replaced by production sharing
agreements, state participation and service contracts' which reflect a better balance and
therefore a more sustainable relationship between both parties.
As far as the stability of investment agreements in Saudi Arabia is concerned, there is a
significant conflict between Shari'a's view of certain foreign investment contract types. It has
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been shown that they are not in conformity with Shari'a law of contract in several ways, as
discussed earlier. Therefore, this could give rise to legal risks for the development of foreign
investment projects in the country. However, as has been discussed, the flexibility of Shari'a
means that it has the capacity to adapt to changes of circumstances and contractual
divergence which will enhance the development of contract law in Saudi Arabia under
Shari'a.
The history of private ownership of land has been examined in this chapter as this is of
such vital preliminary importance to the economic exploitation of mineral rights through
petroleum extraction and production, and to legal issues surrounding foreign investment in
such activities. Land ownership was practised before and after Islam. Land was given by the
Prophet (Pbuh) and his successors with the right to use and transfer the title. At times, the
absolute right of ownership was taken away by the government, and restrictions on its use
were imposed in the interest of the community. Generally under most legal systems such as
those highlighted in the chapter, (with the exception of the private land regime in the USA or
Canada and a very few other countries), petroleum below the surface of any land is deemed at
all times to be the property of the state. The procedure for disposal and transfer of ownership
has to be decided by law. The example of the UK was highlighted to show this difference. As
for the ownership of petroleum at the surface, when petroleum is produced by persons
authorised by the state under an exploration production license, there is a transfer of title of
petroleum produced at the surface between the state and the producer in conformity with
existing law and the agreement entered into between the state and such producer.
It has been shown that virtually all minerals ownership regimes are based on the
jurisprudential theory of state sovereignty. United Nations resolutions relating to the
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permanent sovereignty of natural resources have further strengthened the notion that the state
owns all the resources found within its boundaries. The sovereign over a defined
geographical area has exclusive dominion over the area, and this includes its natural
resources. The sovereign can recognise private ownership of these resources, or it can treat
them as state-owned minerals whose commercial exploitation shall be managed by a state
agency. It may also authorise development by private companies, including foreign
companies. Whichever route it chooses it will need foreign expertise, capital and labour. This
will only be supplied on competitive terms if a sufficiently certain and clear legal framework
for FDI is in existence as well as the availability of effective, independent and impartial
mechanisms for the settlement of foreign investment disputes. The next chapter explores the
role and suitability of the dispute resolution system to the foreign investor in Saudi Arabia.
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(3) THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES
Introduction
In any commercial agreement, despite the fact that parties to the agreement are bound
by its terms, there is still a possibility of a dispute occurring. Thus the infrastructure of, and
legal process for, dispute settlement are just as important to an optimal legal framework for
FDI as the substantive content of that framework. Parties therefore include provisions in
their agreements that cater for such an eventuality. The most important provision is a dispute
settlement mechanism for addressing future disputes. Before the method of resolving the
dispute can be put into force, the mechanism for determining a dispute and the law that will
be used in the method must be determined. Therefore, the need to determine the applicable
law is very important.
During the last few decades, it is apparent that International Commercial Arbitration
,
(ICA) has gained worldwide acceptance as the favoured means of resolving international
commercial disputes. Around the world domestic laws on arbitration have been mobilised
and international agreements on arbitration have been signed with a notable degree of
success. The gradual removal of political and trade barriers and the significant progress of
globalisation bringing with it an acceleration of economic activities, has made the need for
national and international arbitration more evident. Increasing reliance on arbitration in
national and international trade is one of the main features of today's world business
community. All these developments have cr~ated challenges for arbitration institutions in
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response to the growth in demand by parties for certainty and predictability, greater speed
and flexibility as well as neutrality and efficacy in the settlement of commercial disputes.
This chapter examines how foreign investment is protected in Saudi Arabia by means of
dispute settlement methods and infrastructure. It examines the purpose, role and suitability of
the dispute resolution system that is in place, including arbitration. It provides a critical
overview and evaluation of the international regime and relevant law in Saudi Arabia relating
to the settlement of investment disputes. The chapter also examines the concept of arbitration
under Islamic law and how it can be used in modem litigation and identifies the main legal
obstacles relating to investment agreements. It will also look at the available dispute-
settlement mechanisms for the resolution of foreign investment disputes in Saudi Arabia. It is
important to have an effective dispute resolution system for the protection of foreign
investors. This will pave the way for more economic development in Saudi Arabia and
encourage more foreign investors to invest in many different types of industries. This will be
achieved in part by foreign investors' awareness of Shari'a, the Saudi legal system and its
attitude in respect to methods of disputes resolution. The government and the judiciary of
Saudi Arabia are also obliged to fully recognise and adhere to international arbitration
agreements and conventions which Saudi has signed and ratified.
The focus in this chapter is therefore the question of how investment disputes in Saudi
Arabia are resolved by litigation, domestic and international arbitration. The structure of this
chapter is six sections dealing with the following issues:
Section 1 analyses the settlement of investment disputes through litigation in Saudi Arabia. In
this section, the structure of the judicial system in Saudi Arabia will be considered followed
by the different legal aspects of Shari'a courts and facilities for resolving disputes in the
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Board of Grievances.I Section 2 summarises the history of dispute settlement methods in both
the pre-Islamic period and early days of Islam. The purpose of this section is to see how the
Prophet (Pbuh) resolved disputes in his time and the methods of settlements he applied.
Section 3 explores the resolution of disputes arising out of investment agreements through
ICA. The discussion in this section will address the influence of the famous ARAMCO
award, the Council of Ministers Resolution No 58, the Ministry of Commerce's Circular and
the shift in Saudi Arabia's attitude toward leA.
Section 4 will deal with international treaties/conventions with a discussion of the New
York Convention (NYC), summary of the United Nation Commission for International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL)2 and its applicability in Saudi. Section 5 confines itself to the examination
of whether Islamic Law represents an obstacle to the application of International Arbitration
Law, which will entail discussion of arbitration under the four Islamic Schools and the
suitability of ICA in respect of the commercial security and investment stability for both
foreign investors and the government of Saudi Arabia. Section 6 examines elements of the
domestic Arbitration Law in Saudi Arabia contained in the Arbitration Code of 1983, the
arbitration clauses, the autonomy of the arbitration clauses, appointment of arbitrators,
number and qualification of arbitrators. It goes on to look at the revocability of arbitrators,
procedures of arbitration under Shari'a, arbitration proceedings, place and applicable law of
arbitration place, the award and finally the enforcement of foreign arbitral award in Saudi
Arabia.
1 For more details see Chapter 1 of the thesis.
2 The UNCITRAL Rules were adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 31198 dated December 15,
1976.
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3.1 Historical view of Dispute Settlement Methods
In general, there is more than one method of dispute resolution arising out of investment
agreements. These include methods such as negotiation.' mediation" and arbitration.' In many
cases, negotiation and mediation/reconciliation are preferred by commercial parties rather
than judicial or arbitral means 'due to their amicable nature which allows the disputing parties
to reach a compromise solution to their disputes. Arbitration and judicial settlement, on the
other hand, are employed when there is a requirement for a binding decision, usually on the
basis of international law, and hence these are known as legal means of settlement,"
Arbitration has a long history as a means used to settle disputes; it pre-dates the state
judiciary, or even the state itselC Indeed, some forms of arbitration process may be found
even in earliest societies. Peter Stein noted a rudimentary form of arbitration existed in
ancient Athens, with commercial arbitration in disputes involving large sums of money.
subject to institutional arbitration as early as 403 B.C.8
3 See Buhring-Uhle, C. Arbitration & Mediation in International Business, Kluwer Law International, (1996),
f' 222; Negotiation is 'communication directed at achieving a joint decision'.
Mediation is a device for resolving disputes that attempts to defuse a great deal of hostility and anguish
between the parties by using a third as a go-between. It has a number of characteristics such as: it is not very
time consuming, relatively inexpensive and is normally confidential. Best of all, it is a superior device for
preserving the underlying business relationship while permitting the parties to resolve the dispute at hand
because it is not nearly as confrontational as litigation. See Fox, W., International Commercial Agreements, 3rd
ed., Kluwer Law Intl., (1998), p. 35.
S Arbitration is a device whereby the settlement of a question, which is of interest for two or more persons, is
entrusted to one or more other persons-the arbitrator or arbitrators-who derive their power from a private
agreement not from the authority of a state, and who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such an
agreement. Arbitration is an alternative jurisdiction to national courts which are specifically established by the
state to apply and uphold the law and determine all forms of dispute. Lew, M., Comparative International
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, (2003), p. 17.
6 Merrills, J., International Dispute Settlement, 3rded., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1998), p. 88.
7 Fathy, R., Arbitration According to Islamic Law, 1 Arab Arb. J. (2000) p.3l.
8 Fox, W., supra note 4, p. 286.
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3.1.1 Pre-Islamic period and early days of Islam
Resort to arbitration ("AI-Tahkim") in the pre-Islamic period in the Arabian Peninsula
was optional and left to the free choice of the parties. It relied on tribal justice administered
by the chief of the tribe and trustworthy individuals instead of organised judicial justice.
Arbitral awards were not legally binding unless the parties had agreed to the contrary." In that
period, there were no specific rules to limit the arbitral subjects and the arbitral proceedings
were simple and rudimentary.l" Tribal disputes were settled by arbitration methods, the best
example was the dispute which arose between the leaders of Quraysh II about who should
have the honour of lifting and placing the black stone after rebuilding the Holy Kabba.12 The
dispute was settled by an agreement to accept the arbitration of the first comer to the place,
who happened to be Mohammed Al-Amin (the trustworthy) and the decision of the sole
arbitrator was accepted and enforced by the parties. 13
Arbitration in the early days of Islam was recognised as a means of disputes resolution.
The Holy Quran indicates its awareness of arbitration in the following verses:
If you fear a breach between them twain, appoint two arbiters, one from his family and the
other from hers; if they wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation; for Allah hath
full knowledge and is acquainted with all things. 14
The other verse that deals with arbitration is:
But no, by the Lord, they can have no real faith, until they make thee judge in all disputes
between them, and find in their souls no resistance against thy decisions, but accept them
with thefullest conviction. /5
9 Alqurashi, Z., Arbitration under Islamic Shari 'a..OGEL, Vol. 1, Issue 2, (March, 2003).
10 Ibid.
11 Prophet Mohammed's (Pbuh) tribe.
12 The first house of God, Quran, (3 :96).
13 The prophet said: "Bring me a cloak." When they brought him the cloak he placed the Black Stone on it and
said: "Let the elders of each tribe hold on to one edge of the cloak and raise it (to the position of the stone)."
They did so and the Prophet (saws) placed the stone in its place. See El-Ahdab, A., The Muslim Arbitration
Law, Arab Comparative & Commercial Law, Vol. 1, (1987), p.233.
14 Holy Quran, (4:35).
IS Ibid verse 65.
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Arbitration was also recognised and practiced by Prophet Mohammed. For instance, he
acted as an arbitrator in the feuds of A I-Aws and Al-Khazraj, the largest tribes in Al-Madinah
at that time, with three Jewish clans." Prophet Mohammed appointed arbitrators on several
occasions to settle many disputes and their decisions were accepted.!" In fact, arbitration at
that time, as stated earlier, relied on tribal justice administrated by the head of the tribe and
trustworthy individuals instead of organised judicial justice. For this reason, there was no
arbitration code and neither was arbitration confined to any particular forum or specialised
institution. Arbitrators used their wisdom and the legislative Quran verses.
3.2 The Settlement of Investment Disputes through Litigation in
Saudi Arabia.
The settlement of investment disputes through litigation is not regarded as beneficial to
foreign investors, due to the fact that the foreign company may have to appear before several
tnbunals.f Furthermore, a foreign investor who lodges a claim against a state in the state's
own courts may reasonably or unreasonably fear that the state may act both as judge and
party in its own cause.19 Furthermore, litigation is usually too expensive and time consuming
16 Amin., S., Commercial Arbitration in Islamic & Iranian Law. Tehran: Vahid & Glasgow: Royston, (1988), p.
50.
17 Al Samaan, Y., The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia. Dar AI Andalus for Pub. & Dist.
Hail, Saudi Arabia, (2000), p. 326.
18 Several tribunals resolve disputes in specialised areas of Saudi law. The Civil Rights Directorate is primarily
responsible for enforcing the judgment of a Saudi Arabian court or tribunal. The Negotiable Instruments
Committee decides cases involving bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques. The SAMA Committee
resolves certain disputes between banks and their customers. The Conciliation Committee at the Chamber of
Commerce assists in settling problems that arise when a foreign company attempts to change commercial
agents. The Preliminary Committee for the Settlement of Labour Disputes hears all matters related to labour and
employee relations.
19 Suleiman, A., Arbitration in Petroleum Contracts. 13-14 October. Abu Dhabi. U.A.E, (1998), p. 2.
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and court judgements have little international impacr'" because court judgements cannot be
easily enforced in other countries.
The importance of domestic courts in the settlement of cross border investment disputes
has grown over the years. Judicial systems around the world have grown in confidence in.
interpreting and implementing rules of international law into their domestic legal systems,
and giving effect to them through national enforcement mechanisms. The areas of law that
have been developed through local courts and their interpretation of international law rules
are mainly in the fields of the environment, human rights and business transactions.
The role of the domestic court in the settlement of an investment dispute is mainly to
provide a remedy against home states which have' interfered with the rights of foreign
investors. It should also provide a remedy to the citizens of the host state that have been
affected by the operations of the foreign corporations. Litigation by foreign investors in the
domestic courts is a facility which is available in most countries. It can be regarded as a
I
means to promote protection of foreign investment by multinationals through access to the
domestic courts of their home states to settle investment disputes arising from contracts made
in host states.
However, it is always difficult for the home state to have jurisdiction over contracts
entered by its nationals in another country, unless the host state agreed to a forum selection
which allows the home state to have such jurisdiction. In most cases, the host state would
insist on having jurisdiction to such disputes. But - for example - in the case of the USA, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act provides that US courts could have jurisdiction over
20 Fox, W., supra note 4, p.2.
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commercial acts of foreign sovereigns which produce effects within the USA.21 Some
exceptions to this rule include sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine. These
exceptions are important where it would upset the existing international order based on the
equality of the states. This is the reason why no domestic court of one state is competent to
exercise jurisdiction over another state_22
Examining methods of settlement of disputes arising out of investment agreements
through litigation in Saudi Arabia will involve exploring Saudi's legal system. However, as
the latter has been discussed earlier in this study,23 the focus in this section will be
exclusively placed on competent judicial bodies (courts & BO) to adjudicate disputes arising
out of investment agreements. The Saudi judicial system which is based on Shari'a, is also
reflected and incorporated by the various Royal Decrees and decisions of Council of
Ministers issued from time to time by the government.i"
3.2.1 The Judicial System in Saudi Arabia
Significant changes are taking place in the Saudi judicial system.i" One of these
changes is the newly established Supreme Court to be set up with specialised courts for
labour, commercial and personal disputes. The government emphasises that new commercial
courts will meet a pent-up demand by local and foreign investors.i" It has been assumed that
21 See Somarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, (2004), pp.344-345.
22 Ibid, pp. 345-357.
23 For more discussion on the Saudi legal system see chapter 1 supra.
24 See the forgoing discussion.
25 Saudi Embassy in Washington at: http://www.saudiembassy.net/abouticountry-
infonnationigovemmentJlegal and judicial structure.aspx. See also Saudi Judicial System Improving,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SAUDI +ARAB IA+-+Saudi+ Justice+System+ Improving-aO 170 168734
26 Ibid, Royal Decree No.(M178) dated 19/9/1428H (1110/2007) was issued, approving the Charter of Judiciary
system, and the Grievances Bureau Charter, and the implementation work mechanism for both Charters. See
SAMA website at:
http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/SAMAEN/ReportsStatisticslReportsStatisticsLib/1300 R EcoDev En 2007 12
25 04.pdf. See also Abdulghafour, P., Kingdom Overhauls Judiciary; Independence of Courts Stressed, Arab
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the previous system of dispute settlement - the BG - will come under the purview of the
commercial courts. These changes reflect the Saudi need for regulations that match the
requirements of a growing economy that is steadily opening up to foreign investment.
Implementation of a more professional system is expected to help clear a backlog of cases.
While there is no codification of laws involved, the reformed system is considered likely to
make arbitrary judgements less likely than in the past and the ~ystem more transparent.V
These reforms are at too early a stage to evaluate their effect."
(i) Courts
The judicial system consists of both general courts and specialised commercial courts.
Courts and tribunals may consist of a combination of judges and non-judges. Decisions may
be given instantly or may take some time. In some cases, decisions may be appealed/" The
general courts are Shari'a courts administrated by the Ministry of Justice according to
Judicial Code of 1975.30 Shari'a courts have general jurisdiction over all disputes except
those excluded from their jurisdiction by special codes.t' In particular, they have exclusive
jurisdiction over' civil, criminal cases and matters of personal status.32 Shari' a courts consist
of Summary Courts, Ordinary Courts and Courts of Appeal.33
News Newspaper, (Oct. 2, 2007), available at:
http://www.arabnews.coml.?page=l&section=O&article=1 02007 &d=3&m= 10&v=2007.
27 AME Info., Saudis move to modernise legal system, available at: http://www.ameinfo.comlI34904.html.
28 The process to bring about structural and procedural changes will take 20 years, said Minister of Justice.
Sheikh Abdullah Aal Al-Shiekh. See Saudi Gazette at:
http://www.saudigazette.com.salindex.cfm.?method=home.regcon&contentID=2008123125381 &archiveissuedat
e=31112/2008.
29 For more information see Info-Prod Research (Middle East), Saudi Arabia, at
http://www.infoprod.co.i1/article/24
30 Royal Decree No. Ml46, dated on 23/07/1975 and amended by Royal Decree No. Ml76 dated on 19/10/1975;
Royal Decree No. Ml4 dated on 06/01/1981.
31 Al-Samman, Y., supra note 17, p. 220.
32 Royal Decree No. Ml76 of 1975.
33 AI-Samman, Y., supra note 17, pp. 119-220.
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Under the Judicial Code of 1975, Article 53, judges in Shari'a courts are appointed by
royal order to execute decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council. Judges must be Saudi
nationals of good conduct and possess a degree from the Saudi Islamic Law Faculty or its
equivalent. The minimum age is twenty two years or, in the case of appellate judges, forty
years.34
(ii) Board of Grievances (Administrative Court)
The Board of Grievances (the BG) adjudicate disputes between government agencies
and private parties as well as other matters provided for by special codes such as bribery,
forgery and trademarks. Most cases are decided on their individual merits, and therefore,
legal precedent does not bind judges.3s The BG usually seeks outside technical experts to
decide cases, which are necessary for complex disputes."
This means that the BO is the adjudicative body having subject-matter jurisdiction over
cases to which the Saudi government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities is a party. In
other words, the BG (Diwan Al-Mazalimy is the judicial authority competent to hear
investment disputes in Saudi Arabia. Its antecedents are in historical jurisdiction outside the
Shari'a court system over grievances against government officials.37
34 The Law of the Judiciary 1975 available at Saudi Embassy in Washington website:
http://www.saudiembassy.netlaboutlcountry-informationl)aws/Law of the Judiciary.aspx. See also Lerrick A.
& Q. Mian., Saudi Business and Labour Law, Graham & Trotman, (1987), p. 200.
35 The legal system of Saudi Arabia does not accept the principle of stare of decisis (binding precedent), thus,
previous decisions of Saudi courts and other adjudicative bodies -such as (BG) - are not considered as
establishing binding precedents for the decision of later cases.
36 For more discussion in-depth see chapter 1.
37 Lerrick A. & Q., Mian, supra note 35, pp. 231-232.
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(iii) The Independence of the Board of Grievances
Article 19 of the Council of Ministers Code of 1954 provides for the establishment of
the BO as an institution attached to the Council of Ministers. It was reorganised in 1983 and
became an independent institution headed by a president, who is directly responsible to the
King as Head of State.38 The BO is defined by Article 1 of the Code of 1983 as an
autonomous judicial body which possesses an exclusive jurisdiction over administrative
cases. However, as it is linked directly to the King this would be automatically perceived by
foreign investors as a contradiction due to the fact that its autonomy is threatened by the
superior executive power of the King. Modifying Article 1 of the Board's Code should be
considered in order to separate the BO from any linkage whatsoever 0 the King, and to enjoy
the same full independence that is enjoyed by Shari'a courts.39 Article 3 of the BO's Code
stipulates that the appointment and dismissal of the president, vice-president and the judges
are made by royal decrees. This may be also perceived by foreign investors to negatively
affect the impartiality and independence of the Board's judges. A more impartial approach
would be for their appointment and dismissal to be made by the Supreme Judicial Council
rather than by the executive body, and this was debated before the 1983 reform.l" This might
eliminate foreign investors' fears and restore confidence in Saudi judicial system.
With the increasing significance of foreign investment in the Kingdom by the 1980s,
the government considered restructuring the BO to give it more judicial authority to deal with
all the cases mentioned previously. This led in 1983 to restructuring under a new code to
38 Royal Decree No. Ml13/8759 of 1955. Despite the recent judicial reforms the BG remained linked to the king,
Royal Decree No.(M/78) dated 19/9/1428H (1/10/2007). See note 27, supra.
39 Even though the King's extensive power clearly affects the independence of the judiciary, it is very difficult to
implement any proposal or reform to limit or reshape the Kings authority over the judiciary. This will require
constitutional arrangements and acceptance by the King himself. Al-Jarbou, A., Judicial Independence: Case
Study a/Saudi Arabia, 19 Arab L.O., 52, (2004), pp. 5-54.
40 AI-Samman, supra note 17, p. 224.
109
become a judicial administrative tribunal. However, the BO is still subject to criticism due to
its lack of full independence since the restructuring did not remove entirely the need for the
approval of the King.41 The reforms gave it jurisdiction over claims submitted by government
civil servants against the government, and over appeals filed by interested parties from
administrative decisions on the grounds of formal defects, violations of applicable codes and
their implementation rules and abuse of power. The jurisdiction of the BO also includes
compensation claims against the government, disputes relating to agreements between
government agencies and private parties, disciplinary cases for civil servants and criminal
cases under the Anti-Bribery Code and Anti-Forgery Code.42
The BO also adjudicates on foreign investment disputes. Since litigation before the
Courts can be a longwinded and protracted process, foreign investors view the local courts as
lacking sufficient knowledge to deal with sophisticated investment transactions, and see the
publicity accompanied with local court hearings as an infringement of their confidential
investment dealings. There is also a lack of trust of the impartiality of local courts. It is
,
therefore assumed that foreigninvestors prefer arbitration as a means to resolve any disputes
arising from their investment activities, and arbitration will be discussed further later.
By virtue of Article 9, the BO is prohibited from entertaining issues pertaining to acts of
state, or appeals from individuals against decisions of the courts or judicial bodies in matters
within their jurisdiction.Y The reason for this prohibition is that all these activities,
particularly those related to natural resources carried out by public entities; enjoy sovereign
immunity because the purpose behind such activities is in the public interest. In addition to
41 See generally, Trumbull, C., Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, Vand.
L. Rev., Vol. 59, Issue 2, (Mar. 2006), pp. 609-647.
42Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Statutes of the BG, for more discussion see chapter 1 supra.
43 Royal Decree Ml51 of 1983.
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the BOs adjudicative jurisdiction, it was in charge of enforcing judgements rendered in states
parties to the Arab League agreement regarding the execution of'judgements."
Since the transfer of jurisdiction of the Committee on Commercial Disputes" to the BO
in 1987, its jurisdiction has been broadly expanded to cover all commercial disputes within
the territorial domain of Saudi Arabia. This, of course, is of crucial importance to foreign
investments in Saudi Arabia. The BO became competent to hear appeals filed by a foreign
investor against the decision of the Foreign Capital Investment Committee. It is also
responsible for the withdrawal of investment licences or the deprivation of investment of any
investment incentives and is also the competent forum for litigating all other disputes arising
out of, or in connection with, foreign investments."
3.3 International Commercial Arbitration (ICA)
In this section the focus will be on the advantages and developments of international
commercial arbitration (ICA). The Saudi government's attitude towards ICA before and after
the ARAMCO Award will be dealt with.47 Although already mentioned earlier, it is worth
summarising common reasons48 why the settlement of foreign investment disputes by
litigation has always been undesirable to foreign investors. These reasons are:
Foreign investors lack confidence in the impartiality of national courts of the host
countries.
The long time taken by the court to render a final decision.
44 Convention of the Arab League on the Enforcement of Judgements and Arbitral Awards was established on
14/09/1952.
45 See chapter 1 for more discussion on this committee, supra.
46 AI-Samman, supra note 17, p. 226
47 For more discussion on the ARAMCO Award see chapter 4 infra.
48 See Lew, M., supra note 5, pp. 17-19. See also Fox, W., Supra note 4, pp. 283-285
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Court proceedings are for most part public and subject to scrutiny. This conflicts with
the desire of foreign investors to keep their disputes confidential.
Settlement of foreign investment disputes by litigation is usually too expensive and
court judgements have less international impact.49
3.3.1 The Development of International Commercial Arbitration
(ICA)
As one of the main aims of this thesis is to examine dispute settlement mechanisms in
Saudi Arabia from the perspective of their role in the legal framework affecting foreign
investment, this section will only discuss briefly the main elements of lCA. Suffice it to say it
is a private, effective, widely used and now generally accepted method of resolving
international business disputes around the world, including those relating to foreign
. t 50investment,
Arbitration, especially in international trade disputes, is not merely an attempt at
conciliation or restoration of relations. It is in fact, a fundamental method used to settle,
disputes and national courts are generally referred to in these disputes as a secondary
method." The position of international arbitration is not the same as that of national
49 While there are only limited arrangements in force for the international recognition and enforcement of
judgments in commercial cases, the position is the opposite in the case of international commercial arbitration.
This is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, which has been ratified by no fewer than 137 states. Under that Convention, a party receiving an
arbitral award in one state is entitled, on complying with the requisite formalities, to have the award recognised
and enforced in another state, provided that state is a party to the Convention. Such recognition and enforcement
may be refused only in the restricted circumstances laid down in Article V. See Goode, R., Litigation or
Arbitration? The Influence of the Dispute Resolution Procedure on Substantive Rights, available at:
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisgibiblio/goode.html#23 last accessed 08/12/2008.
so Redfern, A., & M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet & Maxwell,
(1999), p. 1-12.
SI El-Ahdap, A., Arbitration Rules in the International Trade, The Lawyers Journal, (April, 1993), p. 245.
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arbitration, perhaps the main difference being that each system of arbitration is concerned
with different types of disputes.52
A foreign investor, justifiably in many instances, will not have confidence in the
impartiality of the local tribunals and courts in settling any disputes that may arise between
him and the host state. Arbitration, in a neutral state before a neutral tribunal, has traditionally
been seen as the best method of securing impartial justice. Where an international treaty
backs up the investor by creating an obligation on the host state to submit to any arbitral
proceeding brought against it, a major step could be said to have been taken towards
• . 53mvestment protection,
For arbitration to be an effective form of international dispute settlement, agreement
between states is needed on the manner in which each state's legal system will accept foreign
arbitration.54 Therefore, a number of international accords and protocols have been prepared
regarding international commercial arbitration.55
3.4 The Saudi Government's Attitude towards (leA).
In order to fully examme the Saudi attitude towards international commercial
arbitration, we will focus on the 1958 ARAMCO award. Generally, both before and during
the dispute between ARAMCO and the government of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government
52 The term 'international' is used to distinguish the difference between arbitrations which are purely domestic
and those which in some way transcend national boundaries and therefore are international or in the terminology
adopted by judge Jessup, 'transnational'. '
53 Sornarajah, M., supra note 21, p. 266.
54 Collier, J., & V., Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law, Oxford University Press, (2000). p.
46.
55 Redfern describes an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration any disputes or differences between
them as 'the foundation stone of modem international commercial arbitration'. If there is to be a valid
arbitration, there must be first a valid agreement to arbitrate which is recognised both by national laws and
international treaties. Supra note 55, p. 21.
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had confidence in the system of international commercial arbitration. That is evident both
from the government's acceptance of the arbitration clause in the concession agreement and
again from the fact that the government was the party that took the initiative in suggesting the
referral of the matter to arbitration. 56 It was likewise the first to appoint its arbitrator.
However, following the government's defeat in the ARAMCO arbitration, the attitude
towards ICA changed dramatically. 57
On April 1954, Aristotle Onassis signed an agreement with the Saudi government,
according to which Onassis was permitted to form a Saudi local company called Satco (Saudi
Arabian Tanker Company). Satco was granted a quasi-monopoly for all transport of crude oil
from the Kingdom at rates which were very favourable and the agreement was ratified by
Royal Decree No. 5737 of 1954. ARAMCO refused to comply with the Onassis agreement,
asserting that according to the concession agreement of 1933 between it and the Saudi
government, it had the absolute right to choose the means of transport of crude oil.
ARAMCO and the Saudi government agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration by Von
Sauser-Hall.58 In the award, which dealt with many issues of international public and private
law that are undoubtedly of interest to international scholars, the arbitrator held that the
theory of vested rights is an essential principle of the national and international law of
S6 The Saudi government suggested a solution to the disputes by arbitration on October 26, 1954. The proposal
to refer the dispute to arbitration was based on the provisions of Article 3 of the ARAMCO Concession
Agreement of 1933, which provided for the use of arbitration.
S1 EI-Ahdab stated that most of the arbitral awards in Anglo-Arab cases have favoured the European investors
against the host state; the applicable law was purportedly the law of the host state, but the law applied in each
case was that of a western country. The Arab jurists appointed in the cases resided in the West and did not have
any association with the host country and the domination of Western arbitration was apparent in all investment
cases. EI-Ahdab, A., Is there an Arbitration Crisis in the Arab World? in Strengthening Relations with Arab and
Islamic Countries through International Law, Kluwer Law International, (2001), p. 309.
S8 The arbitral tribunal was held in Geneva in 1958. Professor Sauser-Hall observed that: The law in force in
Saudi Arabia should be applied to the content of the concession because this state is a party to the agreement, as
grantor, and because it is generally admitted, in private international law, that a sovereign state is presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, to have subjected its undertakings to its own legal system. This principle was
mentioned by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its judgement in the Serbian Loans Case.
Sornarajah, M., supra note 21, p. 418. See also Sayen, G., Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal
Tradition in Saudi Arabia, 24 U. PA. J. InCI Econ. L, (2003), pp. 909-910.
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"civilised countries". He further stated that the Saudi government could not take away rights
granted to one party in a previous contract by granting them to another party in a later
contract. This arbitral decision upset the Saudi government, as it took the view that the
decision failed to recognise the shift in public policy towards ownership and control over
what was now seen as a sovereign national resource, and subsequently Resolution No. 58 was
enacted in 1963.S9
3.4.1 The Influence of the ARAMCO Award on Saudi Attitude
towards Arbitration.
The Saudi government viewed the ARAMCO Award as a great disappointment, not
simply because it was made in favour of ARAMCO, but because of the exclusion of Saudi
law and the way in which it was excluded, which may be understood as an exclusion of the
Shari'a rules, even though it was the applicable law according to the parties' Arbitration
Agreement.60 Arbitrators in these arbitral tribunals paid no consideration to Islamic values,
they further lacked basic knowledge about Shari'a and its fundamental principles applicable
to commercial transactions.t' As a result of the ARAMCO arbitration award, the Saudi
government regarded international arbitration as a device used to favour only the interest of
Western companies. The direct reaction to the ARAMCO arbitration award as well as other
arbitral awards involving some Arab countries and foreign oil companies working within
59 ARAMCO v Saudi Arabia August 23, 1958, 27 International Law Report (1963), p.117. for more details see
AI-Shareef, N., Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia: Groundfor Refusal Under Article (V)
of The New York Convention of 1958, PhD Thesis, CEPMLP, University of Dundee, (2000), pp. 85-88, and Al-
Samman, Y., supra note 17, pp. 257-258.
60 Al-Eshiwy, M., Arbitration Regulations in the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) States: A Comparative
Study, PhD Thesis, Exeter: University of Exeter, (1997), p. 232.
61 AI-Samman Y., supra note 17, p. 240.
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their territories'f was that the Saudi Council of Ministers issued Decision No. 58, on June 25,
1963.
Decision No. 58 prohibited the referral of cases to arbitration if the Saudi government or
a governmental agency was a party to the arbitration, and the other party was a native person
or a private company or establishment. Decision 58 did not distinguish between national and
international arbitration. However, it was not an absolute rejection of arbitration, since
arbitration was still allowed in two situations: concession contracts of great interest to the
state63; and technical disputes.t" Under this Resolution all disputes to which a governmental
agency is a party are referred to the BG. 65
The next major development in consequence of the ARAMCO Award was the
establishment of a Ministry of Commerce Circular (an internal circular directed to all
branches of the Ministry and all commercial register offices in Riyadh), dated 31/01/1981
under the heading "Agreements Establishing Companies must not contain provisions
allowing arbitration to be conducted outside the Kingdom".66 Consequently, according to
this Circular, reference could be made to domestic Saudi arbitration in the articles of
association of a joint venture company which is formed by foreign and private local partners
for the purpose of carrying out investment operations in the country.
62 Such as Petroleum Development Ltd. V. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, [September 1951], 18 International Law
Report 1951, p.144. and Qatar V. International Marine Oil Company Ltd, [June 1953], 20 International Law
Report 1953, p. 534.
63 The state alone determining what constituted such vital interests or a government contract was a technical in
nature.
64 El-Ahdab, A., Arbitration with the Arab Countries, Kluwer Law International, (1990), pp. 602-603.
65 For more details on the Board of Grievances see chapter 1 supra.
66 After revision of this issue, the Legal Department of the Ministry issued memorandum number 174.k dated
22/02/1399, which was approved by the Minister by letter dated 23/02/1399, stating that arbitration clauses
contained in agreements establishing Saudi companies which allow arbitration to be conducted abroad are null
and void.
116
3.4.2 The Shift of Saudi's Attitude towards leA
Saudi Arabia possessed a great economic asset embodied in the form of its oil wealth,
and has actively sought a prominent position in international trade. For this reason it was
unwise for the Saudi government to continue the rejection of arbitration as a result of the
ARAMCO award, since acceptance of referral to arbitration had become an important feature
of such international trade. Therefore, as a result of the economic boom'" of the 1970s and
early 1980s which necessitated the involvement of foreign capital and international oil
companies in the Saudi economy, the Saudi government sought to soften its attitude towards
arbitration of disputes involving it or any of its bodies."
In fact, Saudi Arabia had not only attempted to understand ICA, but also to practice it.
The result is that the negative attitude toward arbitration resulting from the outcome of the
ARAMCO award has fundamentally changed in favour of arbitration. This is evidenced not
only by the fact that Saudi Arabia has now accepted arbitration clauses in its international
contracts, but also by having become a party to important international conventions relating
bi . 69to ar itration.
67 In the early 1970s, the economic situation changed dramatically. Oil exports expanded substantially. royalty
payments and taxes on foreign oil companies increased sharply. Oil-exporting governments, including the
kingdom, began setting and raising oil export prices. Saudi Arabia's revenues per barrel of oil (averaged from
total production and oil revenues) quadrupled from US$0.22 in 1948 to US$0.89 in 1970. By 1973, the price
had reached US$1.56 and soared to US$IO and higher in 1974 following the Arab oil embargo introduced to
pressure Western supporters of Israel during the October 1973 War. In 1982 the average export price per barrel
of oil reached well above US$30. Between 1973 and 1980, government oil revenues jumped from US$4.3
billion to US$10 1.8 billion. At last these higher oil revenues gave Saudi officials the means to make major
structural changes in the economy. See Country Studies, Saudi Arabia: Economic Policy Making, available at:
http://countrvstudies.us/saudi-arabia/36.htm.
68 This policy was later reflected in Art. 3 of the Arbitration Regulatory which regulates the restrictions on the
use of arbitration as a method for dispute settlement involving Saudi government bodies. Art. 3 provides that
"government agencies are not allowed to resort to arbitration for settlement of their disputes with third parties
except after having obtained the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers".
69 For more details see chapter 2 on Stability of Investment Agreements. See also the forgoing discussion for
example of these conventions and agreements such as NY Convention on enforcement of arbitral awards.
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·The above discussion leads to one important question, since Saudi Arabia has not only
practiced ICA but also has accepted arbitration clauses in its international contracts, why is
'Shari'a' considered to be one of the legal problems associated with the foreign investments
in Saudi Arabia?
In fact, the problems can be limited to two main legal problems of international commercial
arbitration which arise in cases:
When an arbitral award provides for the payment of interest (Riba) and/or an
arbitration clause contains an element of uncertainty (Gharrar) violating the
mandatory rules of Shari' a.70
When an arbitral award contradicts Council of Ministers Resolution N. 58.
In respect of the first problem, when the award provides for payment of interest, the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(NYC) subjects these types of arbitral awards to the domestic law of the country where
enforcement is sought. Interest is enforced under NYC if it is customary international practice
and recognised by all states. The Shari'a principle of severance allows for the principal
amount to be enforced in Saudi Arabia. However, a foreign arbitral award providing for the
payment of interest would not be enforced by the competent court (BG), since scholars see
this as an infringement of Shari' a law and the public policy that flows from it and as
70 An example of Gharar judgement is in NGCC v. Lucent Technologies International, Inc. In such a case, when
a party files a suit in the United States, the law of the forum state governs the interpretation of the contract.
Saudi law, and therefore Islamic law, governs the obligations of the parties to the contract NGCC revolved
around a contractual dispute relating to the installation of certain payphone and emergency phone stations in
Saudi Arabia. NGCC sued Lucent Technologies for failure to perform, and sought damages not only for the
amounts injured, but for lost profits, future loss, and lost opportunity. The Court addressing Gharar said:
"Future activity is deemed Gharar because it is uncertain to anyone except for God. Saudi Arabian courts will
not enforce the sale of anything uncertain or unknown. The object of a contract must be certain and defined and
in existence". National Group for Communications and Computers, Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies, 331 F. Supp.
2d 290 (D.N.I. 2004). Roark, M., Reading Mohammed in Charleston: Assessing the u.s. Courts Approach to
the Convergence of Law, Religion and Commerce, (February 21, 2007). Available at:
http://law.bepress.com!cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4862&context=expresso. See also Trumbull, C., supra note
46, pp. 635-636.
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contradictory to its morality." Arbitration clauses that contains element of uncertainty are
dealt with by art. 1 of the Saudi Arbitration Regulatory of 1983 discussed earlier.
The second problem is when the arbitral award contradicts Council of Ministers
Resolution No. 58. In this respect Article 3 of the Arbitration Regulations of Saudi Arabia
and the rules in Sect. 8 the Implementation Rules of the Saudi Arabian Arbitration
Regulations incorporate the prohibition of government entities into arbitration provided in
Resolution No. 58 but enlarges the exception provided therein. It provides that:
"Government agencies may not resort to arbitration to settle their disputes with third parties
except after approval of the President of the Council of Ministers. However, these provisions
may be amended by resolution of the Council of Ministers ".72
It is also considered that Sect. 8, by referring to disputes "where a government authority
is a party with other", may be intended to permit arbitration where the Saudi government
might be the only government sector in a multiparty arbitration. These provisions may also be
indicative of the change in the attitude of the Saudi government towards international
arbitration. It should also be noted that Council of Ministers Resolution No. 164 Of
04/04.1983, by which the Arbitration Regulations were approved, refers specifically to
Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 without abolishing it.73
It could be argued that since arbitration involving Saudi governmental entities must be
conducted in Saudi Arabia under Saudi law, that is still a problem. This is still the case even
though such arbitrations may be governed by rules of procedure established by international
bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the United Nations
71 Al-Shareef, N., supra note 64, p. 200.
72 A, Lerrick & Q., Mian., supra note 35, p. 154.
73 Ibid, pp. 10-11
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Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).74 As a matter of fact, this may no
longer be such a major problem. El-Ahdab 'S75 description of the 1983 Saudi Arbitration
Regulatory and the rules promulgated in 1985 under the Regulatory suggest that the
arbitration procedures in Saudi Arabia under this new act are not much different, in
procedural sense, from those of international bodies. The rules provide for notice of the
arbitration, the convening of an arbitral tribunal, the conducting of a hearing in which
evidence and argument is received, the construction of the hearing record and the issuing of
an award upon close of record. At the same time, there have been a number of construction
contract arbitrations carried out in Saudi Arabia using the UNCITRAL rules. " Foreign
investors have usually preferred settling their disputes through arbitration by inserting a
foreign arbitration clause in their contracts. However, such clauses, as previously mentioned,
are not allowed in a governmental contract without a decision by the Saudi Council of
M·· 77misters.
3.4.3 The Suitability of leA for security for both Foreign Investor
and the Government of Saudi Arabia.
To securely achieve the objectives of foreign investors, the international aspects of such
agreements dictate that any disputes or differences between them and host countries should
be referred to independent arbitration by an international tribunal.i'' Foreign investors view· .
international commercial arbitration as a safe method that lubricates the wheels of trade and
encourages major investors to conclude more contracts with different host countries,
regardless of their religion or culture. In respect of Saudi Arabia, a balance has to be struck
74 The UNCITRAL Rules were adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution No.3 1198 dated 05/12/1976.
7S El-Ahdab, A, supra note 64, p. 430.
76 Fox, W., supra note 4, p. 370.
77 Article 3 of Arbitration Regulatory, available in Saudi Embassy in Washington website:
http://www.saudiembassy.netlaboutlcountry-informationllaws/ Arbitration Law.aspx.
78 Ernest, K., Legal Aspects of Business in Saudi Arabia, London: Graham and. Trotman, (1979), p.86.
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between the national objective of increasing national revenues, and requirements to
encourage business activities on the part of foreign investors."
These objectives can be achieved by the acceptance of host countries to refer any
disputes that may arise out of foreign investment agreement to an international tribunal. As
mentioned earlier, since the 1970s economic boom in Saudi Arabia, and as part of the need
for reform of financial instruments in order to advance the natural resources industry,
international arbitration has become the accepted method for the resolution of disputes arising
out of investment agreements. Therefore, on 19 April 1995 Saudi Arabia acceded'? to the
1958 New York Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award
(NYC) and has become a party to many other international treaties pertaining to international
. I bi . 81commercia ar itration,
3.5 The Islamic Law (Shari'a) Attitude toward leA.
In this section, focus will be placed on whether or not Shari' a, which is the main source
of Saudi Law, is really in fact adverse to the enactment of legislation for international
arbitration. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Shari'a recognises and confirms the pre-
Islamic method of settling disputes with some modifications. The validity of arbitration is
recognised in the two essential sources - Quran and Sunnah82 - of Shari 'a. As to arbitration,
the Holy Quran says:
"Verily, the Believers are but brothers. Therefore set matters right between your brethren
and be conscious of ALLAH in order that you may obtain mercy". 83
79 Leuch, H., Petroleum Exploration/Production Agreements & Taxation, Deventer: Kluwer Law, (2001), p. 2.
80 See discussion in chapter 5, infra.
81 Barrows, G., World Petroleum Arrangements, New York: The Barrows Company Inc, (1991), p.219.
82 For more discussion see chapter 1, supra.
83 Quran. 49:10.
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The prophet, in his time used to resolve cases on an ad-hoc basis" and there was no
formal distinction in the first period of Islam between conciliator, arbitrators and judges.85
The Prophet, explaining the merit of such mediation and the danger of conflict and hostility,
said,
"Shall I not inform you of something far better than fasting, charity and prayers? On
receiving reply, 'Yes', he said: It is putting things right between people, for to incite people to
dispute is like a razor. And I do not mean that it shaves off the hair but that it shears the
I., " 86re 19zon .
In brief, arbitration is recognised by Shari'a as a method for settlement of disputes. It
has been provided for and recognised by the four sources of Shari' a; the Quran and the
Sunnah (the acts and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed), Ijma (consensus of opinion) and
Quiyas (reasoning by analogy)." Arbitration has also been used as a means of resolving
disputes by the companions of the Prophet i.e., the arbitration which occurred in 657 A.D
between the fourth Caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the governor of Al-Sham Province
Muawaiya Ibn Abi Suftan. 88 The permissibility of arbitration is unquestioned by the main four
Islamic Schools; Maliki, Hanba/i, Hanaft and Shaft'. However, the field of settlement of
disputes is one of the richest areas of different opinions across the different School of Islamic
84 Where the parties themselves arrange in their arbitration agreement for the appointment of the arbitrators and
the arbitral procedure
85 Angell, N., & G., Feulner, Arbitration of Disputes in the UA.E, Arab Comparative & Commercial Law, Vol.
1., (1987) p. 243.
86 Reported by Al-Tirmidi and others, cited by AI-Qaradawi, Y., The Lawful & Prohibited in Islam, 15th ed., the
Islamic Office for Pub. & Dist., (1994), p. 291, (in Arabic).
87 For more discussion on these sources of Shari 'a see chapter 1 supra.
88 El-Ahdab, A., Supra note 69, p. 602.
89 Zeyad, Alqurashi., supra note 9.
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3.5.1 Arbitration under the Four Islamic Schools
As has been stated above, arbitration is recognised by all sources of Shari'a but has
received close analysis in the doctrinal writings of the four Islamic Schools. Nevertheless, it
is possible to discern what each school provides in relation to arbitration.
The Hanafi School emphasises the contractual nature of arbitration, confirmed by the
Ottoman Majallah (the civil law of the Ottoman Empire which was derived from the Hanafi
doctrine applied in some of Arab countriesj.i" The school holds that arbitration is legally
closed to agencies, which means that an arbitrator acts as an agent on behalf of a disputant
who had appointed him. They stress a close connection between arbitration and conciliation.
To the Hanafi School an arbitral award is closer to conciliation than to a court judgement,
although it is of lesser force than a court judgement. Nevertheless, under this school the
disputing party cannot be relieved from being obligated to be bound by the award, because
the agreement to resort to arbitration binds the parties like any other contract.
According to the Shaft 'i School, arbitration is a legal practice, whether there is a judge
in the place where the dispute has arisen or not." However, under this school, the position of
arbitrators is inferior to that of judges since the award of arbitrators is liable to be revoked up
to the time of the issuance of the award.
According to the Hanbali School, an arbitral award decided by the arbitrator has the
same binding nature as a court's judgement and an arbitrator must have the same
lif . f'a i d 92qua 1 ication 0 a JU ge.
90 EI-Ahdab, A., supra note 13, pp. 23-24.
91 Saleh, S., Commercial Arbitration in Arab Middle East, Study in Shari'a and Statute Law, Graham&
Trotman, (1984),p. 22.
92 Iben Qudamah, Al-Moghni, Riyadh: Dar Ehea Atturath AI-Arabi, Vol. 9, (1985), p. 483.
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The Maliki School holds that one of the disputing parties can be chosen as an arbitrator
by the other disputing party. The Malikies stress that an arbitrator cannot be revoked after the
commencement of the arbitration proceedinga"
Shari'a influences all aspects of Arab law, including arbitration, even though most Arab
States have now passed codified arbitration acts. These acts were, besides Shari' a, also
influenced by other sources such as European legislation. Arab legislation can thus be
classified into five groups, according to the influences to which it was exposed."
Laws influenced by arbitration under Shari'a: Saudi Arabia.
Laws also influenced by the arbitration system of French origin: Libya, Morocco,
Syria (these were influenced by the old French arbitration system) and Algeria and
Lebanon (influenced by the modem French system).
Laws also influenced by the arbitration system of (old) English origin: Iraq, Jordan (a
new law inspired by the UNCITRAL model Law is pending in Jordan), and Sudan.
Laws inspired by the UNCITRAL model Law, with or without modifications:
Bahrain, Egypt, Oman and Tunisia.
Laws which were not inspired by any particular source and are only inspired by the
New York Convention: Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
Today, there is evidence that arbitration is coming back into favour in Arab countries,
and that these countries once again trust arbitration. Most Arab countries have now issued
modem arbitration acts and numerous Arab countries have acceded to the New York
Convention of 1958 and/or to the Washington Convention of 1965 (the ICSID).95 From
analysis, it can be stated that Islamic Law has never had any objection to the enactment of
93 Saleh, S., supra note 95, p. 21.
94 El-Ahdab, A, supra note 13, p. 1.
9S Ibid.
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legislation for ICA. On the contrary, Islamic law in theory and practice has indeed
historically encouraged mutual arbitral settlement of disputes. Although the ARAMCO
Award paid no attention to Shari'a values and its basic principles applicable to commercial
contracts, Shari'a still recognises ICA as a method of dispute resolution despite its negative
attitude towards the ARAMCO Award itself.
3.6 The National Arbitration Law in Saudi Arabia.
Foreign investors want specific assurances that potential disputes will be resolved
impartially, promptly and efficiently. They may prefer to remove their disputes from the
jurisdiction of national courts of the host state and to have them settled by arbitration.I"
Therefore, arbitration has become the most effective alternative mechanism for disputes
settlement. After all, commercial arbitration has a long history in Arab countries, it predates
the existence of organised system of states courts."
One of the main contributing factors for arbitration to be increasingly used in Saudi
Ar~bia as a mean of settlement of commercial disputes on both national and international
scale was the economic boom of the 1970s. For these purposes, Saudi Arabia enacted
Arbitration Regulations and Implementation Rules by the issuance of Royal Decree M/46.98
As a result, the arbitration of disputes is no longer uncommon in the kingdom. However, for
arbitration to be recognised as an alternative form of disputes settlement, co-existing with the
courts, it was necessary that national laws support it.99 Four significant features of the process
96 Al-Samman, supra note 17, p. 248.
97 Collier, J., & V. Lowe, supra note 59, p. 45.
98 This is the Arbitration Code. See the Royal Decree No. MJ46 of 25104/1983. The Arbitration Regulations
were published in Umm Al-Qura, the official newspaper, on June 3, 1983 and became effective 30 days from
that date. The 1985 Arbitration Regulations Implementation Rules, Council of Ministers Resolution No.
7/2021IM on 27/05/1985.
99 Collier, J., & V. Lowe, supra note 59, p. 46.
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of international commercial arbitration are briefly mentioned now, although they are the
subject of more detailed comments later on. These features" are:
Agreement to arbitrate.
Choice of arbitrators.
Decision of the arbitral award.
Enforcement of the award.
Itwill now be shown how Saudi laws incorporate these elements.
3.6.1 The Arbitration Regulatory of 1983
During the last four decades, arbitration has become of increasing significance in Saudi
Arabia as a means of resolving business disputes. It was within this period that the first
Arbitration Regulations were adopted in 1983.101 Like all Saudi laws, the Act and the rules
are inspired by Shari'a, which is marked by openness towards the world. The Act draws a
distinction between Arbitration Clauses (i.e. agreement referring future disputes to
arbitration) and Arbitration Agreements (i.e., agreement referring to an already existing
dispute to arbitration) and holds that the former is as valid and binding as the latter.
Before the enactment of Decree Ml46, which came into force on July 3, 1983 (30 days
after its publication, in English, in the Saudi Official Gazette No. 2963, on June 3, 1983),
Shari'a, articles 493-7 of Regulations No. 32 of 15Muharram, 1350 H, (1971) relating to the
statues of the Saudi Commercial Board ("SRCB arbitration" or "arbitration under SRCB"),
and more recently the Chambers' Rules ofImplementation, were major sources of Arbitration
100 Redfern, A., & M., Hunter, supra note 55, p. 4.
101 Some important Saudi Government laws are Constitution or Basic Law of Government. (1993), The
Consultative Council Establishment Act. (1993), The Consultative Council Statute. (1993), The Council of
Ministers Statute. (1993) and The Regional Authorities Establishment Act. (1993). The text of these laws can be
viewed at http://www.servat.unibe.chJlaw/icI!sa indx.htmllast visited on 07/03/2008.
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Law.102 The recent enactment of Decree Ml46 reduces Shari'a influences as well as fulfilling. .
contractual practice. The Decree expressly repeals the provisions relating to arbitration in
Regulations No. 32 (SRCB arbitration) and has enacted what is meant to be a comprehensive
piece of legislation regulating arbitration. The regulation Code of 25 April 1983 contains 25
Articles and the Implementation Rules of27 May 1985 contains 48 sections.103
It should be mentioned that in cases where conciliation is not allowed, neither
arbitration regulation nor implementation rules are permitted. Therefore, Article 2 of the
Arbitration Regulations provides that arbitration shall not be permitted in cases where
conciliation is not allowed. This vague definition is clarified by the Implementation Rules
which indicate that arbitration is not permissible in criminal matters, which can be interpreted
as personal status matters and matters pertaining to public order.
3.6.2 Arbitration Agreement and Arbitration Clauses
The four Islamic Schools consider a formal arbitration agreement (submission
agreement) whereby parties may agree to submit an existing dispute to arbitration, as the
principal basis for conferring upon arbitrators the power to issue binding decisions.l'"
However, their doctrinal writings are silent about arbitration clauses (i.e., the agreement
referring future disputes to arbitrationj.l'" Before the enactment of Decree M/46, the effect of
arbitration clauses and arbitration agreements made in Saudi Arabia and subject to Saudi
Arbitration Law might have been weak. This was as a result of the absence in Saudi domestic
102 Saleh, S., supra note 95, p. 290.
103 Ibid, p. 292.
104 Abul-Enien, M., Liberal Trends in Islamic Law on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 2 J Arab Arb. (2000) p.
5.
lOS Saleh, S., Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Meddle East - Shari 'a, Lebanon Syria and Egypt, 2nd ed.,
Oxford: Hart publishing, (2006), p. 16 and 59. The author stated as one of main elements of Arbitration in
Shari'a, "{the existence of} a dispute". He also said that: "the contemporary Western practice ex contractu
agreeing that a future dispute is not determined by reference to arbitration (i.e. an arbitration clause) is not even
eluded in Shari'a texts". .
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law of the concept of arbitration clauses and revocability of the appointment of arbitrators. 106
According to certain commentatorsl'", the new law acknowledges that arbitration clauses are
binding on parties and recognises arbitration stemming from such clauses without the
necessity to enter into a new arbitration agreement (which would then have to be confirmed
by the authority originally having jurisdiction). In other words, arguably, there is no official
acknowledgement of the validity and binding nature of arbitral clauses in contracts.
Moreover, Article 1 of the Arbitration Code expressly recognises the validity both of
the submission agreement and the arbitration clause. 108 This constitutes a significant
improvement with respect to the previous Commercial Court Code of 1931, under which the
arbitration clause was unenforceable. Therefore, the recognition of the validity of the
arbitration clause has removed the uncertainty and made such clauses valid and binding.i'"
Article 1 of the Arbitration Code provides:
"It may be agreed to refer to arbitration an existing specified dispute; likewise, it may be
agreed in advance to refer to arbitration any dispute which may arise as a result of the
implementation of a specified contract".
Therefore, Article 1 of the regulations validates arbitration generally as a means of
dispute resolution and does not limit arbitration to commercial matters.i'" According to
Article 5, the submission agreement (called the 'arbitration agreement') must be signed by
the parties or their authorised attorneys, and by the arbitrators, and must state the details of
106 Saleh, S., supra note 95, p. 321.
107 El-Ahdab, A., Arbitration with the Arab Countries, 2nd ed., Kluwer Law International, (1998), p. 569, cited
by Shoult, A., Doing Business with Saudi Arabia, 3n!ed., Global Market Briefings, (2006), p. 106.
108 Lerrick, A., & Q., Mian, supra note 35, p. 151.
109 Karam, N., Business Laws of Saudi Arabia, Vol. 3, Kluwer Academic Publishers, (1988), p. 342.
110 So disputes relating to non-commercial property rights, civil debts or financial transactions and the like may
be resolved by arbitration
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the dispute, the names of the arbitrators and their agreement to hear the dispute. I II Article 5
also requires that the submission agreement be filed with the Authority originally competent
to hear the dispute, together with copies of the documents relating to the disputes. In this
particular matter, the most likely Authority will be the Board of Grievances. However, it
could be argued that the Regulation is not entirely clear as to whether the Authority originally
competent to hear the dispute must also approve the arbitration clause. Article 6 provides
that:
"The Authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall record the application for
arbitration submitted to it, and make a decision approving the arbitration instrument ",
Article 6 of the Arbitration Regulations requires the Authority originally competent to
hear the dispute to approve only the arbitration agreement with no mention or indication to
the arbitration clause. Therefore, the focal question in this respect is whether arbitration
clauses are valid under Shari 'a. To analyse this, it could be argued that, despite the silence of
the regulation on the arbitration clauses, it does not mean they are prohibited. It could have
been ignored due to the fact that they were not in use in the past. The validity of the
arbitration clause depends very much on its necessity to the commercial agreement. However,
there is a division of opinion amongst Muslim scholars regarding the validity of arbitration
clauses under Islamic law. One opinion argues that the validity of arbitration clauses could be
challenged on the ground that they provide for the submission of non-existing disputes to
arbitration, and obviously this involved uncertainty which is undoubtedly forbidden by
Shari 'a. I 12 Similarly, others view that the silence of Islamic schools on the issue of arbitration
III Nancy, T., supra note 25, p. 6.
112 For more discussion of uncertainty (Gharar) see chapter 2 supra.
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clauses does not mean they are prohibited by Shari 'a, but only because past prevailing
conditions did not require their use. I 13 Al-Sanhury concludes that:
"The specific contracts mentioned by scholars are those which were known in their time. If
the present civilisation has given rise to new contracts which, contain clauses deemed legal
by Figb (Islamic Jurisprudence), these new contracts must be considered as legal'" 14.
In respect of whether the arbitration clause is prohibited by Shari'a, a notable academic
in Arab law Prof. Ballantyne.'? took the view that if the embargo upon the submission of a
future dispute goes against a basic provision of Shari'a, then why was it permitted in the new
Saudi regulation? He said:
"Let us, recall that the old Constitution of the Hijazll6still provides Shari 'a as the only
source of legislation and indeed, this is the invariable practice in Saudi Arabia. So we must
conclude that this dictate of Shari 'a was not regarded as presenting a difficulty to the
enactment of modern international arbitration legislation, the position must be examined to
see whether this is in fact the case ",
Accordingly, it could be stated that arbitration clauses are valid if:
.They are necessary to the contract, i.e., the delivery of item sold;
They are appropriate to the contract, i.e., a bond to guarantee payment;
113 Arbitration clauses were ignored by early Muslim scholars because the commercial conditions at that time
did not require the use of such clauses. It has to borne in mind that the answers given by Islamic Law to
arbitration problems have been given before the commercial and economic evolution had reached today's stage.
However, they are not unalterable and do not constitute an exception to the universal rule that 'the law must
change over time '. Indeed, Shari'a is not static and rigid and it is only bound by the Quran, Sunnah, Idjma' and
Qiyas (analogy). See El-Ahdab, A., supra note 69, p. 604.
114 AI-Sanhury, Masader Al-Haq, Vol. 3, Cairo: Dar AI-Nahza AI-Arbia, (1968), p. 101, cited by A. EI-Ahdab,
General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries in International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration,
Suppl. 2, Kluwer Law International, (January 1990), p.7.
liS Ballantyne, W., The Bahrain Euro-Arab Arbitration Conference (1989): a summing up published with
~roceedings in Essays and Addresses on Arab Laws. Curzon Press, (2000), p. 206.
16 Hijaz is the Western Region of Saudi Arabia where the two Holy cities of Makkah and Madinah are located.
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They are commonly used in transactions.i'"
Additionally, for an arbitration clause to be valid, the disputed matter must be clear and
specific. For the following reasons the arbitration clause is not inadmissible and there is no
room for alternative interpretation:
The legislator does not want the parties to renounce trust in the adjudication's
competence in certain matters.
By specifying the disputed matter, the arbitrator's authority is determincd.!"
3.6.3 Arbitration Clause Autonomy (Severability)
One of the main elements of guaranteeing the binding effect of an arbitration clause is
to consider it as an agreement independent from the contract in which it is contained. This is
known as the principle of autonomy, or severability, of the arbitration clauses. In fact, the
question of severability is neither addressed in Saudi Arbitration Regulations nor in the
Implementation Rules, nor explicitly enunciated in the rest of the Gee States' laws.
However, in this regard El-Ahdab suggests that:
"The solution in our opinion is for the parties to confirm the severability of the arbitration
clause from the other provisions of the contract by signing this clause itself so that it becomes
uhi t,,119an agreement wll In an agreemen .
In most countries, the arbitration clause is considered as an agreement independent from
the contract in which it is incorporated. The main effect of this principle of the severability of
the arbitration clause is that invalidity of the main contract, in principle, does not entail the
invalidity of the arbitration clause. This prevents a disputing party from avoiding arbitration
117 El-Ahdab, supra note 13, p. 7.
118 El-Eshiwy, supra note 65, p. 168.
119 Ibid, p. 174.
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on the grounds that a contract is invalid. The international acceptance of the principle of the
autonomy of the arbitration clause relies on the fact that arbitration is essentially a procedural
provision without prejudice to the parties' substantive contractual rights and obligations.P" It
may be observed that arbitration clause autonomy is found explicitly in many arbitration
rules, for example article 2112 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 41 of the
ICISID Convention and Article 8 of ICC Arbitration Rules. Since most disputed matters are
related to the annulment of the main contract, the negligence of the separability of the
arbitration clause principle might jeopardise the effectiveness of erbitration.V' As for Saudi
Arabia, the separability of the arbitration clause is recognised as valid as long as the clauses
are not contrary to public policy; (namely they do not permit what is prohibited by
Shari 'a). 122
3.6.4 Arbitrators
(i) Appointment of Arbitrators
Generally speaking, the regulations for arbitration do not provide procedures for a
party's appointment of arbitrators. However, once the disputing parties have agreed to resolve
their dispute by arbitration, they are then obliged to reach an agreement on the appointment
of arbitrator(s).123 Article 12 refers to formal notifications to be made by the parties to one
another of the arbitrators they have respectively appointed. In this respect, the four schools of
120 Schmitthoff, C., International Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 1, New York: Oceana Publications, (1980), p.
21.
121 For more discussion see Redfren, A., & M., Hunter, supra note 55, pp. 17-77.
122 Al-Samaan, Y., The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of Domestic Arbitration in Saudi
Arabia, Arab Law Ouarterly, Vol. 9, No.3 (1994), pp. 217-237.
123 Article 10 of the Arbitration Law stipulates that: "If the parties have not appointed the arbitrators, or if either
of them fails to appoint his arbitrator(s), or if one or more of the arbitrators is unable or refuses to assume his
mission or withdraws, or if he is dismissed, and there is no special agreements between the parties, the authority
originally competent to hear the dispute shall appoint the required arbitrators upon request of the party who is
interested in expediting the arbitration, in the presence of the other party or in his absence after being summoned
to a meeting to be held for his purpose.
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Shari'a are silent on the possibility of appointing arbitrators by a third party. Their silence is
probably based on the fact that there is nothing under Shari'a which prohibits the
appointment of the arbitrators by a third party.
(ii) Number of Arbitrators
According to the four schools of Shari'a, there are no restrictions on the number of
arbitrators. The matter is left to the parties involved. However, Article 4 of the Saudi
Arbitration Regulation provides that: "in case of multiple arbitrators, they shall be odd in
number". The Regulation does not specify the required number of arbitrators in case the
parties have not agreed thereon. However, it seems from the current practice in Saudi Arabia
that the panel of three arbitrators is the rule.124 Where the arbitral tribunal consists of three
arbitrators, each of the parties will usually have the right to nominate one arbitrator, leaving
the third arbitrator to be chosen in some other manner. The advantage to a party of being able
to nominate an arbitrator is that it gives the party concerned a feeling of confidence in the
bi l trib 1125ar itra n una.
(iii) Qualification of Arbitrators
Saudi Arbitration Law has adopted particular requirements for persons who wish to act
as arbitrators. These requirements have been provided for in Article 4 of the Saudi
124 The usual tribunal consists of three arbitrators, one arbitrator to be appointed by each party and the third who
shall head the tribunal, to be appointed by the two appointed by the parties. Moreover, it can be understood from
the ARAMCO Award in 1958 where the tribunal consisted of three arbitrators that this is the case in Saudi. For
more discussion on the ARAMCO Award see chapter 4 also see 27International Law Reports 117. (1958), p.
168.
125 Redfren,A., & M., Hunter, supra note 55, p. 185.
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Arbitration Regulation and section 3 and 4 of the rules for implementation rules.126 The
requirements can be summarised as follow:
The arbitrator must be a Muslim, whether a national or foreigner. 127
The arbitrator must be experienced and of good conduct and behaviour.
The arbitrator must be of full legal capacity.
The arbitrator must not have been convicted of a heinous crime.
The arbitrator must have no interest in the dispute':".
The arbitrator must not have been subject to a disciplinary sanction by which he was
debarred from holding public office.
The arbitrator must not have been bankrupt, unless he has been rehabilitated.
In the case of more than one arbitrator, the chair of the panel shall have knowledge of
Shari'a rules, commercial regulations, customs and traditions applicable in Saudi
Arabia.
Except for the additional qualification of 'expertise' and the statutory requirement of
'good conduct and behaviour', it is expected that the rules of Shari' a and Saudi practice prior
to Decree Ml46 will be maintained.129 Islamic law is quite different to Western law on the
issue of procedural fairness. Generally speaking, impartiality and independence are less
important to Shari'a practitioners than expertise. Only the Maliki School of Islamic
jurisprudence places a high importance on the neutrality of the decision maker. 130
126 Neither the Regulation nor the Implementation Rules state the nature of the required experience, therefore, it
seems reasonable to imply that the arbitrator should be an expert in the subject-matter of the arbitration.
127 Saudi Arabia Regulation on Arbitration, Implementing Rules issued by Council of Ministers Resolution No.
7 of 8/9/1405 A.H. (May 27, 1985). It should be noted that the rules and do not require the arbitrator to be Sunni
Muslim. Article 3 of the Rules stipulates that: "Arbitrators may be nationals or Muslim foreigners".
128 Impartiality and independence of arbitrators is laid down in Section 4 of the Implementation Rules.
129 Saleh, S., supra note 95, p. 299.
130 Veeder, Q., in Saleh, S., supra note 109, p.17.
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(iv) The Revocability of Arbitrators
Articles 11-12 apply to the disqualification of arbitrators. Article 11 provides that "the
parties are permitted to dismiss an arbitrator by mutual consent, and the arbitrator so removed
may claim compensation if he had proceeded and if he had not been the cause of such
removal. Furthermore, he cannot be removed except for reasons that occur or appear after the
filling of the agreement to arbitrate".
Article 12 provides that "an arbitrator may be challenged on the same ground as judges.
The request for removal is made with the authority originally having jurisdiction within five
days of the notification of the appointment of the arbitrator to the other party, or as of the date
the grounds for a challenge appeared or arose. The request for removal is examined at a
hearing with both parties as well as the challenged arbitrators being summoned".
As to challenges and removal of arbitrators by one of the parties, there are different
opinions between the Maliki School and the other three Schools. The Maliki School prohibits
revocation after the procedure has started. On the other hand, the Hanafi, Shaft', and Hanbali
Schools permit the revocation (removal and challenge) of the arbitrators at any time before
rendering the award.
In fact, the Maliki School's opinion provides that the appointment of an arbitrator is
irrevocable after the commencement of the procedure except by mutual agreement of the
disputing parties. This is the most appropriate due to its similarities to the requirements of
international transactions in the case of resorting to national or international arbitration.
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3.6.5 Place of Arbitration
Both the Arbitration Regulation and the Implementation Rules are silent on the issue of
the arbitration location. Notwithstanding, this silence may be assumed that the following
rules apply:
Within Saudi Arabia it is left to the disputing parties' free choice to designate where
the arbitration is to be held. Arbitration inside the country triggers the application of
the Saudi Arbitration Law. Arbitration inside the country under the application of
foreign arbitration law is not possible. The Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58
dated 25/06/1963 stipulates that:
It is not permitted for any governmental body to designate any foreign law to govern
its relation with any relevant body as the applicable law shall be the Saudi Law, as the
law of the place of performance.
In respect of arbitration outside the country, the Council of Ministers Resolution No.
58 stipulates that disputes with the government or government agencies cannot be
submitted to arbitration, whether it is inside or outside Saudi Arabia, unless consent of
. the President of the Council of Ministers is obtained. Furthermore, as mentioned
earlier, the Ministry of Commerce Circular dated 31/01/1981 provides that
.
agreements establishing companies must not contain provisions allowing arbitration
to be conducted outside the Kingdom.
Looking at the place of arbitration under the ICC rules to see the difference;
Article 14 provides that:
a) The place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the court unless agreed upon by the
parties.
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b) The arbitral tribunal may, after consultation with the parties, conduct hearings and
meetings at any location it considers appropriate unless otherwise agreed by the
parties.
c) The arbitral tribunal may deliberate at any location that it considers appropriate.
As to the place of arbitration under UNCITRAL rules Article 16 provides:
a) Unless the parties have agreed upon the place where the arbitration is to be held, such
place shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal, having regard to the circumstances
of the arbitration.
b) The arbitral tribunal may determine the location of the arbitration within the country
agreed upon by the parties. It may hear witnesses and hold meetings for consultation
among its members at any place it deems appropriate having regard to the
circumstances of the arbitration.
c) The arbitral tribunal may meet at any place it deems appropriate for the inspection of
goods, other property or documents. The parties shall be given sufficient notice to
enable them to be present at such inspection.
d) The award shall be made at the place of arbitration.
Generally speaking, the above discussion indicates that, there are many similarities
between UNCITRAL131 rules and ICC132 rules. It could be argued that their fundamental
differences are due to the fact that the UNCITRAL is ad hoc arbitration, and the other is
institutional arbitration. The popularity of the ICC rules means they are used frequently for
their institutional characteristics, whereas ad hoc arbitration may be undesirable due to the
lack of institutional oversight. As for Saudi Arbitration Rules, the latter are not consistent
131 For more information see the UNCITRAL website at: http://www.uncitral.org!uncitraVenJindex.htmJ
132 For more information see the ICC website at: http://www.iccwbo.org!policy/arbitrationJid2882/index.htmJ
137
with ICC Arbitration Rules. The difference between Saudi law and the ICC is that Saudi law
does not codify the practice and outcomes of international arbitration. Saudi law would
challenge the jurisdiction of an ICC arbitration tribunal because arbitrators should apply
Saudi law as being the law of the place of performance of the contract. A foreign private
party should therefore comply with the requirements of Saudi law.l33 It should be advised
that to facilitate the arbitration procedures and achieve the best results, the parties should
have their arbitration inside Saudi Arabia. This would make it easier for them and for the
arbitrators to communicate with the authority originally competent to hear the dispute. On the
other hand, in order to overcome the apprehension of foreign investors, the Saudi Arbitration
Code should contain specific and liberated rules as to the place of arbitration to give more
freedom to the disputing parties.
3.7 Basic Considerations/or Arbitration under Shari 'a
As to the contractual aspect, Shari'a treats Muslim and non-Muslim disputants on an
equal footing. However, it could be argued that Saudi Arbitration Regulations are not
attractive to foreign investors because the arbitrator must be a Muslim and all the
documentation and procedure must be in Arabic.134 However, the main reason for foreign
investors' rejection of Saudi Arbitration Regulations and reluctance to accept the national
courts in Saudi Arabia could be based on their representatives' lack of knowledge of the
Islamic Law or the Saudi Legal System. In fact, there is no fear from the arbitrators being
Muslim as they apply Shari'a which:
133 AI-Shareef, N., supra note 64, p. 139.
134 Ballantyne, W., Islamic Law and Finance: Introduction: Islamic Law and Financial Transactions in
Contemporary Prospective. p. 1, Centre for Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (CIMEL) at SOAS,
www.soas.ac.uklCentres/IslamicLawlIsIFinlntro.html
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Does not discriminate between Muslim and non-Muslim or between a national and
foreigner.135
Recognises in full the sanctity of contracts. 136
Applies the principle that "the contract is the law of the contractors", which reflects
the basic maxim pacta sun! servanda which means that parties who freely and legally
enter into a contract are bound to fulfil obligations undertaken through it.137
According to the principle of freedom of contracts under Shari' a, parties are free to
include any clause in their contract as long as it does not permit acts 'against God's
commands, including the incorporation of 'interest' (Riba) clauses,138
The documentation and procedure must be in Arabic; however, there should be no
concern because each party can have his own interpreter. 139
3.8 Applicable Law
The tenets of Islam significantly affect the legal systems, and the systems of
commercial arbitration in a number of countries in the Middle East and Africa significant to
this study. As mentioned previously, the Saudi Legal System is based on Shari'a, with the
Quran and Sunnah representing the main sources of law. The commercial dispute settlement
system in Saudi Arabia is an example of a religiously influenced system. However, this does
not mean that this dispute resolution system is unacceptable under Western standards.v'" It is
135 "0 you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even if it be against yourselves, your
parents, and your relatives, or whether it is against the rich or the poor ..." (Quran 4: 135),
136 "Oh you who believe, observe contracts", (Quran 5: 1)
137 The Quran orders Muslims "to fulfil the covenant of God when you have a covenant and break not oaths
after their confirmation", (Quran, 16:91),
138 Al-Qurashi, Z., supra note 9.
139 Section 5 of the Implementation Rules of the Arbitration Regulations, 1985 stipulates that: "the Arabic
language shall be the official language to be used before the arbitration panel, whether in the discussion or in
correspondence. The arbitration panel and the parties may not speak other than the Arabic language and any
party who does not speak Arabic shall be accompanied by an accredited translator who shall sign with him the
minutes of hearing, approving the statements made".
140 Fox, W., supra note 4, p. 369, See also note 75 supra.
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worth noting that even though the commercial laws of Saudi Arabia are significantly
influenced by Western commercial laws. This is despite the Saudi Arabian legal system itself
being among the least influenced by Western legal principles.i'" In Saudi Arabia, the laws
applied explicitly in commercial matters, such as companies, banking, and commercial paper
laws, strongly resemble French and Egyptian laws.142 The question that may rise here is what
is the applicable law that arbitrators must apply regarding the dispute? This is obviously a
concern and will be examined more fully below.
Section 39 of the Implementation Rules143 provides that the award is made by
arbitrators who are only bound to comply with the rules of procedure contained in the
Arbitration Regulation and its Implementation Rules. In other words, arbitrators, like judges,
are bound to apply Saudi Law, whether the dispute relates to a domestic or an international
transaction. According to fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) rules, the choice of law does not exist
when it comes to the Shari'a.!" The very concept of a divinely inspired system of laws precludes
the choice of any other law by the parties to a dispute.l" In fact, Quranic injunctions urge
believers to have their disputes judged "by what God has revealedv.!" This explains why Saudi
courts and regulations do not recognise the Western conflict of laws principles and automatically
141 Shaaban, H., Commercial Transactions in the Middle East: What Law Governs? 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS, (1999), pp.158-159,169.
142 Vogel, F. & S., Hayes, Islamic law and finance: religion, risk, and return, BRILL, (1998), p. 50. Amin said
that the modem commercial practice and international trade has made a significant contribution in the course of
the development of the contemporary Saudi Arabian legal system, and that the expert commercial lawyers of the
Western world who participate in drafting and negotiating contracts on behalf of their clients have in effect
introduced the bulk of modem business law (basically American legal concepts) to the Saudi Arabian legal
environment. Amin, S., Middle East Legal Systems, Royston Limited, (1985), p. 317.
143 See section 39 of the Rules for the Implementation of the Arbitration Regulation (1985). For more discussion
see generally, El-Ahdab, A., Arbitration in Saudi Arabia under the new Arbitration Act 1983 and its
Implementation Rules 0/1985, J. Int. Arb., (Pts. 1 & 2), Vol. 3, No.3, 27 (Sep. 1986) & Vol. 3, No.4, 23 (Dec.
1986).
144 Sloane, P., The Status of Islamic Law in the Modern Commercial World, 22 Int'l Law, (1988), p. 762.
145 Sayen, G., supra note 63, p. 924.
146 Quran 4:60. Another Quranic verse says: ''judge (you 0 Mohammad) among them by what God has revealed
and follow not their vain desires", Quran 5:49.
140
apply Saudi laws.!" Accordingly, the award must comply with mandatory principles of
Shari'a and the applicable regulations. To meet the ever changing needs of commercial
practice and business transactions, Royal and Ministerial Decrees are periodically issued and
reviewed. Such Decrees are only valid, however, if they do not conflict with Shari'a
mandatory principles. These decrees need to be considered to increase the use of settlement
or arbitration for deciding conflicts to become more common in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi officials maintain, however, that they have made tremendous progress in
resolving the backlog of commercial disputes, almost to the point of complete elimination.148
Moreover, the government no longer requires exclusive applicability of Saudi law in the
resolution of private commercial disputes. In practice, however, Saudi courts tend to apply
Saudi law in commercial disputes litigated in the Kingdom, even when the relevant contract
contains a foreign choice of law provision and provides for a foreign forum to have
jurisdiction.149 From the point of view of a foreign investor.P" this matter represents some
risks and problems of unpredictability in the event that a dispute arises that cannot be settled
by negotiation or mediation. This is particularly true if the dispute is with a government or an
147 David, J., Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know? 25 GEO. WASH. J. Int'l. L.
& Econ, (1992), p.131.
148 See Saudi American Bank (SAMBA), The Saudi Economy at Mid-Year 2005, Riyadh, (2005).
149 It is interesting to note that in the field of international commercial arbitration the question of the law
applicable is rarely a primary issue. Arbitrators rely on contract interpretation and trade usages. However, this is
not the case in state contracts. The question of the law applicable to state contracts is one of the most disputed
issues. See Peter, W., Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, London: Kluwer
Law International, (1995), pp. 132-157. An example of unpredictability of the BG judgement is a contentious
case involving a Saudi company and a Malaysian Subcontractor. The Board of Grievances in Riyadh, in a
lengthy opinion based largely on Hadith (the Traditions of the Prophet Mohammed), concluded that a Saudi, as
a matter of public policy, cannot choose to have his obligations governed by any law other than Shari'a. The
Board's judgment was appealed to the Review Panel, which remanded with the observation that a blanket
prohibition against enforcing a foreign choice of law itself violated the Shari'a mandate that one fulfils one's
legal obligations. Despite this recommendation from above, the Board reaffirmed its refusal to enforce the
choice of foreign law in even stronger terms. On the other hand, in a much older decision, the Board of
Grievances in Jeddah did not hesitate to enforce the choice of French law in a contract between a French
perfume manufacturer and its Saudi agent. Suffice it to say, then, that the issue remains in a state of flux.
O'Kane, M., Securities Regulation in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: The Law Firm of Salah Al-Hejailan, (July 5,2008),
available at: http://www.scribd.comJdoc/3827775/Securities-Regulation-in-Saudi-Arabia.
ISO Afridi & Angell, An Overview of Legal Structures In The GCC Countries - Issues of Risk and Strength,
Dubai: World Services Group, (Dec. 2006), available at: http://www.hg.org/articles/article 1649.html.
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instrument of the government. Therefore, careful negotiation of the contract to reduce the
possibility of disputes and a conciliation or mediation clause, or at least a requirement for a
significant "cooling off' period to be used for negotiation, may be the best practical
safeguards. In addition, all issues between parties should be expressly regulated in the
contract..Particular attention should be paid to ensuring each contractual provision conforms
to Shari'a. Business-to-business arbitration assistance, although expensive, is available from
local chambers of commerce for some types of disputes. lSI
3.9 Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia
The purpose of arbitration is to obtain an award, either in the form of an amicable
settlement, or in the form of a decision given by the arbitral tribunal. The award is simply the
arbitral tribunal's decision or judgement on a dispute referred to it in pursuance of an arbitral
clause or arbitration document, but to have effect it must be enforced.ls2 This raises the issue
of enforcement and the procedures and processes for enforcement which are dealt with
below.
Because of the increasing commercial and investment activity of Arab countries and the
resulting increase of arbitration proceedings and awards, the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards in the Middle East is ever more decisive. The rules governing the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards vary from country to country in the Middle East.IS3
In Saudi Arabia, Article 20 of the Arbitration Regulation provides that the award of the
arbitrators shall be due for execution, when it becomes final, by an order granted by the
151 See more info. at http://www.infoprod.co.iVarticle/24
152 See articles 9, 14, 15, and 17 of the Arbitration Code.
153 EI-Ahdab, A., supra note 13, p. 324.
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authority originally competent to hear the dispute. The order shall be granted upon the
petition of an interested party after the authority has confirmed that "there is nothing to
prevent its execution legally". In other words, the award is fully consistent with the
mandatory principles of Shari'a. So the reason of making the enforcement of an arbitral
award by means of a judicial decision is to ensure that the award is fully consistent with the
mandatory principles of Shari'a. However, although arbitral awards have a judicial character,
they are still different from court decisions because the arbitrator cannot enforce the awards
without the approval of the courts.
It should be noted that an application for the enforcement of a foreign judgement must
include details regarding the plaintiff who requests the enforcement, the defendant against
whom the award is to be enforced, the subject of the dispute, and the nature of the award
concerned .. According to an opinion attributed to Imam Shafi'i, as to whether an award is
binding is dependent upon the agreement of the parties. Even after the award has been made,
the consent of the parties is necessary for its enforcement.P" It could be argued, therefore,
that there is an opportunity for the losing party to prevent the award from being enforced.
However, it is argued that as the default position in Saudi Arabia follows the Hanbali School
(which does not require parties' consent for a judgment to be enforced),155 therefore, as
provided Article 20 of the Saudi Code, enforcement of an award does not in fact require the
consent of the parties.
Once the award is declared enforceable in accordance with Article 20 of the Arbitration
Code, the award is considered as having the same status as a judgement made by the
IS4 Ibid, p. 324.
ISS For more discussion see chapter 1 of the thesis.
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authority originally competent to hear the dispute.IS6 Procedures before the BG allocate the
enforcement of a foreign judgement to the Administrative Circuit of the Board. Foreign
judgements include foreign arbitral awards issued outside Saudi Arabia since they are not
included in Arbitration Law No. M146. The procedures and requirements for the enforcement
of a foreign judgement will apply equally to the enforcement ofa foreign arbitration
award.IS7
As already mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia is a party to the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention. This Convention has established an
effective, unprecedented framework for enforcement of awards.IS8 The Convention under
Articles 53 and 54 requires every contracting state to - including those involved in the
arbitration proceedings - recognise the awards rendered by the arbitration tribunals of the
Centre, and to enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed in these awards, as if they were
final court decisions in that state. Such an award also is not subject to an appeal.P" This being
the case, it will be expected that the BG would give effect to these provisions in respect of
foreign awards. However, it should be emphasised that, Saudi's membership of the ICSID
convention is subject to the established exceptions particularly that the award must not
contradict with the Shari'a principles specially the issue of interest (Riba), and public policy.
Hence, conditions required for the enforcement of foreign awards are as follows:
Non-violation of Shari' a, which includes non-violation of public order or policy of the
state in which enforcement sought.160
156 Article 21 of the Arbitration Code.
157 Nader, M., Settlement of Disputes through Arbitration, Proceedings of first Arab Regional Conference, Arab
Comparative and commercial Law, YoU, (1987).
158 Hirsch, M., The arbitration Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, (1993), p. 23.
159 Ibid, p. 23.
160 Nader, M., supra note 159, p. 298.
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Reciprocity or mutual treatment. Reciprocity may be applied if the state in which a
foreign judgement is issued both accepts enforcement of judgements issued in Saudi
Arabia and accepts enforcement procedurally in the same manner as in Saudi Arabia.
It could be suggested that Saudi arbitration would be more attractive for foreign
investors if the Kingdom benefited from other countries experience in the field. This would
be the case especially for those who consider Shari'a as one of the main sources oflaw, and
have a statute that contains ingredients found in both the UNCITRAL commercial arbitration
rules and the new UNCITRAL Model Law on (leA). It also should recognise arbitration as a
legitimate means of dispute settlement, and permit arbitration to take a place outside the
country. It has to be stated that the emphasis and concern of Shari'a is only with regard to the
dispensation of the case by the tribunal rather than the forum where the case is resolved or
other procedural formalities.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the process of settlement of foreign investment disputes in
Saudi Arabia and the efforts of the government to create adequate dispute settlement
mechanisms capable of resolving disputes arising out of investment activities. Such efforts
resulted in the restructuring of the BO in the early 1980s in order to make the Board
competent to hear all disputes to which the government or any of its agencies is a party as
well as all commercial disputes including those relating to foreign investments. Unlike
Shari' a courts and other Saudi courts, the BO observes a system of precedent which creates
predictability and ensures that like cases are treated alike. Furthermore, decisions of the
Board may be appealed.
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The Saudi government maintains that they have made tremendous progress in settling
commercial disputes to the extent that they have achieved a complete elimination of obstacles
to dispute settlement. Moreover, the government no longer requires exclusive applicability of
domestic law in the settlement of foreign investment disputes. In practice, however, national
courts tend to apply domestic law in commercial disputes litigated in the Kingdom, even
when the relevant contract contains a clause of a foreign choice of law and provides for a
foreign forum to have jurisdiction. As to arbitration in Saudi Arabia, it is available from local
chambers of commerce for some types of disputes. Royal Decree No. M146 has incorporated
some Shari'a tenets alongside modem concepts of arbitration, and has generally softened the
serious conflict between Shari'a and Western legal concepts which has existed previously in
the Saudi arbitration system.
It is apparent that many people doing business in the Middle East are more
apprehensive about the method of solving legal disputes than any other aspect of their
business.i'" Such apprehension is perhaps justified in isolated instances, but generally
speaking there is no need for concern.162 Saudi Arabia has been following a middle course in
its approach towards ICA, hence:
Based on Shari'a tenets, it up-holds arbitration as a means of resolving disputes
arising from investment activities.
It restricts government bodies from submitting to arbitration whether international or
national but with special leave by the Council of Ministers. This is arguably to allow
government to exercise its right to national sovereignty over its natural resources as a
result of its bitter experience with the ARAMCO Arbitral Award.
161 Russell, B., An Introduction to Business Law in the Middle East, London: Oyez Publishing, (1975), p. 18.
162 Ernest, K., supra note 73, p. 86.
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Pursuant to its commitments under the relevant conventions, it will permit
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards subject to reciprocity, public policy, and
Shari'a which also recognises the supremacy of public interests.
In conclusion, there are no particular difficulties in the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards in Saudi Arabia unless they, as stated previously, contain elements of interest, or
conflict with the enforcement regulations of the Saudi Arbitration Code of 1983. However, in
practice, the Saudi Arbitration Law as it stands could be said to be less favourable to a
foreign investor for the following reasons:
1- Arbitration involving Saudi Arabian governmental entities must be conducted
in Saudi Arabia under Saudi law.163 This contradicts the equal footing
principle.
2- The close involvement of the BG.
3- The rule that the arbitrator must be a Muslim.
4- Arbitration must be engaged in Arabic.
5- The uncertainty about enforcement of foreign awards.
Various provisions of the Arbitration Regulations and Implementing Rules make it clear
that the arbitrators are to apply Saudi procedural and substantive law to the dispute. This is
consistent with the general practise of Saudi courts, which do not recognise the doctrine of
conflict of laws, and will not apply non-Saudi law to disputes brought before them even if the
disputing parties have chosen a foreign governing law. However, a specific rule derived from
a foreign law and incorporated as an express contractual provision should be enforced if not
in conflict with any mandatory provision of Saudi law.
163 Fox, W., supra note 4, p. 370.
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(4) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA
Introduction
Saudi Arabia has been the world's leading oil producing and exporting country for
many decades. It is a major player in shaping international oil policy, whether through OPEC
or outside of it. However, prior to the grant of the first oil concession in 1933, few were
convinced that the country possessed the large amounts of oil which was to be discovered
subsequently. The history of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia's oil and gas industry is
closely linked with the participation of an American oil company in Saudi - Standard Oil
Company - and the establishment and evolution of ARAMCO.
Foreign investment in the Kingdom dates back to 1933 when Standard Oil of California
signed the first concession agreement with the government of Saudi Arabia. It is widely
perceived that the American company took advantage of the inexperienced Saudis throughout
the negotiations and drafted the concession in their favour. 1 The concession agreement
amounted to a hugely successful commercial bargain to the company. Standard Oil of
California was subsequently joined by other American companies to create the Arabian
I Moran, H., The Evolution of Concession Agreements in Underdeveloped Countries and the United States
National Interests, 7 Vanderbil J. Transnational Law, 315-334 (1974). Cited by AI-Samaan, Y., The Evolution
of Contractual Relationship between the Government of Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO. Masters Dissertation,
University of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, (1990).
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American Oil Company (ARAMCO).2 The evolution of ARAMCO is therefore very closely
linked with the development of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia and therefore plays a major
role in the country's national economy? Many commentators are of the opinion that the
feeling of unfairness and inequity created by ARAMCO's attitude increased steadily from the
time of The 1933 Concession Agreement until resorting to The General Agreement on
Participation in 1972.4 It was the view of the Saudi government that the country had paid
more than enough of its national product to American companies in exchange for their
contributions to the development of the national oil industry. 5
The mam aim of this chapter is to outline the historical background of foreign
investment in the country. It will analyse - from a legal and historical perspective - the
efforts of the Saudi government to nationalise ARAMCO through the method of state
participation. For the purposes of understanding the Saudi government's subsequent intention
of taking control of the industry, the concept of state participation and some of its pertinent
features need to be explained. In addition, it is necessary to trace the development of the
original 1933 concession agreement which determined the relationship between the Saudi
government and foreign investors, notably through the history of ARAMCO. Later, the
chapter will highlight the 1972 General Agreement on Participation between the government
and international companies (including ARAMCO) to illustrate similar actions in
neighbouring countries as regards their relationship with foreign investors in the oil and gas
2 For background information on American influence and participation in the Saudi Arabian oil industry see
Hamilton, C., Americans and Oil in the Middle East, Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, (1962).
3 From its beginning the Saudi government has been exercising its influence over the historical evolution of
ARAMCO. For details of the development of the oil industry, see ARAMCO Handbook, Oil and the Middle
East, Arabian American Oil Company, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, (1968).
4 For a discussion on the terms of the 1933 Concession Agreement, and the initial privileges of ARAMCO, see,
Al-Samaan, Y., supra note, 1, pp. 28- 33. See generally, Anderson, I., ARAMCO, the United States and Saudi
Arabia: a Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy 1933-1950, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
(1981).
S On the shift of the bargaining position of Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO, see Al-Samaan, Y., Chapter II, Supra
note 1, pp. 55-60.
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industry." Finally, it is also necessary to highlight some of the pertinent activities during and
after the takeover of ARAMCO in 1980.
4.1 The meaning of 'State Participation' in the Petroleum Industry
Generally speaking, state participation" in the petroleum industry means the technical
and commercial involvement of a state or its designated representatives in the exploration and
exploitation of petroleum resources.i State participation can be obligatory or non-obligatory.
State participation is obligatory when it indicates as a condition the participatory role of the
state through its national company as part of the exclusive license granted by the host state. It
is non-obligatory when the host state or its national oil company are permitted to participate
whether in a domestic or foreign joint venture as a participant on a voluntarily basis for
commercial purposes. Usually the foreign investing company will invite the state company to
join it in the petroleum activities because of the advantages in having the state's database
(including existing technical studies) and knowledge of the resources at its disposal.
In the case where the host state or its national company, as petroleum rights holder and
also holder of the licence participate in the joint venture in the form of a joint company, the
state usually becomes a shareholder in such company. Usually, the host state does not
participate itself, per se, in the petroleum operations but will be represented in the joint
venture by the national company.
6 The General Agreement on Participation was concluded in December 1972 between Saudi Arabia and Abu
Dhabi on one side and the international major companies working within their national jurisdiction on the other.
The companies were: Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited, Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited and
ARAMCO.
7 For in depth discussion see chapter 2 supra. Some of the facts mentioned in that chapter are also mentioned
here for clarity and emphasis. See also Zakariyah, H., New Directions in the Search for and Development of
Petroleum Resources in Developing Countries. 9 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L., 545-556, (1976).
8 Taverne, B., Co-operative agreements in the extractive petroleum industry, Londres: International Energy and
Resources Law & Policy Series. 79-100, (1996).
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The joint venture is similar to a partnership agreement which forms the basis of the
contractual relationship between the host state and the foreign oil company. The partners in
the joint venture share the risks and rewards of the petroleum arrangements as the agreement
determines the portion of each partner's share of costs, losses, and profits.
Generally, the meaning of 'state participation' in the oil and gas industry can be found
in the following type of petroleum arrangements: joint venture, service contract, and
production sharing agreement. 9 These three types of agreements on state participation are
distinguishable.
4.1.1 Joint venture agreement:
Generally, a joint venture is where two or more existing businesses agree to co-operate
and combine their resources with a view to profit on a specific project for a specific length of
time without being bound together indefinitely. In the petroleum industry, under this type of
agreement, a foreign oil company and a host government through its national company each
contributes a portion of the cost to form a joint venture.l" This newly-formed company will
then, under the authorisation of the licence explore and exploit petrol in the licensed areas. If
a commercially viable find is made, then the foreign oil company's exploration cost will be
reimbursed by revenues after production of that field. If a commercially viable find is not
made, then the foreign oil company loses all its exploration's costs.
9 See Johnston, D., International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts, Oklahoma:
PennWell Publishing Company Tulsa, (1994), p. 296. On petroleum agreements in general see Maniruzzaman,
A., The New Generations of Energy and Natural Resource Development Agreements, JENRL, Vol. 2 No.4,
207-247, (1993).
10 See Stevens, P., Joint Ventures in Middle East Oil 1957- 1975, Beirut: Middle East Economic Consultants,
(1976), p. 17.
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·Such participation on what is known as a 'carried interest' basis is attractive to host
countries because it involves a government in exploration and development in situations in
which that government lacks the funds to do so. From the beginning the government is
involved as a partner carried by the contractor but without the risks of a financial
commitment. 1 1
4.1.2 Service contract:
Under a service contract the private oil company provides on a contractual basis over a
pre-arranged period, specific services for the host government. This type of participation is
useful, because, it can fill the gaps in the state's experience such as management, technology
and know-how. The private firm is considered to be working as a contractor for the state and
not as a partner, in carrying out the wishes of the state where it has no interest in the
resources themselves. Normally the payment is in cash and not oil which differentiates it
from the PSA (Production Sharing Agreement) where the payment is in kind. However, this
type of contract is not always attractive to integrated companies who are keen to increase
their access to crude oil supplies.V The private oil company, in most circumstances, is still
viewed as a conventional concessionaire - the foreign company is not a concession holder or
partner, but merely a hired agent - as far as the end result is concerned. 13
11 Cameron, P., The structure of petroleum agreement, Petroleum Investment Policy in Developing Countries,
(1988), p.43.
12 Cameron, P., Petroleum Licensing, A Comparative Study, London: Financial Times Business Information Ltd,
(1984) p. 12.
13 For more discussion on service contracts and its two types of arrangements see chapter 2 supra.
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4.1.3 Production sharing agreement:
This type of arrangement between the State and the private company was first
introduced in Indonesia in 1967.14 Zhiguo Gao defines it as follows:
"The production-sharing contract is an agreement under which a foreign company,
serving as a contractor to the host country/its national oil company, recovers its costs
each year from production and is further entitled to receive a certain share of the
remaining production as payment in kind for the exploration risks assumed and the
development service performed if there is a commercial discovery ",15
This is the most commonly used petroleum agreement and its form was shaped by the
law that was promulgated in Indonesia in 1960 (law No. 44).16 Article 3 provided that the
mining of oil and gas could only be undertaken by the state and that mining undertakings of
mineral oil and gas were to be exclusively carried out by the state enterprise. Article 6 of the
law, however, authorised the Minister of Mines to appoint foreign companies [as contractors
for the state enterprises] if they were required to carry out operations which [cannot, or
cannot yet be executed by the state enterprises involvedj.V
The production sharing agreement has some elements of both a joint venture agreement
and a service contract, in that the underlying basis of a production sharing agreement is the
sharing of petroleum production between the parties, rather the revenue produced from the
petroleum sale. Under this type of agreement the contractor undertakes the risk of exploration
and production. If there is no commercial discovery, the loss is borne by the contractor. But
in the case of commercial discovery, the contractor has the right to be reimbursed out of a
14 Bindemann, K, Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis ..Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,
(1999), p.l.
IS Zhiguo G., International Petroleum Contracts, Current Trends and New Directions, Graham & Trotman Ltd,
(1994), p. 72.
16 Cameron, P .• supra note 12, p. 14.
17 Hossain, K., Law and Policy in Petroleum Development, (1979), p. 139. The production sharing agreement in
Indonesia was introduced and developed to meet the requirements of the Indonesian 1945 constitution, which
reaffirmed the sovereignty of the state over its natural resources and to meet the national demand of supervising
foreign investment. See generally Fabrikant, R, Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum
Industry, 16 Harv Int. L. J., 303, (1975).
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percentage of the oil produced; this percentage is considered as cost oil as well as
compensation for the efforts done by the oil company. The oil company (Contractor) is
entitled to recover the petroleum costs it incurred by taking and freely disposing up to a
maximum percentage per year of all crude oil and natural gas produced from the contractual area
or such lesser percentage as is necessary to recover the petroleum costs. This amount of oil is
referred to as "cost oil", the ceiling of which varies from PSA to PSA for example, ranging from
40% in the majority of countries to 70% in the Philippines."
4.2 The main features of state participation in exploration and
exploitation of oil.
Generally, host countries prefer to have a system of state participation in the oil and gas
industry for the following reasons:
(i) Increasing government revenues:
In the past a number of countries entered into concession agreements with foreign oil
companies to explore and exploit their natural resources. As already mentioned, these
concession agreements were generally one sided, for long periods, and more advantageous to
the oil company than to the host country. As a result of the growing dissatisfaction against
concession agreements, host countries embarked upon a process to revise these arrangements.
This relationship between the international company and the host government came under
intense scrutiny in Saudi and other oil producing countries. Saudi's former Oil Minister,
Yamani acknowledged this new strategy and urged the major oil companies to "revise their
18 See Johnston: D., supra note 9, p. 296. See also Blinn, K., Claud, D., H., Le Leuch & Pertuzio, A.,
International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and Policy Aspects. New
York: Barrows Company Ltd., (1986), p. 242. See also Barrows, H., & Gordon, Worldwide Concession
Contracts & Petroleum Legislation. PennWell Publishing Co., (1983), for detailed information on the petroleum
laws in most countries.
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whole system of operation in the producing countries and enter into partnership with the
countries.t'" The type of partnership arrangements envisaged are those mentioned above.
A different strategy adopted by some host countries is the introduction or increase of
petroleum taxes. They have realised that they could increase their portion of revenues through
the levy of petroleum taxes instead of direct involvement in the petroleum investment. In
some cases, international companies are quite happy to be faced with an increase in tax rather
than be burdened by the involvement of the state participation.
(ii) Control over petroleum resources and over the activities of the
concession companies:
Due to the importance of petroleum as a natural source of energy and as a matter of
national interest, the intervention of the UN General Assembly was important with respect to
the ownership of mineral rights. However, the main event that led to the revision of the
meaning of ownership of natural resources in developing countries including Saudi Arabia
was an inequitable situation where the seven major international oil companies controlled
huge areas under long term concession contracts that only benefited themselves, at the
expense of the host nations in which they operated during the first half of the 20th century.i"
Consequently, the UN General Assembly took the following action:
On December 21, 1952, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 626 (VII)21 which
provided that:
19Wall Street Journal, 27 June, 1968.
20 See Yergin, D., THE PRIZE, The Epic Quest/or Oil, Money and Power, New York: Free Press, (1991) for an
examination of the history of the world oil industry, the founders, the global struggle, war and strategy, the
hydrocarbon age and the battle for world mastery including the events that led to the creation of OPEC.
21See text of Resolutions at UN General Assembly website: http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm (13-06-
2005).
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The right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources
is inherent in their sovereignty.
On December 14, 1962, at its Seventeenth Session, the General Assembly adopted Resolution
No. 1803 (XVII)22 entitled Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources which provided
that:
The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the
well-being of thepeople of the State concerned.
At the same time it was declared that
Nationalisation, expropriation or relinquishment shall be based on grounds or
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised as
overriding purely private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in
force in the State taking such measures in exercise of its sovereignty and in
accordance with international law.23
The 1962 Resolution was reinforced in 1966 by Resolution 2158 (XXI) which was even
more explicit on host country rights.i" Host countries were 'advised', by exercising their
permanent sovereignty, to secure the maximum exploitation of natural resources and to
achieve this by the accelerated acquisition by developing nations of full control over
production operations, managing and marketing.P
On December 12, 1974, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 3281 (XXIX)26,
entitled "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" which provided that:
22Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24Ibid.
25 See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and
Mining Agreements: A Technical Paper, New York: United Nations, (1983); Stevens, P., supra note 10, p.
131. For the details of this resolution, see Blinn, K., & others, supra note 18, p. 30.
26See text of Resolutions at UNGA website: http://www.un.org/documentslresga.htm (12-06-2005).
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1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including
possession, use and disposal, over all of its wealth, natural resources and
economic activities ...
2. Each State has the right:
"To nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property in which
case appropriate compensation shall be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account any relevant laws and regulations and all
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question
of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic
law of the nationalising State and by its Tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on
the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle
offree choice ofmeans. ,,27
The issue of control is very important for the host government because of the notion
that the resources in the country belong to the state.28 The state does not want to surrender
this right entirely to the foreign company, which subsequently led to these participation
arrangements ensuring the right to intervene in petroleum activities. Participation is also
regarded as the beginning of full control of petroleum resources by host states, which
would give them the opportunity to playa major role in designing the decision-making and
other policies of the venture. This control would cover essential issues such as the capacity
of production and plans for future explorations. This policy was supported by OPEC's
conferences in order to enhance the role of member countries in pricing policy, and the rate
of production which was largely dominated by multinational oil companies.
(iii) Acquisition of technical and managerial experience:
In most countries, host governments are not able to undertake exploration and
production operations because of inadequate levels of technical and managerial experience.
27 The above stated UN General Assembly's resolutions of 1952, 1962 & 1974 are cited by Blinn, K., supra note
18, p. 30-31.
28 See Schrijver N, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Cambridge University Press, (1997), for a detailed
examination of the issue of permanent sovereignty over oil and gas resources.
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Hence, participation with an experienced international oil company could be considered the
best method to get a better understanding of its resources, to gain the necessary experience
and to eventually reduce dependence on foreign oil companies. A policy of state participation
would also require that nationals are given opportunities to be involved from the top levels of
management to the operational field leve1.29
(iv) Access to the international oil market:
Host governments usually tend to depend on foreign oil companies to sell their oil in
international markets; this may be due to a lack of experience or rather from an absence of
links with these markets. However, host countries under a system of state participation,
would have the opportunity to acquire the required experience in doing so. The following is a
closer examination of the events that led to a change of thinking in Saudi Arabia and
neighbouring countries and which in tum led to the desire to increase their participation in the
oil industries.
4.3 The General Agreement on Participation
4.3.1 Background
Before dealing with the General Agreement on Participation, we need first to outline the
attitude of international companies holding a concession in OPEC member countries as well
as the dramatic changes which favoured the oil producing countries that happened in the early
1970s.
29 See Hossain, K., supra note 17, p. 138.
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In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, two events took place that would have a major
impact on the oil industries of the oil producing countries. Firstly, in September 1969, Col.
Gaddafi, the Libyan leader overthrew the former monarchy in Libya through a military coup
- known as the 'Green Revolution'. The new government under Gaddafi dealt swiftly with
foreign oil companies operating in the country. The government required increases in the
posted prices and threatened that if its requirements were not met, it would nationalise its oil
industry. 3D The second important event was the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, which resulted in
oil embargoes. Following the armistice in this war, in October 1973, oil ministers of
OAPEC31 held a meeting in Kuwait, which resulted in an embargo on oil shipments to the US
and the Netherlands because these countries had supported Israel in the war.32
These two events resulted in significant changes in the structure of the relations
between the oil companies and host countries, for example, Libya's success in increasing its
oil prices and the rate of income tax encouraged other OPEC countries to demand increases
in oil posted prices and tax rates." The oil companies resisted this sudden demand for
participation by the host governments because they considered it as a threat to their rights as
well as a breach of the concession agreements between them and their host countries. The oil
companies argued that they owned the exclusive right to determine the oil price according to
the terms of the agreements concerned. Per contra, the host countries argued that they had the
sovereign rights to participate in the setting of oil prices because they owned the resources.
30 See Cattan, H., The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Oceana
Publications, Inc., (1967). See also Karim, M., Oil, Islamism and International Petroleum Industry Legal,
Economic, Political and Cultural Issues, LLM dissertation, University of Dundee, CEPMLP, (2001), Chapter 2.
31 The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
32 See Yergin, D., supra note 20, p. 606. See also Shihata, I., The casefor the Arab oil embargo: a legal analysis
of Arab oil measures with the full text of relevant resolutions and communiques, Institute for Palestine Studies,
(1975), p. 75.
33 See Shihatah, I., Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, The American
Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 68, No.4, 591-627, (Oct., 1974).
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In Saudi Arabia, the government insisted on its demand for participation. ARAMCO
rejected that at first and suggested an alternative solution by offering 50 per cent government
participation in the exploitation of undeveloped proven resources. However Saudi Arabia
. rejected thi~offer.34
As a result of the above events during 1960s and early 1970s, the OPEC countries were
encouraged to participate in their oil industry in order to meet the difficulties which were
facing them, such as the decline of oil prices, the domination of foreign oil companies over
their petroleum resources and the diminution of their portion of profits. These events led to
the oil producing country conference in Caracas, Venezuela in December 1970.35 The
conference passed resolution XX1.120,by which it instructed the member countries to:
• Raise income tax to the rate of 55 per cent.
• Introduce a uniform general increase in posted prices
• Eliminate all remaining discounts allowed to the concession-holders under the royalty
regime.
4.3.2 The agreement by the Gulf States to increase government
participation
The actions by the OPEC countries, highlighted in the previous paragraph very much
influenced the rest of the Gulf States to change their relationships with the international oil
companies. A meeting in Tehran between 13 oil companies and the six Gulf States (Abu
Dhabi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) resulted in an agreement known as
34 Al-Samaan, Y., supra note 1, p.137.
3S The OPEC countries met on 9 December 1970 at Caracas, Venezuela, in December where they agreed to raise
the posted prices of Arabian Gulf oil and increase taxes on the oil. See the OPEC website at:
http://www.opee.org.InI970. Libya's leader, Gaddafi, used OPEC's influence to put pressure on the other
independent Middle Eastern states by cutting its supplies and thus increasing the asking price per barrel. See
Adelman M., Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies As OPEC Tax-Collectors, Foreign Policy. No. 9
(Winter, 1972-1973), pp. 69-107 (doc:l0.2307/1148086).
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"Tehran Agreement". The agreement proposed an increase of the tax rate to 55 per cent and
an increase of the posted prices as well as an adjustment mechanism for the period 1971-1975
in order to take into account world inflation. Because of global inflation and the devaluation
of the American dollar, the countries of this agreement argued that it needed to be revised.
Therefore, the countries started negotiating with oil companies to raise oil prices. However,
oil prices rose dramatically as a result of the oil crises of 1973. The increase in oil prices was
over 100 per cent in posted prices. From then on, oil prices have been fixed by the producing
countries.
4.3.3 The positions taken by the Gulf States on participation in
their oil industries
The negotiations for state participation started in May 1972 between the Gulf country
governments of Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia on one side and the
international oil companies (concessionaires) on the other.36 The negotiations focused on the
compensation to be paid by the countries to the oil companies in exchange for the .
introduction of state participation in the petroleum ventures. At first, the parties could not
reach an agreement. During the negotiations and the formalisation of a draft agreement,
major differences on the agreement arose between the Gulf countries which resulted in the
withdrawal of Iran and Iraq from the negotiations in June 1972. Furthermore, Qatar did not
agree with the method of determining the 'buy-back price' for government participation and
started separate negotiations with its own concessionaires. Although the Kuwaiti Minister of
Petroleum signed the agreement on 8th January 1973, the Kuwait National Assembly
36 See generally, Stevens, P., National oil companies and international oil companies in the Middle East: Under
the shadow of government and the resource nationalism cycle, Journal of World Energy Law & Business, Vol.
1, No.1, 5-30, (2008).
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(parliament) refused to ratify it. 37 Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia on one side, and the oil
companies investing in their territories on the other, reached a conclusion by signing the
General Agreement on Participation in December 1972. The importance of these two
agreements was their objective of the national oil companies of each country acquiring a 51%
ownership by 1983. However, it was noted that this agreement included only general
principles, which meant that it should be possible for each party to sign separately concluded
complementary agreements with oil companies investing on its territory.
(i) The contents of the Agreement
Generally speaking, this agreement was an attempt by the Gulf country governments to
re-define the relationship between them and their international investors and to solve
continuing controversial issues, which centred around the following.'!
o The rate of participation:
The countries in this agreement attempted to determine the rate of entitlement on the
basis of their ownership over the petroleum resources. For this purpose, it was agreed on an
initial 25 per cent which would increase gradually by 5 per cent within 10 years until it
reached 51 per cent.
o Participation on ownership and management:
The countries also attempted to obtain definable interests in the production of crude oil
through the Agreement. The amount of these interests' was to be equivalent to the country's
37 Al-Sabah, Y., The oil economy of Kuwait, Routledge, (1980), pp. 20-31.The Kuwaiti Parliament refused to
ratify this agreement on the grounds that it aimed at strengthening the position of the concession-holding
companies, since it provided for minority and effective participation of 25%. In addition the opposition group in
the Parliament argued that the duration of this agreement was excessive as it covered the entire remaining
concession period which was due to expire in 2026 and demanded effective and immediate 51% participation.
Arab Oil and Gas Magazine, Vol. II, No. 34, 16th (Feb., 1973), available at: http://www.arab-oil-
~as.comlindex l.htm visited 16/0112009.
8 For a detailed overview of investment in the petroleum sectors of the Gulf countries, see Gulf Organization
for Industrial Consulting, Studies Department, Study on Investment Climate in the GCC Countries for Attracting
Direct Investment, Final Report, (Sep. 2001).
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percentage of participation. Additionally, the countries were awarded the right to participate
effectively in the management of the operations,
o The method of compensation payment:
It has been stated that the governments and companies did not, in the first instance,
reach an agreement on the method of compensation. Later on it was agreed that compensation
was due to the companies in return for the transfer of the ownership shares to the host
• 39countnes.
o Offtake Agreement:
The Agreement obliged the countries to sell certain amounts of their portion of oil to the
concessionaires in order to enable them to meet their previous commitments of oil supply.
The agreement indicated that the payments should be made at agreed prices within the first
three years of the agreement.
(ii) The implementation of the Agreement
The agreement between the Gulf States dealt with conflicting issues and tried to solve
them by revising some of the rights and obligations of the two parties under the existing
agreements. This agreement obliged the two parties to share the production costs and risks. It
also provided for the adherence to any previous agreements between them through Article 9
which states the following terms:
"Each Gulf state and company or companies presently holding a concession agreement
agree that all existing agreements between them in respect of such concession shall remain in
full force and effect in accordance with their terms, the terms of this agreement and
39 Ibid., p.182.
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applicable Implementing Agreement. Each state and the company or companies concerned
shall cause all steps to be taken to perform their respect of the relevant concession ".40
As already mentioned, the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and the oil embargoes that
followed it led to the unilateral determination of oil prices by OPEC countries and thus
speeded up the process of nationalisation in some countries. Subsequently, these events
empowered the Gulf countries in their bargaining position with the oil companies. They were
able to enforce their control over their petroleum resources and reduce the domination of the
oil companies through the imposition of state participation. Another factor that influenced the
relationship between Gulf countries and the oil companies is that the latter feared that these
states would follow the Mexican example" and nationalise the entire oil industry with little
hope of compensation. The companies were in a position to choose between contractual
modification and complete loss of the concession.Y Therefore, companies were willing to
renegotiate the old concessions and to form participation agreements which led to the
eventual takeover of its oil enterprises in their countries and subsequently the collapse of the
General Agreement on Participation.
Consequently, all subsequent agreements concluded after the 1973 Middle Eastern
wars and the oil embargoes were notably different from the previous concessions and also
that of the General Agreement on Participation. Hence, on June 5th 1974, Saudi Arabia agreed
with ARAMCO to revise the General Agreement on Participation and to raise the State's
40 Ibid, p.183.
41 In 1938 Mexico nationalised the entire oil industry and placed all of the mineral properties in a state-owned
oil company, for more examination of the Mexican nationalisation see for example: Kielmas, M., Oil Investment
in Latin America, in Walde, T., and Ndi, G. (eds.), International Oil and Gas Investment Moving Eastwards,
London: Graham & Trotman, (1994), p.133.
42 Anderson, R., Fundamentals of the Petroleum Industry, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, (1984), p.
47.
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participatory interest to 60 per cent." In fact, the evolution of state participation in the
Arabian Gulf Countries was that the process of state participation developed gradually from
early 1960s towards the main objective of these countries which was the complete takeover
of their enterprises from the hands of foreign investors by the end of the 1970s.44 In Saudi
Arabia the history of ARAMCO provides interesting insights into foreign company- host
government relations in FDI.
4.4ARAMCO
4.4.1 The Role of ARAMCO in the Exploitation of the Oil
Resources of Saudi
The American petroleum companies played an important part in the exploitation of the
petroleum resources of Saudi Arabia.4s From these ventures, the Arabian American Oil
Company (ARAMCO) was created." However, the contribution of ARAMCO cannot be
mentioned in isolation from the impacts of events such as the discovery of petroleum; the
concession agreement of 1933; the discontent of government with the agreements; a fifty -
fifty profit sharing formula; the shift in the relative bargaining power of the participants; the
takeover of ARAMCO through the participation agreement. These will now be outlined in the
following paragraphs.
43 A Study on Investment Climate in the GCC Countries for Attracting Direct Investment, supra note 38, p. 185.
44 The initial call for participation among OPEC members was first raised by Saudi Arabia when it approached
ARAMCO on the matter in 1963. Later on, Saudi Arabia took the whole subject of participation to OPEC in
1968; the concept of participation was put at the top of the agenda of most of the OPEC subsequent conferences.
See Yamani, Z., The Oil Industry in Transition, Nat. Resources Law, 391-398 (1975), P. 394. Cited by AI-
Samman, Supra note 5, p. 133. See also Zhiguo, G., supra note 15, p. 17.
45 For a detailed history of ARAMCO see, ARAMCO Handbook, supra note 3. See also Al-Samaan, Y., supra
note 1.
46 For a historical background of ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia, see Wells, D., ARAMCO: The Evolution of an Oil
Concession, in Mikesell, R., et al, Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of
Investor-Host Country Relations. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, (1971), pp.216- 236.
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4.4.2 The Discovery of Oil in Saudi
Following the successful discoveries of oil in Iran in 1908 and Iraq in 1923 the Saudi
government invited foreign investors to invest in the Kingdom's petroleum and mineral
resources. At that stage the existence of Saudi's petroleum resources was mainly based on
speculation.Y The first concession was granted in 1923 to the British group Eastern and
General Syndicate to explore the eastern province of the territory. The concession area was
large and covered approximately 36,000 m2• However, no discovery was made and the
concession was abandoned in 1927.48
The subsequent discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1931 increased the potential for oil
discovery in Saudi. Subsequently, in 1933, the Saudi government granted the first concession
award to an American Oil Company, namely, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL, now
Chevron), to explore and produce oil in an area of 495,900 m2•49 A few months after signing
the agreement, there were positive results from the preliminary geological research of oil
exploration work which showed encouraging signs of oil in the Jabal adh-Dhahran area.so
In 1938, the first oil discovery was made with the Dammam Well No.7 in an area
known as the Arab Formation. A year later in 1939, the first Saudi oil shipment was exported
from Ras Tanura Port. Several discoveries followed. By 1999 there were 90 discovered fields
(7 of them gas fields; 1 condensates, and the rest oil fields). Eighty-three of these fields are
47 See generally, Enav, P., The Saudi Oil Dilemma, London: Financial Times Energy, (2000); also Lackner, H.,
A House Built on Sand: a political economy of Saudi Arabia, Ithaca Press, (1978).
48 The country and its king (Abdul Aziz) were facing many difficulties in generating the necessary funds to meet
the country's increasing financial demands, particularly when the country was experiencing a decrease in the
pilgrimage tariff after World War I, which was the main financial source for the country.
49 See ARAMCO Handbook, supra note 3.
so Ibid.
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located within the Saudi ARAMCb's concession area, and the remaining are in the Neutral
Zone's partitioned area between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.i'
4.4.3 The 1933 Concession Agreement
The old style concession agreement, as described above, dominated oil production in the
Middle East between 1901 and 1972. The first successful agreement of this type in the area was
the concession granted to the British company D'Arcy in 1901 by the Persian Government.f
Traditional concession agreements worked largely to the advantage of the oil companies of the
West and gave them a strong bargaining position to wield power over the host governments of the
Middle East. They were in places where governments granted the concessionaires extensive
rights, which later came to be regarded as unfair to the oil bearing countries, as these rights were
so extensive that some commentatorsr' have regarded it as amounting to the transfer of
. 54sovereignty.
The concession agreement, whatever form it takes, constitutes the 'charter' or foundation
document whereby the state grants to the international oil companies (IOCs) the governmental
authority they need in order to conduct their operations in a lawful manner.P This was common
in the old style concession agreements where managerial freedom was given to the IOCs in the
development of their concession area.56
51 For a detailed overview of the historical background of the oil discoveries in Saudi Arabia, see the website of
the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources at: http://www.mopm.gov.sa (October 2006).
52 Stevens, P., supra note 10, p.l.
53 See Sornarajah, M., The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, London: Kluwer Law International,
(2000); P. 44. See also Clove, A, Oil Economics and Policy, London: Kluwer Academic Publisher, (2000), p.
59.
54 AI-Samaan, Y., The Legal Security of Private Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, PhD
thesis, University of Dundee, CEPMLP, (1993), pp. 11-12.
55 Miller, P., The Chain of LNG Project Contracts, Greenwald, G., (eds), Liguefied Natural Gas. Developing &
Financing International Energy Projects, Kluwer Law International, (1998), p. 138.
56 Stevens, P., supra note 10, p. 4.
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The 1933 Concession Agreement is widely regarded as the starting point of the legal
regime for the exploitation and development of the petroleum resources of Saudi. The
agreement was signed on 29 May 1933 by the Saudi government and the Standard Oil
Company of California. The agreement was promulgated by Royal Decree No.1 135.57 The
provisions formed the starting point for subsequent agreements. The concession defined the
area, the duration of the concession, the payments to be made by the concessionaire to the
government and the mutual rights and obligations of the parties. 58
In 1934, the Standard Oil Company was joined by the Texas Company to form the
'The California Arabian Standard Oil Company'. Oil was discovered in 1938 and
subsequently the California Company was compelled to share the concession with other
companies which eventually led to a change in the name to the Arabian American Oil
Company (ARAMCO).59 The exclusive rights of ARAMCO under the 1933 Agreement were
extended in 1948 when the government granted the Company an Offshore Agreement which
covered the whole offshore area of Saudi. 60
4.4.4 Discontent of the Government with the Concession
Agreements
The weaknesses of the Concession which led to the discontent of the government were
mainly the following: the Saudi government was still at an infant stage with large socio-
economic demands to provide for its people, to alleviate poverty and to provide for
57 See Umm al-Qura, (official gazette in Saudi), 14 & 21 July 1933.
58 Al-Samaan, Y., The Legal Protection Of Foreign Investment In The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia, Dar AI-
Andalus for Pub. & Dist. Hail: Saudi Arabia. (2000), p. 28.
59 In 1948, the Standard oil Company of California, the Standard Oil accompany of New Jersey and the Texas
Company each acquired 30% and Socony Mobil Oil Company 10% of ARAMCO. See Anderson, I., supra note
4, pp. 3-35.
60 Royal Decree No. 6/5/4/3711 promulgated on the 1st day of Sha'aban, 1368, corresponding to the 28th of
May, 1948. See also Al-Samaan, supra note 1, pp. 9-12.
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education." Therefore, government was in urgent need to receive the petroleum investment
funds.62 This weakness of the Saudi government was soon realised by the American oil
companies, which exploited that position.f The government did not have a clear negotiation
strategy, there was no legislation for regulating the exploration and development of
petroleum resources, and some very important terms and conditions were not included in the
agreement. These related to minimum expenditure, government participation interest in the
decision making process, company obligations to submit geological data to government,
company obligations to reinvest part of the investment returns in the country, determination
of crude oil production and price and the observation of conservation of petroleum
resources.64
Additionally, the company was given absolute discretion over the direction of the
exploitation of the petroleum resources.f In the terms of the Agreement, the company also
enjoyed an exclusive right to be exempted from all taxes; and the exclusive right to explore
and exploit the Eastern Province for the duration of 60 years. It also had the exclusive right to
export and sell petroleum and their products.t"
However, this picture was to change with the unfolding of international events. In the
1940s external events contributed to the strengthening of the bargaining power of the
developing countries in the international oil industry. These events include the Second World
61 See Enav, P., The Saudi Oil Dilemma, London: Financial Times Energy, 2000; These problems are still an
issue in modem Saudi See also McNulty, C., An Evaluation of Saudi Arabia's Policies for Economic
Diversification, Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Durham, (1984) for an examination of the policies
for economic diversification which came about because of the first major oil price rise in the early 1970s.
62 Ibid. See also SAGIA, The Legal Background to Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia General
Investment Authority (2003).
63 Moneys paid to the Saudi government included a bonus of 30000 pounds of gold, that was paid at the signing,
an advance payment of 50000 pounds gold and annual surface fees of 5000 pounds gold.
64 See AI-Samaan, Y., supra note I, p. 7.
6S Saudi Arabia Information Resource at http://www.saudinf.comlmainlelll.htm (05/12/06).
66 See Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources at: http://www.mopm.gov.sa (23112/06).
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War, the emergence of the new participants in the industry" and importantly the introduction
of a 50% income tax on foreign oil companies by the Venezuelan government. Furthermore,
the Saudi government was also influenced by the high royalty that was offered by the Getty
Oil Company for a concession in the Neutral Zone shared with Kuwait and Iraq. The high
profit sharing offered was one eighth of the company's production profits and one quarter of
its refinery profits. Consequently, the government perceived that ARAMCO should offer
more than that. 68
In view of these international developments, the discontent of the Saudi government
became obvious when they demanded in the early 1950's a 50% share of the profits from
ARAMCO, through a new profit sharing formula. This strategy was executed' with the
introduction of new types of joint venture agreements. The Saudi government demanded
firstly a 25% share to participate in the decision making process of the operations of
ARAMCO. These events led to a Saudi government demand for ARAMCO to increase its oil
revenues and a protest against the high tax imposed by the USA on ARAMCO. On 30
December 1950 the government and ARAMCO concluded the Profit Sharing Agreement
.whereby it subjected the company to a 50% tax and cancelled the original tax exemption
clause of the 1933 Agreement which was imposed unilaterally by the oil company.f" This
profit sharing arrangement was the first step by the government to exert its sovereignty over
67 In 1957 a number of small companies known as the "independents" emerged from the USA and some major
consuming countries. These companies changed the overall situation so that the "Seven Sisters" bargaining
power was in decline as they faced increased competition from the "independents". See Mikesell, R., Petroleum
Company Operations and Agreements in the Developing Countries, Washington D.C: John Hopkins University
Press, (1984), pp. 23-24.
68 See ARAMCO v Saudi Arabia [August 23,1958J, International Law Report, 27 (1963), p.117.For detail see
AlsharrifN., Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia: Groundsfor Refusal Under Article (V)
of the New York Convention of 1958, University of Dundee, PhD Thesis, (2000), pp. 85-88. See also Al-Saman,
Y., Evolution of the Contractual Relationship between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO, Journal of Energy &Natural
Resources Law, Vol. 12, No.2, (May 1994), pp. 257-258.
69 The royalty provisions in the Middle Eastern concessions granted in the 1930s were unfavourable to the
governments. The concessions provided for a royalty calculated as a flat rate per ton of oil rather than as a
percentage of the value of the sale price of production. For instance, in the concession granted by Saudi Arabia
the royalty was set at four shilling per ton. See Blinn, K., Duval, C., Le Leuch, H., and Pertuzio, A., supra note
18, p. 57.
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the petroleum resources of the country and to redress the balance of the one sided 1933
Concession Agreement.
Article Iof this agreement provided that:
"In no case shall the total of income tax and all other taxes, royalties, rentals and exaction of
the government for any year exceed 50 per cent of the company's gross income after such
gross income had been reduced by ARAMCO's costs of operations, including loss and
depreciation, but not reduced by taxes, royalties or exaction ".70
It is widely accepted that despite the improvement of the financial terms of the
agreement, the Saudi government was still not in control of its own oil industry and could
therefore not direct the much needed investment to the economic and industrial development
of the country.i' During the 1960s, the OPEC member States including Iran, Iraq and Libya
restructured their original concessions and gained complete control over their petroleum
resources through a campaign of nationalisations. Despite this, Saudi still preferred to
participate rather than to nationalise its oil industry because of the realisation that they did not
have the technical know-how, and the fear of having to compete with other countries that had
by then already nationalised their oil sectors.72
In June 1974 the Saudi government agreed with ARAMCO to increase the
government's share to 60% with their intention to fully takeover the company. This was
followed by the government's demand of the acquisition of the remaining 40% of
ARAMCO's producing assets. In 1980 the government acquired 100% ownership of
70Al-Samaan, supra note 7, p.30.
71 Al-Samaan, supra note 54, p.19.
72 See Bunter, M., An Introduction to Islamic (Shari'a) law and to its effect on the upstream petroleum sector,
CEPMLP., (2003), pp. 23-24; see also AI- Samman, Y., supra note 67.
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ARAMCO's which resulted from participation agreement mentioned earlier and purchasing
almost all of the company's assets. However ARAMCO continued to operate and manage
certain phases of the oil operations on behalf of Saudi ARAMCO under a service contract. In
1989, ARAMCO was converted into the national oil company of Saudi Arabia under the
name Saudi ARAMCO.73 Saudi ARAMCO is fully owned by the government, it is regarded
as an autonomous legal body, with full financial responsibility.I" However, the supreme
decision making authority is the SPMC under the chairmanship of the President of the
Council of Ministers (the King) with ten members appointed by Royal Decree." The Council
is responsible for the determination of the general policy of the company, the endorsement of
the 5 year business plan, programmes for oil production, exploration and development, and 5
year capital investment plans. The Council is assisted by the Board of Directors, under the
chairmanship of the Minister of Petroleum and Minerals resources, with 8 members also
appointed by Royal Order for 3 years. The Board is responsible for the day to day
management of the company on a purely commercial basis. The Ministry of Petroleum and
Mineral Resources is responsible for the supervision of the Company and to ensure that the
Company carries out its operations in accordance with government policy, and in line with
the regulations on the conservation of petroleum resources in the country. 76
4.4.5 The Petroleum Policy of Saudi Arabia
In summary, government petroleum policy is mainly based on the following important
aspect: Saudi is the world's largest oil producer, exporter and reserve holder in the world oil
73 See ARAMCO Website at www.Saudiaramco.com and also Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources at:
http://www.mopm.gov.sa (23/12/06).
74 Ibid.
7S The Supreme Petroleum and Mineral Affairs Council (SPMC) was established in January, 2000, by Royal
decree by King Abdullah. The new body will be the ultimate decision-maker over future downstream joint
ventures with foreign companies - a development the kingdom is eager to pursue. These projects include
transforming gas in value-added industries such as power, desalinated water, and petrochemicals, as well as
refining technology, lube-oil production. See http://www.saudinf.comlmainlc551.htm (10/6/05).
76 See Saudi ARAMCO website at http://www.saudiaramco.com.
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market. This situation underlines the long-term objectives of the government's oil policy.
Furthermore, the oil sector accounts for one third of the gross national product and two thirds
of government revenues.f Oil policy is geared towards stabilising the revenues from oil over
time, for the sustained development of the Saudi economy. Therefore, the cornerstone of
Saudi Arabia's oil policy is stability in the international oil market in the interests of the oil
producers and consumers and the healthy growth of the world economy. Thus, the Petroleum
Policy developed by the Ministry of Petroleum, is based on the following aspects: stability in
the international oil market, cooperation with the oil producers and consumers, ensuring
continued growth in world oil demand in line with world economic growth, the building of an
efficient, integrated and competitive national oil industry and the establishment of channels
of communication and dialogue with concerned countries and industries, on energy,
. d hn I . 78environment an tee 0 ogy Issues.
Conclusion
It is beyond question that OPEC member countries played a major role in the process
of nationalisation of their oil enterprises during the late sixties and seventies. In this process,
like the rest of the OPEC countries, Saudi also played a prominent role, with the ultimate goal
of exerting its sovereignty over its natural resources in order to control both the rate of
production and prices.
As far as early concession agreements are concerned, they represented an obvious
exploitation of public resources of the host state, as they placed the concessionaire on a
footing higher than that of the host government. Therefore, Muslim oil producing countries
77 For updated information on the national economy see World Bank website at:
http://devdata.worldbank.org/extemal/CPProfile.asp?CCODE=SAU&PTYPE=CP. See also the contribution of
oil to the national economy of Saudi Arabia at the OPEC website:
http://www.opec.org/aboutus/member.l1020countries/sArabia.htm (12/12/06).
78 See policy on Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources website at: http://www.mopm.gov.salindex.htm
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considered concession contracts for the exploitation of their natural resources as "an
encroachment on national sovereignty and an instrument of foreign domination over their
national economic development.i" Accordingly, such agreements have been gradually
terminated by the Saudi government and many other Muslim countries, particularly with the
rise of the power of OPEC in 1960, and have been replaced by exploitation by state-owned
petroleum companies, often with technical assistance from or in a joint venture with
international petroleum companies. Saudi Arabia preferred to gradually nationalise
ARAMCO through the method of state-participation rather than outright nationalisation as
had occurred in Libya. The question arises as to why Saudi Arabia did not nationalise
ARAMCO from the start but instead opted for a gradual process through state participation?
The following reasons could be offered for this approach:
First, as stated earlier in this chapter, it would conflict with the way of Saudi thinking
about their economic and political systems. Secondly, Saudi Arabia tried not to upset its
strong relationship with the US and other foreign investors. Thirdly, Saudi Arabia lacked the
necessary capital and technical know-how. Fourthly, it was concerned that the concession-
holders might increase off take from non-nationalised sources of oil as a retaliatory action
against nationalising countries, as these companies did in the case of Iranian nationalisation
from 1951-54 and in other instances later on. Finally, Saudi Arabia was concerned that
nationalisation might lead to a competitive production race among the producing countries,
which could cause the erosion of crude oil prices, which consequently would cause political
and financial instability to such country. 80
79 Walde, T., Methods of Mineral Investment Promotion, Foreign Investment Law Review (ICSID Review).
(1991), p.l. See also AI-Samman Y, supra note 67, p. 257.
80 See Cordesman, A, Economics, Energy and the Future Stability of Saudi Arabia, Strategic Energy Initiative,
Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, (1999). See also Aramco v Saudi Arabia supra
note 67, p.l17. See also Al-Saman Y., supra note 67.
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This chapter has provided a historical account of foreign investment in the oil
industry of Saudi Arabia. Before a closer examination of the protection of foreign investment
in Saudi, the next chapter will examine the general legal framework in which such protection
occurs. It will address some of the pertinent issues relating to Islamic law and foreign
investment in Saudi Arabia. It will also briefly highlight the importance of international law
in relation to the treatment of foreign investment as well as Saudi Arabia. The next chapter
deals with the legal system of Saudi Arabia which is governed by Shari'a and supplemented
by a variety of statutes and regulations promulgated by the government.
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(5) PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Introduction
In order to attract foreign investors, measures have been taken by host countries,
particularly developing states, to offer legal guarantees for foreign investments. Most of these
countries sought to achieve this objective by unilateral means, i.e. by providing equitable
treatment and security for foreign investments in their legal systems and foreign investment
laws. However, due to the fact that the host state can unilaterally modify its national laws,
there is a view among foreign investors that the guarantees and assurances provided by such
instruments are of limited value. Thus a number of developed and developing states sought to
offer foreign investors effective legal protection by concluding multilateral and bilateral
treaties on the promotion and protection of foreign investment.
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the protection of foreign investment
under Saudi national law, Islamic law and international law. Efforts are made to highlight the
protection of foreign investments under Saudi domestic law and to demonstrate whether the
guarantees provided are sufficient to secure foreign investment. Since Islamic law is the main
source of Saudi law its principles concerning the protection of foreign investment will be
reviewed first. Later, the discussion will focus on the protection of foreign investment under
international law. This chapter will also explore the issue of bilateral and multilateral
investment treaties and organisations which are becoming increasingly important
mechanisms to impose rights and obligations on both the foreign investors and government.
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5.1 The ration ale for the protection offoreign investment
Generally, the host state has the sovereign right to control all aspects of any foreign
investment inside the territorial boundaries of the country. 1 It is because of this exclusive
right of the host state that foreign investors want more protection against any non-commercial
risks. These include nationalisation, restriction on repatriation of profits, and the modification
of domestic laws that may interfere with investment which leads to a fundamental increase in
financial burdens. Additionally, this could include an increase in taxation or sudden and
unplanned development for other onerous regulatory requirements such as new or changed
environmental controls.
Despite how attractive the locational advantages offered by a host country might be, an
investor will balk at a foreign investment decision if the host country does not offer adequate
legal security and stability that for investment. There are however no absolute or universal
standards of investment framework adequacy; it is always a question of what will satisfy a
particular investor in a particular case. A foreign investor will first evaluate the potential for
commercial and financial gain and, after that, weigh up that potential against the risks,
including the political risks, prevailing in the host country. If the host country risks include
significant elements of legal risk, the foreign investor will be faced with a classical dilemma:
either to forego the opportunity or proceed with the investment under legal conditions which
are less than adequate. Only the bravest foreign investor will invest in a country with a legal
system which offers no constitutional or legislative safeguards for investment?
I For most developing countries, this right of the host state originates from the post-colonial period after the
dissolution of the empires. See for example, Sornarajah. M., The International Law on Foreign Investment,
Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.22-30.
2 Flint, D., and others (eds.), Constitutional and Legislative Safeguards for FDI, Economic Development.
Foreign Investment and the Law, Kluwer Law International, (1996), p. 103.
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Foreign investors also demand the provision of adequate and impartial investment
dispute settlement provisions and mechanisms in case their rights are infringed by the host
state. Consequently, it is now the trend in capital importing countries to adopt measures that
would offer some guarantees to the foreign investor. Hence, most developing countries have
now, through unilateral means, provided for equitable treatment and protection of foreign
investment in their national constitutions, foreign investment laws and government policy
instruments. Some of the capital exporting and importing countries have gone further and
concluded multilateral and bilateral agreements to promote and protect the foreign
investment.
5.2 Protection of Foreign Investment under Saudi Law
Usually, assurance and guarantees against expropriation, nationalisation and similar
measures promised unilaterally by the state to foreign investors are found in constitutional
clauses, items oflegislation and official policy statements. The purpose of these devices is to
confirm the desire of the government to protect foreign investment against arbitrary
measures.i
The degree of security provided by investment laws is, however, not uniform and there
are a number of factors which determine the extent of any guarantee provided by such laws.
Among these factors are the degree of requirement for foreign capital, the endowment of
certain types of natural resources and the prospective profitability of investment. For
instance, if a country is in urgent need of foreign capital, it usually seeks to provide all
guarantees required by foreign investors in order to attract them to invest in its territory. In
contrast, a country which has sufficient financial resources and whose principal aim in
3 El Sheikh, F., The legal regime of foreign private investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. Cambridge
University Press, (2004), pp. 114-115.
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attracting foreign investment consists of its desire to obtain foreign technology and expertise
usually pays less attention to providing all the guarantees desired by the foreign investors."
In the light of previous discussions, the Foreign Capital Investment Code (FCIC) issued
in 1979 is a mechanism that regulates foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. The FCIC has been
specially introduced to provide a set of guarantees and incentives for foreign investors
wishing to invest in the country. However, the FCIC has been criticised in that it fails to offer
foreign investors adequate guarantees against potential arbitrary measures taken by the
government, and to assure them their right to freely transfer their investment capitals and
earnings to their home countries. The FCIC lacks the provision of a defined standard of
treatment of foreign investment and a means of resolving investment related disputes. These
issues are regarded as being of the utmost importance by foreign investors.
The FCIC is not yet delivering on previously settled government policy. In 1974, the
government adopted the Basic Principles of Industrial Policy whereby foreign investment
was encouraged with the transfer of technical know-how, and the government also gave an
undertaking not to impose any restrictions on the entry and repatriation of foreign capital.S
Consequently, in the year 2000 the government established the Saudi Arabian
Government Investment Authority (SAGIA)6 to provide information and assistance to foreign
investors. The Authority operates under the umbrella of the SEC and is headed by a
Governor. SAGIA's duties include formulating government policies regarding investment
activities; proposing plans and regulations to enhance the investment climate in the country;
4 Y. Al Samaan, Y., The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia, Hail: Dar Al Andalus for Pub.
& Dist., (2000), p 53.
S See Saudi Consulting House, Guide to Industrial Investment, (1986), pp.53-63.
6 Royal Decree No. MI dated 5/1I142IH, (April 10, 2000).
179
and evaluating and licensing investment proposals. All foreign investment projects must
obtain a license from SAGIA before they can operate in the country. Local investors continue
to apply to the Ministry of Commerce and the industry's foreign capital investment
committee for licenses.i In order to encourage foreign investment with a view to
strengthening the non-oil sector, the Saudi government began revising its 30 years old FCIC
to make the country more attractive to foreign investors and at the same time simplify
procedures. With this in mind, recent changes to improve the foreign investment climate in
the country include:"
Review of the old Foreign Investment Law to allow for inter alia granting to foreign
investors the same rights as are offered to Saudi nationals.
Review of the old Income Tax Law to now impose lower taxes on foreign business
profits in gas investment from 45% to 30% in order to provide greater legal
incentives.'
Also, Saudi Arabia is undertaking significant efforts to improve its legal environment.
New laws such as the Banking Control Law and recent amendments'" and the
insurance regulations II are expected to make the investment environment more
attractive to foreign capital. 12
7 For more information on SAGIA see: www.sagia.gov.sa and for overview of the investment climate in Saudi
Arabia see: www.state.gov./e/eb/fdiJ2005/43038.htmI3/03/2008.
8 For details on the promotion of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia see Saudi Commerce and Economic
Review, Foreign Investors: New Taxation System for Natural Gas, New Business Horizons, No. 121, (May
2004) pp. 1O~12.
9 Arab news, www.arab.net/sashariabiz.htmI6/03/2008.ltis interesting to note that, due to the high revenues
that it receives from oil production, the Saudi government is much less dependent than most countries on taxes
in order to carry out its functions. For more discussion on tax systems and incentives see chapter 6 infra.
10 The Banking Control Law, instated in 11th June 1966 by Royal Decree No. Ml5. The Law established the
groundwork of banking regulations; it has been expanded upon a number of times since it was enacted. More
information available at: http://www.sama.gov.salen!controllprocedure/cofmblr accessed on 17/0112009.
II The Law on Supervision of Corporative Insurance Companies, issued on 31st July 2003. The Law draft is
available at: http://www.sama.gov.salen!controllprocedure/Insurance-Law.pdf accessed on 17/0112009. It should
be noted that the Law allows foreign investors to own up to 49% of insurance companies. However, on April 13,
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The changes 13 introduced by new legislation also include the removal of the
requirement that foreign investors take local partners, allowing foreigners to own property
and to sponsor their foreign employees and to invest in any sector not included in the
'negative list' .14 Finally, some of the recent incentives introduced by the government include
the adoption of a new Corporate Tax Law which lowered the 2003/4 Corporate Tax rate to a
flat rate of 20%.15 A further development to attract more foreign investment is the creation of
new Exploration and Development agreements applicable in the development of four contract
areas in the Rub Al Khali region. 16
All investments and businesses pose a degree of'risk'". Some of the main risks are those
which are political in nature, whether caused by a political decision or an indirect action that
affects the political situation and subsequently affects the investment. Political risk can result
either from government action or a lack of it and can be considered part of a country's risk
analysis by foreign investors.l! In other words, political risks are risks which are unrelated to
the nature of petroleum exploration itself, but arise from the possibility of future change in
the political and socio-economic conditions in the country where the venture is undertaken. 19
However, some authors see political risks as "random events as in natural catastrophe
2005, Royal Decree No. 3120IMB allowed foreign insurance companies to operate in Saudi Arabia through
direct branches, which are not subject to the requirements of public ownership and cooperative form.
12 For detailed analysis of the Legal Tax reforms see Mazzanti, M., Saudi Gas Supplies and Investment Taxation
Legis/ation, OGEL, Vol. 2 - issue 1, (February, 2004), www.gasoil.com/ogel.
13 For more discussion see chapter 6 on legal incentives, infra.
14 See Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) negative list for activities excluded from foreign
investment at www.sagia.gov.saI7/03/2008
IS See the new Tax Law at www.sagia.gov.sa/07/03/2008 for an overview of the taxation regime see Saudi
Commerce and Economic Review, supra note 7, p. 10-12; also see Mazzanti, supra note 11.
16 See Saudi Commerce and Economic Review, Gas Projects: 1" Saudi International Gas Conference, pp. 24-
27; and Future of Natural Resources in Saudi Arabia, pp. 28-35.
17 For more discussion on the distinction between risk and uncertainty see Knight, F., Risk, Uncertainty and
Profit, Boston: Houghton, (1921).
18 Vinter, G., Project Finance, 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell. (1997), p. 187.
19 Zakariya, H., Political Risk Insurance in Petroleum Investment" in Beredjeck, N., and T. Walde, (eds.),
Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries. Graham & Trotman, (1988), p.206.
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risks"_2°Following this approach the probability of the host state taking measures to the
detriment of the investor cannot be influenced, foreseen, measured or cost for by the host
government or the investor. On the contrary, others interpret political risks as the result of an
implicit or actual bargaining process between the host government and the investor, and
therefore see such measures as policy instruments used by the host state in a rational manner
to achieve certain goals.'
,
In relation to the former, governments have a great role in managing political risks and
can reduce their effects. These risks can reduce a state's attractiveness to foreign investment
in as much as it can affect the investor's ability to conduct business there. Political risks can
range from a project company not being able to pay interest on its loans or pay dividends
because the host government imposes restrictions on the remittance abroad of foreign
currency, to the ·collapse of the host state's banking system caused by civil war or other
hostilities.21 One of the "nightmare scenarios" is the violent overthrow of the government of
the host state and its replacement by another government that does not feel bound by the
former government's commitmcnts.f In fact, frequent changes of regimes in developing
countries increase these risks?3 Political risks can also take the form of nationalisation or
expropriation or revocation of approval and licenses, or be focused on the performance of
foreign counter-guarantees in favour of the institutions. The other is to lengthen the short
20 Protopsaltis, P., Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency", Blanpain R., and others, (eds.) International
Encyclopaedia of Law - Intergovernmental Organisation: Supplement 18 Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, (Part 1), Kluwer Law International, (2005) p. 15. See also S. Sinn, Second Thoughts on MIGA 21
Intereconomics. (1986). p.27!.
21 Saudi Consulting House, supra note 5, p 187.
22 See Hollis S. and Berresford, J. Structuring Legal relationships in Oil and Gas Exploration and Development
in 'Frontier' Countries, in Walde, T., and K. Ndi (eds.), International Oil and Gas Investment, Graham &
Tortment, (1994), p. 44.
23 The new Indonesian government sought revision of multi-million dollar contracts concluded by the Suharto
regime on grounds of corruption and improper procedure in awarding some of those contracts. See the
Economist Magazine, Jan. 8th 1997, p. 74.
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maturities of commercial loans by guaranteeing later maturity or by way of guaranteeing
foreign exchange liquidity.i"
5.2.1 Typical political risks include:
• Regulatory Risk: If host government legislation imposes high barriers to entry in
terms of initial capital requirements or regulatory costs so that the necessary approvals
will not be secured without making huge investment, then it becomes difficult for the.
project to go ahead. This could be necessitated by an environmental requiremenr" for
instance. Similarly, future environmental standards can be increased at the expense of
the project, making for increased operating and capital COSt.26
• Contract Enforceability: Host government legislation could be weak or have no
provision for enforcing contracts, thereby prejudicing the rights protected in the
contracts.27
• Political Violence: Includes war, civil unrest, terrorism and sabotage. These are risks
arising from events which are beyond the control of the parties. These risks also
include national disasters, strikes and political insurrection; some of these events are
id dfi . . k 28cons} ere orce majeure ns s.
• NationalisationlExpropriation: This involves the requisition and freezing of project
company assets by the host government which affects the activities of the project. It
can also include discriminatory taxation, also referred to as 'regulatory take' which
changes a profitable enterprise into a loss making one. Another aspect could be the
24 Greenwald, B., Liquefied Natural Gas, Developing and Financial International Energy Projects, The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, (1998) pp. 254 & 291.
2S Ibid, P 297.
26 Stickley, D., Natural Gas Contracts Negotiation &Management, CEPMLP, (Sep. 2001), p 20.
27 Hossain, K., Law and Policy in Petroleum Development, London: Frances Printer Ltd, (1979) p. 70.
28 Teolis, 1., Issues in Project Finance, in Economic Development. Foreign Investment and the Law, London:
Kluwer Law Int., (1996), p. 206.
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unjustified cancelation of permits/licences or the refusal to renew them (e.g. import
export licences), or even refusing to give consent to start a project.
• Transfer Risk: This occurs when the project company is unable to obtain the required
amounts of foreign currency and remit them offshore due to the imposition of
exchange/" controls or due to action taken by the host government. 30
As stated earlier, the management of political risk is mainly the responsibility of the
host government. Middle Eastern States more than ever before have become a cause for
concern, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, which were linked
to the Middle East and made the perception of political risks even higher. It is easy to see
how, as a consequence of these activities, Saudi Arabia's risk rating might have been
hcightened.t' As will be discussed later in this chapter, Saudi Arabia has done much to
minimise the perception of political risk by foreign investors at both international and
national level.
29 Saudi Arabia maintains no exchange restrictions and imposes no trade restrictions for balance-of-payments
reasons. The exchange rate policy of the Kingdom has for a long time been geared to maintaining a stable
relationship with the U.S. dollar, which is the intervention currency. The exchange rate of the Riyal has been
maintained at SAR 3.75 to the dollar since 1986. This created a stable exchange rate environment for the private
sector and has also been conducive to foreign investment.
30 Vinter, G., supra note 17, p. 18.
31 For more detailed assessments and analysis of the impact and effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks, see
Moran, H., (eds.) International Political Management - The Brave New World, Washington DC: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (2004). For the Saudi stand on September 11 and other terrorism
activities, see for example, the report in Iqtisadyvah (The economist) (Arabic newspaper) from 9 February, 2005
(Issue No. 4136), on the joint efforts Saudi ARAMCO and others Saudi government agencies made in holding
public enlightenment programmes and international conferences to prevent and combat terrorism. The campaign
was jointly sponsored by the Ministry for Religious Affairs and also involved universities in the country. See
also Petroleum Intelligence Weekly Vol. XLIII, No. 19 from lOth May, 2004 at: www.energyintel.com. p. 9
where Saudi Foreign Minister Mr. Al Faisal "vowed to strike hard at this deviant group in order to uproot this
wicked disease from the body of our nation". He made the remarks as a result of the terrorist attack in the
industrial city of Yanbu that killed five foreign employees of ABB Lummus, a US Engineering arm of Swiss-
Swedish firm ABB. ABB were working at the Yanbu petrochemical plant jointly owned by Exxon Mobil and
Saudi Sabic. See also a similar report by Energy Compass (Energy Intelligence) Vol. No. 19, May 17, 2004 p.4.
This campaign was also backed by the Muslim World League as evidenced by a recent publication by its
Secretariat General: The Muslim World League's Position towards Terrorism 2005. This publication defined
terrorism and condemned in totality all acts of terrorism as perpetrated on September 11, 2001 and disassociated
the Saudi Government from all those dastardly acts.
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Despite the fact that policy statements are accepted as an expression of good faith
which reassures foreign investors, they are, as observed by Nwogugu.V merely public
statements which are not legally binding. Thus, in order for such policy statements to be of
real value in the strict protection of foreign investment, they must be incorporated in
municipal law or investment contracts. In this case the host government will consider itself
more obligated by such incorporations, and national courts will consider them more readily
enforceable than policy statements.
The introduction of the 1992 Basic Law confirmed the protection of private property
owned by nationals and foreigners. This included a guarantee of the inviolability of private
ownership.r' Private property cannot be expropriated or nationalised except for public
purposes and on the payment of just compensation, and there is to be no public confiscation
of private property as a penalty but only after a court judgment." The Basic Law thus
provides the foreign investor with a legitimate avenue to challenge, in the national courts, the
legality of any government action which adversely affects the investment"
5.3 Protection of Foreign Investment under Islamic Law.
According to the concept of 'Aman' (safe passage in the Islamic Shari'a which is given
to non-Muslim residents) foreign investors are entitled to the same protection as nationals."
The position of Shari'a is of great significance to the protection of property rights. Islamic
32 Nwogugu, E., The legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, Ocean Publications Inc,
(1965), p. 55, cited in AI Samaan Y., supra note 4, p. 56.
33 Basic Law Article 18 stipulates that: "The State shall guarantee private ownership and its sanctity. No-one
shall be deprived of his private property, unless in service of the public interest. In this case, a fair compensation
shall be given to him".
34 Ibid, Article 18 provides that: "General confiscation of assets is prohibited. No confiscation of an individual's
assets shall be enforced without a judicial ruling".
3S Al Samaan, supra note 4 p. 56.
36 This kind of protection is known as "Dhimmi", Literally, this doctrine is a sort of obligation or contract
imposed upon a Muslim state to protect and secure its non-Muslim citizens or residents. Prophet Mohammed
(pbuh) said: "He who hurts a dhimmi hurts me, and he who hurts me annoys Allah", Reported by al-Tabarani.
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Shari'a provides for the respect and inviolability of private property." The Quran states "0
ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: But let there be
amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good-will,,38 It means that no-one is allowed to take
another's property without legal cause. This principle of the inviolability of private property
is confirmed in Islamic writings. These writings emphasise the duty of the state to respect
private property, and that private property rights are sacred under Shari'a Law. Therefore any
infringement is a trespass against the law and a sin against religion" The inviolability of
private property has been also asserted in the teaching of jurists in schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. For instance, Ibn Taimyya, the eminent Hanbalz40 jurist, whose teachings have
had a great influence on the legal institutions in Saudi Arabia, is reported as saying "the first
duty of the state is scrupulously to respect private property."
As mentioned above, the two limits to the right of private ownership are expropriation
for public purposes against the payment of a just compensation and the execution of a
judgment against a debtor's property. Islamic Shari'a allows for expropriation on the basis of
payment of fair compensation. Thus, it can be taken that Saudi has followed this principle on
the strict basis as provided in the Islamic Shari' a. The reason for following this principle is
because it is regarded as compensation not interest (Riba) on overdue payments, which is
prohibited in Islamic law. Therefore, foreign investors are usually advised to include in their
investment contracts a clause providing for payment of liquidated damages or time penalties
in case of delay.42
37 The notion of property can be said to cover both tangible and intangible assets. For more examinations on
~roperty ownership protection under Islamic law Shari'a, see chapter 2, supra.
8 Chapter VI, Verse 29.
39 See for example, Saba, H., Property, Right and Contract in Muslim Law, 62 Columbia Law Review, 450
(1962), pA58.
40 For more elaborating on Shari'a Schools of thought see chapter 1 supra.
41 Ibn Tayymia, Assiyassah Ashariyah,(Islamic politics), Almatba'h Alsalafiyah, Cairo, (1386 H), p. 17. See
also AI-Samaan, Y., supra note 4 pp. 57-58.
42 Ibid, p. 59.
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However, contracts relating to the exploitation of natural resources belong to a special
category under the Islamic law of contract. Under Islamic law, there seems to be a consensus
in current Islamic opinion that ownership of natural resources'f belongs to the Islamic
community (nationals of the Islamic state) and that the Sovereign grants concessions on
behalf of the Islamic community in whom the ultimate right of property is vested."
5.4 Protection of Foreign Investment under International Law
In international law, any foreign investor has to follow certain duties and rights in order
to do business in a particular country. In terms of domestic laws, including treaties and
conventions, there is a duty to observe the host state's laws and regulations; and in turn the
foreign investor is entitled to the protection of their people and property invested in the host
state. It is also notable that capital exporting countries insist on an 'international minimum
standard' to protect foreign investors and their property which may be different from the
treatment of nationals of the host capital importing country. On the other hand the capital
importing countries can argue for the treatment of foreign investors on the same basis as that
is given to its nationals {'national treatment,).45
43 For more discussion on the issue of ownership see chapter 2 supra.
44 EI Malik, W., Mineral Investment under Shari 'a Law, London: Graham & Tortman, (1993) p. 54. This is the
view of the Hanbali and Maliki Schools see Ibn Qudama, Almughni ed., by Mohammed Riad (1948) in Arabic,
Vol. 5, p. 523-524. Yet there are other Islamic law Schools which disagree with this view. The Shaft and Hanafi
Schools adopt the view that mineral ownership follows land ownership, subject to the payment of (Zakat) taxes.
This opinion would be similar to that in Anglo-Saxon Common Law, see Bunter. M., The Islamic Sharia Law
and Petroleum Developments in the Countries of North Africa and the Arabian Gulf, Transnational Dispute
Management. (TDM), Vol. 1, Issue 2, May 2004, at www.transnational-dispute-management.com.
45 For an in-depth examination of the international minimum standard, see Sornarajah, M., supra note 1, pp. 328-
331.
187
5.4.1 International minimum standard
Due to the international and cross border nature of foreign investment patterns, these
standards offer foreign investors fair and equitable treatment, free access to national courts
and respect for their human rights, and in the case of nationalisation or expropriation, the
investor/owner is entitled to prompt, adequate and effective compensation: In support of this
standard there are two main areas of international law which confer protection on the investor
and his property. First are the international rules on state responsibility for injuries to aliens,
which provide certain minimum standards for the treatment of aliens and cannot be violated
by the host state." Secondly, a recent system of bilateral investment treaties also restricts the
sovereign rights of the host state to impose any of its local measures on the investment.Y
5.4.2 National treatment
As stated above, treatment of foreign investors and aliens on the same basis as that given
to host state nationals {'national treatment'} is preferred by capital importing developing
countries. This standard was laid down by developing countries as a way to protect their own
sovereignty against the actions of the powerful multinational corporations from developed
countries. There follows a summary of the background to formulation by developing
countries of this 'minimum standard' in foreign investment law.
The principle of 'national treatment as a mimmum standard' is based on another
principle of international law, which has been recognised as the basis of the ownership by
46 Even though it does not directly relate to a minimum standard and foreign investment, the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) ensures that local regulations do not violate the principles of free trade. GATT
was first signed in 1947 and lasted until 1994, when it was replaced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The agreement was designed to provide an international forum that encouraged free trade between member
states by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by providing a common mechanism for resolving
trade disputes. WTO membership now includes more than 150 countries. For details on the GATT text, see
http://www.ciesin.org/TGIPIITRADE/gatt.html and also http://www.wto.org/ (10 Jan 2008).
47 See Somarajah, M., supra note 1, chapter 6, pp. 225-276 for an in-depth analysis of Bilateral Investment
Treaties.
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states of their natural resources. This is the principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources (PSONR).48 The creation of this principle was spearheaded mainly by former
colonies "and developing countries that have gained their independence in order to take
control of the exploitation of natural resources in their countries - a privilege that used to be
available only to foreign investors, mainly from developed countries.
The main objective of this principle was to underscore the claim of formerly colonised
peoples and other developing countries to the right to enjoy the benefits of resource
exploitation. It was also necessary to allow 'inequitable' legal arrangements, under which
foreign investors had obtained title to exploit resources in the past, to be altered or even to be
annulled ab initio, because they conflicted with the concept of PSONR. However,
industrialised countries opposed this by reference to the principle of pacta sunt servanda'"
and respect for their earlier acquired rights.50
Initial demands to limit foreign control of national resources were made by Latin
American states in terms of the 'Calvo doctrine ,51 by which foreigners agree not to seek the
diplomatic protection of their own state and to submit to the jurisdiction of the host state.52
These attempts were supported by Eastern European Socialist countries and further demands
were made by newly independent states in Asia and Africa, which resulted in a great 'north-
48 For the text see Brownlie, I., Basic Documents in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1995),
pp.235-239.
49 The principle means that agreements are binding and are to be observed in good faith.
so Schrijver, N., Sovereignty over natural resources: balancing rights and duties, Cambridge University Press,
(1997), p.l
SI The inspiration was provided by the writings of Carlos Calvo, an Argentinean diplomat, historian and jurist.
In his Le Droit International (Vol. 6, 5th ed., 1885), he had said: 'Aliens who established themselves in a
country are certainly entitled to the same rights of protection as nationals, but they cannot claim any greater
measure of protection.' This statement, that aliens are entitled to national treatment only, was adopted in the
First International Conference of American States (Washington DC, 1889) and included in the Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States adopted at the Seventh International Conference of American States
(Montevideo, 1933). Cited in Somarajah. M., supra note 1, p. 21.
S2 See Brownlie, I., Principles Of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1998), pp.548·549
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south' confrontation over the issue of PSONR.s3 The main factors that shaped this principle
into international recognition included the following: concerns about the scarcity and
optimum utilisation of natural resources, deteriorating terms of trade in developing countries
and a desire for promotion and protection of foreign investment. Other important factors were
state succession, nationalisation, cold war rivalry, the demand for economic independence
and strengthening of sovereignty and the formulation of greater demands for human rights.S4
This standard was further developed in the 1962 United Nation General Assembly
Resolution (UNGAR) 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty of States over their Natural
Resources and Economic Activities. The principle, of 'permanent sovereignty' was
formulated and debated in the United Nations under the auspices of the Commission on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources'", which together with the Economic and
Social Council produced the text for the Resolution mentioned which was adopted by the UN
General Assembly on 14 December 1962. After its adoption, the principle of 'permanent
sovereignty' became linked with efforts to promote the economic development of developing
countries and to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The focus of the
principle shifted after 1975 to the promotion of exploration and exploitation of natural
resources in developing countries, and the role played by international institutions in foreign
investment.
53 See generally Elian, G., The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
(1979), pp. 141-143.
54 Shrijver, N., supra note 46, pp. 4-6.
55 The Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was set up in 1958 by the UN to conduct
a full survey with recommendations on the status of permanent sovereignty over 'natural wealth and resources'
as a basic constituent of the right to self determination. The Commission was instructed to consider the rights
and duties of states under international law and the importance of encouraging international co-operation in the
economic development of developing countries. UNGA Resolution 1314 (XIII) of 12 December 1958.
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Today pennanent sovereignty remains an important concern for the UN in the
discussion on sustainable development. The whole debate on permanent sovereignty has been
influenced by the rights and duties of developing countries, and their attempt to create a
balance between the main interests of all parties (including developed and developing
countries) involved in ~rder to promote economic development in the developing countries.f
The purpose of the principle is to emphasise the importance of sovereignty over natural
resources, and to encourage international cooperation in the development of developing
countries. It also emphasises the recognition and respect of the sovereign right of every state
to freely dispose of its wealth and its natural resources in accordance with national interests,
and respect for the economic independence of states. The principle stipulates a duty on states
to exercise their right to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources in the
interest of their national development, and of the wellbeing of the people of the state
concerned. 57 Another duty is that the exploration, development and disposition of such
resources as well as the import of foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in
conformity with any national rules and conditions which authorise, restrict or prohibit such
activities. 58
In addition to the above, some developed countries (mainly the industrialised ones)
rejected the adoption of the UNGA Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974 on the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS). CERDS allowed those states to
56 Schrijver, N., supra note 46, pp. 33-35.
57 See Article 1(1).
S8 Article 1(2). In terms of Article 7 the "Violation of the rights of people and nations to sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
hinders the development of international co-operation and the maintenance of peace". See Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, Investing in Developing Countries, 4th ed., OECD, (1978), pp. 94-
97.
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regulate foreign investment within their territorial domain in accordance with their own laws
and regulations in conformity with national objectives and priorities. S9
Under CERDS, the host state is not compelled to grant preferential treatment to a
foreign investor. It has the right to nationalise or expropriate foreign owned property (upon
payment of compensation) and the national courts of the host state must resolve all disputes
relating to the investment, under its domestic laws (unless otherwise agreed by the parties).
However, this interpretation of CERDS is not without controversy between developed and
developing countries. This argument is in line with Article 10 of the Charter of the UN which
provides that the General Assembly may make recommendations to the members of the UN
on any questions or matters, and that Article does not specify that the resolutions of the
General Assembly are binding." The controversy is due to a number of factors. There is an
absence of any reference to the applicability of international law to the treatment of foreign
investment and also an absence of requirements for the observance of good faith of
investment agreements. Finally there is no included mechanism for the settlement of disputes
involving foreign private parties."
5.4.3 Multilateral Instruments on Foreign Investment
The two most commonly cited multilateral instruments dealing with foreign investment
are the United Nations Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) and
59Article 2. The developed countries argue that even if a UNGAR should become a custom, it is in any case not
binding on dissenting states. The custom can become international law only in the absence of protest. The
reservations expressed by these countries to some of these resolutions such as CERDS would have been difficult
to ignore as a form of protest to its provisions - in particular those concerning nationalisation - ever becoming a
source of international law. See generally, Wolfgang, P., Arbitration and Renegotiation of International
Investment Agreements, London: Kluwer Law International, (1995), p. 178. Seidl-Hohenveldern, I.,
International Economic Law, London: Kluwer Law International, (1999), pp. 34-39. On the other hand, the
majority of the UN countries (namely developing countries) held the view that the draft Charter should be a
legal instrument of a binding nature and not merely a declaration of intention. See generally, Brownlie, I., supra
note 48, pp. 517-519. Wallace, C., The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control: Host state Sovereignty in
an Era of Economic Globalisation, London: Kluwer Law International, (2002), p. 990.
60 EI Sheikh, F., supra note 3, p. 168. See also references cited therein.
61 See AI-Samaan, supra note 4, p.64.
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the 1992 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Investment and these are
considered below.
(i) UNCTC Draft Code
The discontent of the Saudi government with the concession system and their position
against foreign company domination was discussed earlier in chapter 1. At the same time, the
activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) raised widespread concerns in developing
countries. As a result, governments and intergovernmental organisations attempted to
regulate the activities of TNCs on an international level. The most notable attempts were
initiated in the 1970s, as developing countries began to assert their interests within the United
Nations and the growing importance of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources was championed. Various agreements were set up to effectively control the
activities of TNCs including the United Nations Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations.Y The development of the Code was initiated in 1977 by the United Nations
Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC). The Code of Conduct was intended to be
voluntary and to forge a positive link between TNCs and the national development goals of
developing and developed countries. The Code is one of the main instruments dealing with
foreign direct investment in developing countries. Its main objective is to 'maximise the
contributions of transnational corporations to economic development and growth and to
62 Other international instruments include the International Labour Organisation'S Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, and the UNCTAD Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices. A History of Attempts to Regulate the Activities of Transnational Corporations:
What Lessons Can Be Learned?, Discussion Paper for Working Group II, Prepared by: Friends of the Earth--
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Washington, DC, November 1998.
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minimise the negative effects of the activities of the corporations.' An important definition in
Article lea) of the Code is that of transnational corporation, which includes:
'enterprises, irrespective of their country of origin and their ownership, including
private, public or mixed, comprising entities in two or more countries, regardless of
the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which operate under a system of
decision-making, permitting coherent policies and a common strategy through one or
more decisions-making centres, in which the entities are so linked, by ownership or
otherwise, that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence
over the activities of the others and in particular, to share knowledge, resources and
responsibilities with the others'.
Provisions of the Code include respect for national sovereignty and observance of
domestic laws, regulations and administrative practices and adherence to national economic
goals and development objectives. It also includes policies and priorities, review and re-
negotiation of contracts or agreements between governments and transnational corporations
and an acknowledgement that states have the right to nationalize or expropriate the assets of a
TNC operating in their territory, but that appropriate compensation is to be paid by the state
concerned."
(ii) The 1992 Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Investment"
Of more recent origin are the non-binding guidelines developed by the World Bank
(MIGA and IFC) to emphasise the protection and standards of treatment owed to the foreign
investor by the host state. The main areas of the guidelines are admission, standards of
treatment, repatriation of capital and returns, expropriation, unilateral alterations, termination
of contracts and settlement of disputes.
63 See historical collection of the former staff of the UN Centre at http://www.benchpost.comlunctc/ (8 Jan
2007).
64 World Bank, Legal Framework/or the Treatment 0/ Foreign Investment (Vol. II: Guidelines, 1992), Report to
the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Investment, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development! the World Bank, 1992. See text in ILM 31,1992, p.l363. See also Shihata, I.,
Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment. The World Bank Guidelines, (1993),
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5.4.4 Bilateral Investment Treaties
Broadly speaking, there are some major differences to the application and effects of
MITs/BITs on foreign investment in the politically risky economies of the developing
world." However, there is a considerable degree of acceptance that membership of or
participation by an otherwise politically risky country in MITslBITs though in itself not a
guarantee for stability is an element which reduces the foreign investors' perceptions of
political risks.66
BITs in general are instruments that deal with the protection of foreign investments
between two countries. As far back as 1853 the United States concluded such a treaty with
Argentina as a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.f" According to the ICSID
the first modem bilateral investment treaty was entered into nearly forty years ago between
Germany and Pakistan and there followed an increasing number of European countries that
concluded BITs with developing countries." This trend resulted in the universal acceptance
of BITs as instruments for the promotion and legal protection of foreign investmcnts.t" In
65 While it has been acknowledged that predictability and transparency of laws and regulations of host countries
may be important for attracting foreign investments, doubts have been expressed as to whether multilateral
investment rules would be more effective in ensuring predictability and transparency than the existing bilateral
and regional investment agreements. The sceptics have also argued that from a development perspective
bilateral investment treaties are preferable to multilateral rules in that bilateral treaties can be tailored to the
individual needs and priorities of individual countries and typically do not limit the ability of host countries to
regulate the admission of foreign investments. See Nieuwenhuys, E., Multilateral Regulation of Investment,
London: Kluwer Law International, (2001), p. 195.
66 See generally Walde, T (with Dow, S.), Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment:
Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines versus Sanctions by Global Markets in Reducing the Political
and Regulatory Risksfor Private Infrastructure Investment, Journal of World Trade, 34(2) (2000), pp. 1-61.
67 See for example the Treaty between US and Argentina, 27 July 1853 at:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonldiplomacy!argentina/argen02.htm. 13/10/2007. For more discussion on
BITs see Somarajah, M., supra note 1, pp. 211-229.
68 See World Bank Group, ICSID, at http://www.worldbankorg/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (9 Jan 2007).
69Lists of bilateral investment treaties were published in 1989 and 1992 in the ICSID Review-Foreign Investment
Law Journal. ICSID. See also Dolzer, R and Stevens, M., Bilateral Investment Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff,
(1995).
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1996 Saudi concluded a BIT with Germany."? In view of the growing importance of BITs, it
may become inevitable that Saudi will enter into more BITs with future investment partner
. countries.
, As part of its strategy to attract FDI and give more comfort to foreign investors Saudi
Arabia has also signed several further BITs 71 in which it agreed to observe the usual modem
investment and international economic law disciplines of national treatment and most
favoured nation treatmenrf to investments and investors from other contracting parties. This
observation is reflected in Saudi efforts to allay such fears by providing various guarantees to
foreign investors in the form of national and equitable treatment under domestic law. Article
6 of the Foreign Investment Act in 2000 stipulates:
"A project that has been licensed pursuant to these legislations shall enjoy all rights,
incentives and guarantees available in respect of a national project in accordance with
the Saudi Law". 73 '
Thus far in this chapter, we have seen an overview of the general framework relating to
the protection of Foreign Direct Investment under Saudi law. It has dealt with the
international framework for the protection of foreign investment at a multilateral and bilateral
level including the discussion of the two main principles of home state control and host state
regulation. The following section examines Saudi's relationship with key multilateral
.investment treaties and economic institutions.
70 See AI-Samaan, supra note 4, p. 103. See also Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, UNCT AD Series on
issues in international investment agreements, UNCTAD ITEIIIN2, New York and Geneva: United Nations
Publications, (2000), at: http://www.unctad.org/enldocs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. Accessed on 24/0112009.
71 Saudi Arabia has signed bilateral investment treaties with Belgium, Malaysia, Austria, France and other
states. For a list and text of these BITs signed by Saudi Arabia see UNCTAD website at:
http://www.unctadxi.orgitemplates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779. Accessed on 07/02/2009.
72 Both the national treatment and most favoured treatment represent the principle of non-discrimination in
international conventional law. The two standards of treatment have a long history and can be found in most
trade and investment treaties. See Muchlinski, P., Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 2nd ed., Oxford:
Oxford University Press, (2007), pp. 178 & 238.
73 See text of Foreign Investment Act 2000 - also known as Foreign Capital Investment Law 2000 - available
at: www.sagia.org.sa. Also see Appendix in the thesis.
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5.5 Saudi's membership of international organisations and MITs
pertinent to FDI
Saudi Arabia is one of the oldest market economies in the world, with a trading history
that goes back many centuries. Amongst its Muslim neighbours, Saudi Arabia's economy is
fundamentally liberal and open to foreign traders, entrepreneurs and investors. The most
favoured nation principle has always been respected by Saudi Arabia, even appearing in a
1933 bilaterai agreement with the United States. Saudi Arabia has no foreign exchange and
relatively few import restrictions. Applied customs duties and barriers to importation and
participation in the Saudi market are low.74
Saudi is also a member of an important regional organisation involve in oil and gas
called the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).75 OAPEC was
founded in January 1968 by Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait. It aims for cooperation between
its member states in developing the Arab petroleum industry in general and stabilising the oil
market. Members of OAPEC increased to thirteen Arab countries in addition to the founding
members, as follows: Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Qatar and
Egypt." Other international organisations relevant to the petroleum sector of which Saudi is
also a member are the World Energy Council77 and World Petroleum Congress."
74See Weeks, J., infra note 84. See also next chapter.
75See OAPEC website at: http://www.oapecorg.org.
76 Ibid. :
77Saudi Arabia became member of WEC in 1991. A national committee consisting of delegates from several
entities represents the country at the WECo The Saudi National Committee to WEC plays an active role and has
a prestigious status at the WEC conference held regularly every three years, and is actively involved in the
Council's works. See http://www.worldenergy.orglwec-geis. 10/06/06.
78Saudi Arabia became member of the World Petroleum Congress in 1968. It was elected as a member to the
Permanent Council of the Congress in 1971 and to the Executive Council in 1991. The Kingdom contributed in
WPC activities through its participation in meetings in Tokyo 1975, London 1983, Houston 1987, Buenos Aires
1991, Stavanger (Norway) 1994, Beijing 1997 and Alberta (2000). For more information see website at
http://www.world-petroleum.org/
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The commitment of Saudi Arabia to the international community was highlighted by
H.E. Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Minister of Finance and National Economy, at an International
Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico on 21 March 2002.79 He
stated'" that Saudi Arabia endorses goals to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic
growth and promote sustainable development as we advance to a fully inclusive and equitable
global economic system. He also stated that international trade should be seen as an engine
for development as the single most important external source of development financing. The
Minister elaborated on the obstacles to achieve this international goal, in that policies in
industrialised countries erect trade barriers against the exports of developing countries, which
are complemented by trade-distorting subsidies and other trade-distorting measures thus
denying the developing countries substantial financial resources."
The role of the Saudi government in international development efforts was also
highlighted in its contribution, as a developing country, to the financing of international
development projects. For example, since the mid seventies, Saudi Arabia's assistance to
developing countries, through bilateral and multilateral channels, amounted to more than US
$75 billion.82
The case of Saudi Arabia demonstrates recognition of the value and significance of
international cooperation and multilateralism through accession to a number of international
79See proceedings of the Conference at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website at:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/FfD/2002/ (12/6/06).
80See the Statement at UN Economic and Social Development website at:
http://www.un.org/ffdistatements/saE.htm. 12/06/06.
81These words by the Saudi Minister are in line with the IMF's thinking for better globalisation where all the
countries have opportunities and integration into the global economy which is good for growth to fight poverty.
Horst Kohler, Managing Director of IMF stated that 'The world needs more integration, not less. But it also
needs stronger international cooperation, to guide and shape the process of globalisation.' See presentation on
'The Monterrey Consensus and Beyond: Moving from Vision to Action', Introductory Remarks by Horst
Kohler, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at the International Conference on Financing for
Development, Monterrey, Mexico, March 21, 2002. http://www.imf.org/externallnp/pdrlFfD/2002/ (12/6/05)
82See Saudi Consulting House, supra note 5, p. 6.
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conventions. By the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 78 dated 15107/1414 AH (29/12
1993) Saudi Arabia acceded to on 19 April 1994 and ratified the 1958 New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.f Similarly, Saudi is a
signatory to the 1964 Convention on the Establishment of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (The Washington Convention), which provides
for arbitration as a method of settling investment disputes between member nations.f" It is
also a signatory to the Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) of the World Bank. An agreement on legal protection for guaranteed foreign
investment between the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia was signed in July 1995.8s It is also a member of many other international
and regional economic cooperation and investment promotion agreements. Of particular and
strategic importance is the position and implications of Saudi Arabia's accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and its observer status in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). While
the WTO represents the "trade dimension" of the new international organisations making up
the governance ofthe global economy, the ECT represents mainly "investment" in the energy
sector.i"
83 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June
1958; Entered into force, 7 June 1959, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959). For text see:
http://faculty.smu.edu/pwinship/arb-31.htm. The Convention, among other things imposes a duty on members to
recognise and facilitate the enforcement of awards issued by international investment! commercial arbitral
tribunals. Thus, in the event of a dispute adjudicated by arbitration at foreign venue, Saudi Arabia, subject to
known exceptions will allow its enforcement against itself or any members to the Convention.
84See ICSID Convention and the Regulations at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsidlbasicdoclbasicdoc.htm. It has
to be emphasised however that at the ratification of the ICSID, Saudi Arabia gave notification to the effect that
it reserves the right of not submitting all questions pertaining to oil and pertaining to acts of sovereignty to the
ICSID whether by way of conciliation or arbitration. See also the notification at
http://www.worlbank.comlicsidlpub/icsid-8d.htm. Accessed on 04/02/2009.
8S See MIGA Convention at the website of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
http://www.miga.org/screens/about!convent/convent.htm MIGA has its own Arbitration Rules incorporated into
its standard Contracts of Guarantee, based on ICSID rules. The MIGA provides a facility for insurance of
political risk of member countries. Therefore foreign investors can have their political risks insured and
guaranteed by MIGA in Saudi Arabia.
86 See Walde, T., Legal and Policy Implications of a Relationship of Two International Treaties in Natural
Energy Resources: OPEC and the ECT, OGEL, Issue 5, Vol. 2, (Dec. 2004). For more discussion on ECT see
the next section ..
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There follows a closer examination of the rules of these international treaties in relation to
Saudi Arabia.
5.5.1 Saudi Arabia's accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO)
Saudi's bid for accession into the WTO started in 1993 and gained fruition following a
landmark BIT signed with the United States on the 9th September 2005.87 Saudi Arabia would
soon after become the 149th member of the world trade body. The WTO is also a dynamic
institution engaging in new negotiations'" and constantly enlarging its membership.i" Saudi
Arabia's efforts to join the WTO can be seen as an important attempt at reform. Saudi Arabia
87 The agreement inter alia requires Saudi Arabia to open its markets to imports of more of US farm and
manufactured goods as well as service companies in sectors including banking telecommunications, energy,
express delivery, transportation and hotel and restaurant management. See Saudi Embassy in Washington
website at: http://www.saudiembassy.netJarchive/2005/press/pageI2.aspx. See also report by Abdulghafour, P.,
The WTO Entry to Boost Foreign Investment. Arab News, (12 September 2004), at: http://www.arabnews.com.
12/01107.
88 See, Weeks, J. M. (Chairman Of The Global Trade Practice Of APCO Worldwide, and Chairman of the
Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the WTO), The Trading System Of The 2 I"
Century And Saudi Accession To The WTO. (Notes For A Presentation At The Jubail Conference - Saudi
Arabia: Major Investment Opportunities In The 2151 Century, Panel Iii: Economy And Globalisation. The
presenter added: The dynamic nature of the WTO is also shown by the negotiations that have taken place since
1995. In 1997 members completed an agreement eliminating duties on information technology products,
covering 94% of world trade in these products, or 10% of total world trade. In addition, negotiators completed
the negotiations on basic telecommunications services, including commitments from 69 countries. The
telecommunications deal included another first, because the regulatory principles to which participants have
subscribed are in fact the first WTO provisions addressing domestic competition policy. Renato Ruggiero, the
then Director-General of the WTO, pointed out the scope and importance of these two agreements. He noted
they covered over one trillion US doIlars in annual international business. He added that the value of that trade
exceeded the value of world trade in agriculture, textiles and automobiles combined. In December of 1997
members successfully concluded the negotiations on financial services. Earlier in this year the WTO members
took up negotiations in agriculture and services, fulfilling the commitment to do so established in the respective
Uruguay Round agreements. Despite the failure to launch a fuIl-blown round in Seattle, the WTO has had an
active and constructive year. Members are now engaged in considering how best to deal with the range of
implementation problems encountered with the Uruguay Round agreements. Furthermore much informal
discussion among delegations is about how to move the agenda forward by enlarging the scope of what is being
negotiated, and to tackle other issues in a renewed program of work.
89 Ibid, From the Middle East region, Oman became the 139th member of the WTO, joining seven other
countries in the Middle Eastern region as members: Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates. Twenty-eight other countries are currently negotiating to join including, of course, Saudi Arabia.
In all 12 members have joined the organisation since its inception in 1995. This growth in membership is a kind
of positive referendum on the value of the WTO. The WTO is well on its way to becoming a universal
organisation.
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first applied to join the forerunner of the WTD, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), in 1993. In November 1999, the late King Fahd stated that "the world is heading for
... globalisation" and that "it is no longer possible for Saudi Arabia to make slow progress'T"
In recent years, Saudi Arabia sought to join the World Trade Organisation, negotiations
focused on the degree to which Saudi Arabia was willing to increase market access to foreign
goods and services and the timeframe for becoming fully compliant with World Trade
Organisation obligations." The Saudi effort to join the WTO was designed to attract foreign
investment (up to $200 billion over the next 20 years), according to Foreign Minister Prince
Saud. This would include over $100 billion in the power sector alone, plus billions more in
petrochemicals and telecommunications. Another goal of Saudi WTO membership is to
ensure markets for the country's petrochemical industry, and to create new markets in the
future.
There are WTO provisions on trade related investment measures. Members are engaged
in a work programme designed to facilitate a decision on whether to enter negotiations to
establish multilateral investment rules in the WTO. With new investment laws Saudi Arabia
would have a keen interest in these matters. Saudi entry to the WTO, would help increase
Saudi Arabia's volume of trade, but it presented several negotiating, cultural-religious and
economic problems. Saudi officials tended to blame the WTO for being insensitive to Saudi
restrictions on non-Islamic imports, like alcohol, and religious problems in dealing with
interest and insurance, while WTO negotiators indicated that the Kingdom has not yet been
90 See Cordesman, A, Study no. VI.: Building True Wealth Versus Over-dependence on Petroleum and the
State. Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century -Politics. Economics. and Energy, Washington, DC: Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), (2002), p. 23, available at:
http://www.csis.orglburke/saudi211S21 06.pdf.>
91 The Working Party on the accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO was established on 21 July 1993. Bilateral
market access negotiations on goods and services are underway on the basis of revised offers. Multilateral
discussions on the terms of entry are ongoing and the latest revision of the draft Report of the Working Party
was circulated in June 2004. The last meeting of the Working Party was held in September2004. See WTO at:
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewtoe/acce/alarabiesaouditee.htm (2/7/06).
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willing to show that it will grant the required access to its banking, finance, and upstream oil
and gas sectors. The negotiators called for better copyright laws; tribunals to rule on trade
disputes; and new legislation on technical trade barriers, customs evaluation, and food health
regulations. Additionally, they called for Saudi Arabia to limit tariffs to 15%, and to agree to
several sectoral initiatives, including an Information Technology Agreement, chemical
harmonisation, a government procurement agreement, and agreements on textiles,
pharmaceuticals, medical and construction equipment, and publishing services.f
It was also argued that \yTO membership might threaten some local businesses. Some
Saudi firms are designed to function in a secure environment, protected by high tariffs and
monopoly agency agreements. A number of manufacturing enterprises fall under this
category, and their managers were deeply worried that having to operate in the WTO
environment would put them out of business.P Opening up the economy to foreign
multinationals and imports would threaten their profit margins and the commercial agencies'
monopolies. Some economists on the other hand said that accession to the WTO would
encourage foreign investment and increase access to the Kingdom's growing markets.
However, despite all these competing arguments, Saudi Arabia finally became a member of
the WTO in Dec. 2005.
By Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO, the government has indicated that it will take
a phased approach to:
• Establishing new trademark and intellectual property laws.
• Removing technical barriers to trade by easing travel visa requirements.
92 See the working party report on accession to the WTO available on the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and
Industry website at: http://www.commerce.gov.sa/english/moci.aspx?PageObjectld=714.
93 Ramady, M., The impact of Saudi Arabia's WTO accession on selected economic sectors and domestic
economic reforms, World Review of Entrepreneurship. Management and Sustainable Development, Vol. 2, No.
3, (2006), pp. 189-199.
202
• Signing the Information Technology Agreement and phasing in tariff-free trade In
information technology equipment.
• Phasing in Basic Telecommunications Agreement to allow competition In
telecommunications services.
• Changing competition laws to provide anti-trust and consumer protection in accordance
with WTO rules.94
The WTO system is essentially a network of contractual rules and commitments
capable of being monitored and enforced multilaterally. Its central feature is predictability
and certainty in conditions and terms of trade. It guarantees the business community that
governments will maintain open and accountable trade regimes. To this end, all WTO
members are obliged to have in place legislation and enforcement mechanisms that are
needed for them to implement their WTD obligations.
The compliance with this essential WTO requirement should not impose a burden on
Saudi Arabia. In most cases the liberal and open practices that lie at the heart of the WTD are
already there, for instance in areas like judicial decision-making. What is required, therefore,
is that existing liberal practices be codified. What is even more important to remember is that
WTD accession and the implementation of WTD-related legislation and enforcement
mechanisms is complementary to .the domestic economic reform process on which Saudi
Arabia has already embarked. Both go hand-in-hand and both are needed to support each
other. Indeed, legislation and enforcement - and therefore WTO accession - are essential for
underpinning the national reform process and for making it credible to the international
community of importers, exporter, producers, consumers and investors.
94 ibid.
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Politically, the issue of Saudi's accession to the WTO brought mixed reactions from
Saudi officials and businessmen. Dislike of the WTO has not led to the formulation of clear
counter-proposals, whether from the private sector in general or from its sub-sectors. Instead,
a general, diffuse fear was spread across parts of the private sector that large multinational
enterprises might steamroll over local business." However, it has not been clear in the Saudi
debates which sectors were perceived as the most endangered, and might have the highest
interest in protection. Somewhat differently from what trade theory would make us expect,
clear sector or factor-based interests have not evolved." Saudi local investors in agriculture
also view the accession as having potential to negatively affect the Kingdom's industrial and
agricultural sectors. "Farmers will not receive most of the incentives they receive now.,,97
There is a fear also that Saudi Arabia and other developing countries would become dumping
grounds for major producers like the US and European countries. This will threaten the
existence of many of Saudi's agricultural projects.'"
It has been noted earlier that Saudi Arabia is a major petroleum exporter and a member
of OPEC. OPEC is an international organisation of 11 petroleum exporting countries and is
open to the accession of only those countries "with a substantial net' export of crude
95 Hertog, S., Two-level Negotiations in a Fragmented System: Saudi Arabia's WTO Accession, Review of
International Political Economy, 15:4, pp. 650-679. See also Freeman, C., Saudi Arabia's Accession to the
WTO: Is a "Revolution" Brewing? Middle East Policy Council Capitol Hill Conference Series on US Middle
East Policy, 13th Jan. 2006, available at: http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/ioil060122-mepc-
freeman.html.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Some OPEC management staff speaking in their personal capacity agree that Saudi's membership of the
WTO will have the effect of opening up of Saudi Arabia's rather close sovereignty in respect of its trade and
investment relations to the outside world. Small and medium scale industries may suffer as they will be unable
to compete with multinational companies coming into the Kingdom as a result of the WTO accession. However,
according to another top OPEC official, the KSA is still guarding its oils and gas sector from "interference," as a
result of the accession, though it would be uncertain how far the WTO will give concessions to Saudi Arabia
and other energy producing or OPEC members already in the world trade body.
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petroleum, which has fundamentally similar interests to those of Member Countries.':"
OPEC's aim and goal as enshrined in Article, 2 of the OPEC Statute is to safeguard the
collective and individual interests of its members and to ensure stabilisation of international
oil prices. 100
Given the strategic position of Saudi Arabia in the energy sector, in this case, petroleum
supply and the OPEC's objectives to control it, one could imagine the rather difficult
situation in which Saudi Arabia will be placed after accession to the WTO. Interests will
naturally conflict between the demands of OPEC's petroleum pricing monopoly posture and
that of the WTO, which is oriented towards trade liberalisation.l'"
Currently, international investment and to some extent, the trade in energy is regulated
more by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) than by the
WTO. However, the ECT rules on trading make reference, in the main, to the relevant WTO
provisions, with formal modifications. 102 In the field of trade, the WTO provides a framework
of rules. Essentially, the WTO is a series of agreements among its members, backed up by the
most highly developed dispute settlement system yet agreed under international law.
However, trading in the petroleum sector is the reserve of OPEC of which Saudi Arabia is a
99 Article 7.C of the OPEC Statute. There were five founding members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
Venezuela, The current membership includes, in addition to the founders: Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
100 See Article 2(b) of the OPEC Statute. In an effort to reconcile the conflicting interests of stakeholders in the
industry (producers, consumers and intermediaries), the Statute provides that OPEC would give due regard to (i)
the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity to secure a steady income for them; (ii) an efficient,
economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and (iii) a fair return on their capital to those
investing in the petroleum industry. See Article 2(c) of the OPEC Statute.
101 This complexity of roles between OPEC and WTO has been analysed in details by Desta, M. OPEC and the
WTO: Petroleum as a Fuel for Cooperation in International Relations, Middle East Economic Survey, VOL.
XLVII, No 10, (08-March-2004).
102 For an in-depth analysis of the WTO provisions adopted by ECT see Energy Charter Secretariat publication
of December 2001: Trade In Energy: WTO Rules Applying under the Energy Charter Treaty. OGEL Vol. 2
Issue 5, (December 2004) at .WWW.gasandoil.com/ogel
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major member. However, petroleum is the "largest primary commodity of international trade
in terms of volume and value."I03 The WTO essentially implements the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and generally promotes competition by discouraging
governmental impediments to the free flow of trade across borders through, inter alia, the
prohibition of trade-distorting subsidies, quantitative restrictions on both imports and exports
and the encouragement of reciprocal reduction/elimination of import tariffs. 104
5.5'.2 Saudi Arabia and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
As stated earlier in the introductory chapter, Saudi Arabia exerts authority as the largest
oil producer and exporter in the world. It also has the 2nd largest proven gas reserve in the
world. It is the biggest and most influential member of the OPEC.IOS Saudi Arabia is
therefore a key country in the world in fossil fuel energy supply terms.
The Energy Charter Treaty of 1994106 is - particularly in view of the demise of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) -the major multilateral investment treaty
,covering over 50 countries plus the EU, Australia, Japan and 'Central Asian countries. 107 It is
an international agreement that aims to create a freer and more competitive energy market
among its contracting parties. It has established multilateral disciplines on the regulation of
103 See Desta, M., infra note, 104, p 1.
104 See more on this objectives and procedures of the WTO in Permanent Court of ArbitrationlPeace Palace
Papers, Strengthening Relations with Arab and Islamic Countries through International Law: E-Commerce, the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Foreign Investment, Fourth PCA International Law Seminar, (Oct. 12,
2001), pp 151-157.
lOS First Saudi Arabian International Gas Conference held at Chamber of Commerce Building, Dammam, Saudi
Arabia, 15-1 i" May, 2004: OGEL Vol. 2, No. OS, (Dec., 2004).
106 The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was signed in December 1994 and entered into legal force in April 1998.
The text of the Treaty can be found in www.encharter.org. For an examination of the investment regime of the
ECT and an analysis of investment dispute resolution mechanism under Article 26 of the ECT, see generally,
Happ, R., Dispute Settlement Under the ECT, German YB Int'l Law, 45 (2003), cited by Muniruzzaman, A.,
Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Change of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for a & G Investors, AIPN
Research Project, (2005-2006). See Walde, T., Arbitration in the Oil, Gas and Energy Field: Emerging Energy
Charter Treaty Practice, OGEL, Vol. 1, No.4, (2003), p. 27. See also Coop, G., infra note 107.
107 Published in 34 ILM 360 (1995) with introduction by Walde, T.
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investment transit and trade in the energy sector. lOS It also has "soft-law" obligations on
competition law, environment, transfer of technology and access to capital markets.l'"
It is widely recognised that trade, together with foreign direct investment, is a major
engine of economic growth. Since the energy sector provides the basic infrastructure for any
human activity, the importance of open and competitive energy markets for our societies
cannot be· underestimated. Transparent, stable and predictable conditions for East-West
energy commerce are, no doubt, fundamental for the creation of open energy markets in the
Eurasian continent.
One of the major achievements of the Energy Charter process has been the adoption by
its member states of the principles and rules of the multilateral trading system. The Energy
Charter Treaty now incorporates for the energy sector the major rules of the WTO that
govern trade in goods. This significantly contributes to creating a transparent, stable,
predictable and non-discriminatory trading environment for East-West energy commerce.
Equally important is that by adhering to the treaty's WTO-based trade rules, ECT signatory
countries that are not yet members of the WTO can carry out domestic trade reforms in the
energy sector that greatly contribute to the advancement of their accession to the World Trade
O . . 110rganisation.
The main ECT disciplines concern investment protection obligations. These are rules
guiding the parties' conducts in, among other things, expropriation, fair and equitable
treatment. That involves the minimum standard treatment, respect for obligations entered
108 Desta, M. & Walde, T. , Legal and Policy Implications of a Relationship of Two International Treaties in
Energy Resources: OPEC and the ECT (annex V), February, 2002 at www.cepmIp.org;
109 Walde, T., Ibid: The soft-law obligations are mainly programmatic statements about what governments
"should" ("endeavour") to do.
110 See World Trade Organization's website.
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(pacta sunt servanda), national treatment and repatriation of revenues. Therefore the
fundamental aim of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy
issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be' observed by all participating
governments. The Treaty's provisions focus on five broad areas. First is the protection and
promotion of foreign energy investments, based on the extension of national treatment, or
most-favoured nation treatment (whichever is more favourable). Second is a stable and
predictable framework for trade in energy materials, products and energy-related equipment,
based on WTO rules. After this comes freedom of energy transit through pipelines and grids;
and mechanisms for the resolution of State-to-State and Investor-to-State disputes. And the
final area is energy efficiency and related environmental aspects.III
Saudi Arabia is currently carrying out internal legal reforms in its investment and tax
laws with a view to opening up its market especially for the development of its vast oil and
gas resources, and for its mining industry.112Now the question is asked as to what is the
importance of the relationship between Saudi and the EeT. Saudi holds observer status in the
EeT and accession could be seen in the same light as its accession to the WTO. On the hand,
accession will serve to demonstrate Saudi's willingness to open up its market to competition.
More importantly, accession will prepare it to subject itself to internationally recognised and
adopted economic liberalisation disciplines of national treatment and most-favoured nation
treatment. Of particular and strategic importance to foreign investors here is that Saudi
Arabia will then accept the automatic investor-state dispute resolution mechanism enshrined
in the EeT jurisprudence. As mentioned earlier, the Kingdom is already a signatory and has
III For more discussion see generally, Coop, G., The Energy Charter Treaty: More than a MIT, Ribeiro, C.,
Editorial, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, New York: JurisNET, LLC, (2006), pp. 3-22.
112See Arab News, www.arabnews.netlsaudi!sashariabiz.htm; see also US Embassy website:
http://usembassy.state.gov/riyadh (13/12/2006).
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ratified both the ICSID and NY Convention. 113 It will also lend more weight and credence to
its internal reforms to encourage inflow of foreign investment. It should also give foreign
investors more certainty as to what the general investment climate is like in the Kingdom.
Consequently, by signing up to EeT, Saudi Arabia will be seen as offering additional security
for any foreign investor against perceptions of political risk.
As Saudi acceded to the WTO, it is hoped that it will soon accede also to the ECT.
Accession to ECT by Saudi Arabi all 4 and the other Middle Eastern OPEC countriesIl5 would
be strategic and feasible because of the favourable geographical convenience of these
countries. Their geographical proximity to the world energy markets provides easy access to
export oil and gas to Europe, Asia and Africa. This is in view of energy transit being one of
the core objectives of the ECT in addressing issues related to the mitigation of energy
investment risks and the right to arbitration. Moreover, the adoption of a number of important
international treaties on foreign investment and the recent investment friendly policy of Saudi
Arabia, which I have mentioned in this chapter, demonstrates the value and significance of
international cooperation and multilateralism.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the law as it relates to foreign investment in Saudi Arabia as
well as the treatment of foreign investment under international law. The effect of these
international instruments on Saudi's oil and gas industry is to reassure foreign investors in the
113 See UNCITRAL website at:
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/enJuncitral texts/arbitrationlNYConvention status.hlml and ICSID website at:
http://icsid. worldbank.orglICS IDlFrontServlet?reguestType= ICSIDDocRH&action Val=ShowDocument&langu
age=English
114 Saudi Arabia still in observer status. See ECT website at: http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=43
us Among these countries are the Arabian Gulf Countries - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and
United Arab emirates - which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These countries possess
roughly 45% of the world's proven oil reserves and 17% of the world's proven natural gas reserves. See Fasano,
U & Iqbal, Z., in the IMF publications at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlmed/2003/eng/fasano/index.htm.
Accessed on 28/0112009.
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oil and gas sector. They show especially that in addition to the abundant investment
opportunities presented by immense resources, the multilateral trade and investment climate
is equally attractive. With regard to the political instability of host states, this is one of the
main problems that investors have to carefully consider and evaluate before embarking upon
FDI projects. In particular, a deterioration of the financial situation (currency inconvertibility)
of the host state may either be the result of a deterioration of the political situation or,
conversely, the cause of it. In this respect guarantees provided by multilateral institutions also
serve a dual role, the objective is to reduce or mitigate political risk arising from the roles
played by governments either in their sovereign capacity or as contracting parties.
It has been explained here that Saudi Arabia is in the process of reviewing its position
as regards these international agencies in order to improve its investment climate. It has
signed a number of investment-related conventions to ensure foreign investors' confidence
and improve perceptions of its political stability as well as opening its market for both local
and foreign investors. Hence, privatisation, foreign investment admission and the legal
incentives and changes of investment will be discussed in the following chapter.l'"
116 As regards environmental aspects, substantial international efforts have been made in recent years to show
the importance of the protection of the environment. In Saudi this environmental obligation can be achieved by
adopting environmental laws which lay down some broad policy guidelines for environmental affairs and
specific regulations for implementation. Attention should also be given to petroleum agreements which could
provide acceptable environmental protection provisions. The importance of the environment is highlighted in
numerous international treaties, whose success depends largely on the signatories and ratification of a number of
states. The effective implementation of these treaties therefore depends on the joint will of the states and without
it these, exercises on the environment are futile and a waste of money. A typical example is the Kyoto Protocol,
which could improve the environment if all industrial countries including USA sign and comply with its
regulations.
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(6) PRIVATISATION, ADMISSION AND LEGAL
INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
SAUDI ARABIA
Introduction
As stated earlier in this thesis, Saudi Arabia's oil-based economy has seen strong
government control over major economic activities. As is well known, the world is
witnessing a diminishing role of the state in economic activities. The trend is to open up
through reforms and liberalisation. Governments are assuming a much less interventionist
attitude towards their economies than they used to. Instead, deregulation, restructuring and
privatisation are the order of the day.' There is a general consensus on the positive impact of
foreign investment on the welfare of host countries. Foreign investment is considered to be
the solution to economic problems and a vehicle for development and prosperity. Due to the
advantages of foreign investment, states compete against one another in attracting foreign
investors by offering ever more generous incentive packages. They justify their actions with
productivity gains that are expected to accrue to domestic producers from the knowledge
externalities generated by foreign affiliates. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the
economy and its contribution to the development of these main economic activities. Based on
I See generally, Sarcevic, P., Privatisation in Eastern and Central Europe, London: Graham & Trotman, (1992),
pp. 3-11. However, it should be noted that recent rolling back of state involvement in the economy has a
somewhat hollow ring after so much part-nationalisation and state intervention in banking and automotive
industries etc worldwide. State intervention is justified on the ground of market failure - e.g. the current global
economic crisis - to promote development and correct market imperfections. However, this issue is out of the
scope of the present study and will not be discussed. For more discussion on this issue see generally, Taylor, J.,
The Financial Crisis and the Policy Response: an Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong, available at:
http://www.stanford.edu/-johntayllFCPR.pdf. See Crotty, J., Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis:
A Critical Assessment of the 'New Financial Architecture, available at:
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadminlpdf/working papers/working papers l5l-2001WP l80.pdf. See also
Bourland, B., Saudi Arabia and the Global Financial Crisis, Jadwa Investment, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Dec.
2008, available at: http://www.jadwa.comlResearch/store/Monthly%20Bulletin%20December..10202008.pdf.
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a country profile approach, this chapter will tackle selected Issues of Saudi Arabia's
economic and legal environment. The criterion for selection was relevance to foreign
engagement in investment activities in Saudi Arabia. The following issues have been dealt
with: economic policies between 1960-2009, development prospects, development
incentives, the tax system and customs and import regulations. Note should be taken of the
successful introduction, albeit incomplete, of private players in the oil industry, which could
also be repeated in other sectors. Economic setup should, therefore, be conducive to
spearheading this transformation of the remaining sectors towards greater privatisation.
Approximately 4 million foreign workers play an important role in the Saudi economy,
particularly in the service sector? This suggests that there is an existing model for foreign
investment in the country which could be of relevance to privatisation. In other words, it has
been argued that privatisation might help to strengthen the government's spending power and
make up for tax cuts, creating more jobs and providing a better environment for investment.3
In 1999, the government announced plans to begin privatising the electricity industry, whilst
the privatisation of the telecommunications industry has been ongoing since the mid 1990s.4
The government is expected to continue looking towards private sector growth in order to
lessen the Kingdom's dependence on oil and increase employment opportunities for the
swelling Saudi population. Economic conditions would seem to suggest that the time is right
to give serious consideration to the privatisation of other government-owned sectors. This is
especially apparent when these economic conditions are allied to the fact that for the
2 See The Economy of Saudi Arabia, at http://countrvstudies.us/saudi-arabial34.htm (212/06)
3 Calway, S., Europe Will Stay Hooked to Privatisation, Asian Finance, (1987), pp.l03-104
4 Privatisation is also promoted by the Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA). SAGIA hosted a
workshop on privatisation in Saudi Arabia on December 21, 2003 with the active participation of officials
representing Saudi government agencies and the private sector. The purpose of the workshop was to increase
awareness about the benefits of privatisation for the Saudi economy.
http://www.sagia.gov.salprintpage.asp?ContentID= 185&Lang=en (10/6/06).
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government of Saudi Arabia, economic interventions have always been driven by pragmatic
reasons and have never been ideologically motivated. 5
As regards the private sector, the government has adopted a 'Privatisation Strategy" to
encourage private sector investment and effective participation in the economy based on
commercial principles.i The strategy aims at expanding the ownership of productive assets by
Saudi citizens and encouraging local investments of domestic and foreign capital. It also aims
at increasing employment opportunities and optimising the use of the national work force,
ensuring the continued equitable increase of individual income, providing services to citizens
and investors in a timely and cost-effective manner. It wants to further rationalise public
expenditure and reduce the burden on the government budget by giving the private sector
opportunities to finance, operate, and maintain certain services that it is able to provide,
increasing government revenues from returns on participation in activities to be transferred to
the private sector and monies obtained, for example, from granting concessions or the sale of
. 8government properties.
So far, however, economic reforms have proceeded cautiously because of deep-rooted
political and social conservatism." Nevertheless, private investment is now a major part of the
economy of Saudi Arabia. For example, private investors have contributed, over the past two
S EI-Naggar, S., Privatisation and Structural Adjustment in the Arab Countries, Washington D.C: International
Monetary Fund, (1989), p. 2.
6 Ministry of Planning, General Objectives and Strategic Bases of the Sixth Development Plan, Riyadh: Ministry
of Planning Press, (1995), p. 17. For a recent release of Ministry of Planning see Privatisation, at:
http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.j sp;jsessionid=56AD274 FFB9F2682031 D2C44979059EO .beta?event= Article Vie
w&Article.ObjectID=25.
7 Examples of these sectors are industry, electricity, gas, water, agriculture, trade, real estate and community and
personal services. In addition investments were active in the financial and banking sector as well as in the
transport, communications and information technology sectors, as evidenced by the noticeable expansion of
these sectors. See Ministry of Economy and Planning, Plan Achievements (25) 2008, Chapter two: Private
Sector Development • and Privatisation Policy, available at:
http://www.mep.gov.salhome/HomelEnglish/PlanAchievments/25/ch2.htm. Accessed on 29/0112009.
8 See Privatisation Strategy for Saudi Arabia, at http://www.mafuoum.com/press3/112EI5.htm (29/8/06).
9 See CIA at http://www.cia.gov/cialpublications/factbooklgeos/sa.html (23109/06).
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decades, to the enormous growth in the number of industrial plants operating in the Kingdom.
In 1975, Saudi Arabia had approximately 470 industrial plants, with overall investment
estimated at $2.7 billion. By March 1999, the total number of factories in the Kingdom had
reached 2,557, with a total investment of about $43.3 billion.lo With the growth of private
and foreign investment in the Saudi economy in mind, the following is a brief overview of
the government's economic strategy, which should shed light on the possible role that private
investors could play in other sectors under the current regime.
The investment law introduced in April 2000 reversed the previous ownership policy
through joint ventures under majority Saudi Arabian ownership which had as their aim the
minimisation of foreign interference in the economy. The new investment law permitted one-
hundred-per cent foreign ownership in most sectors. II
There would seem to have been three major factors responsible for the new investment
laws. First and foremost was the Kingdom's bid for membership of the WTO, discussed in
the previous chapter, which was being actively pursued by its Ministry of Commerce. It was
made clear to the Kingdom's negotiators during meetings in Geneva in April 2000 that
liberalisation of foreign investment laws were a prerequisite for membership.V The second
factor favouring foreign investment was government need for investment and finance, as well
as product knowledge and access to foreign markets. The third factor was the liberalisation
experience of the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Businessmen in Saudi
10 See the Saudi Network at http://www.the-saudLnetlbusiness-cel1ter/economy.htm (05/03/06).
II Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, The New Foreign Investment Laws of The Kingdom, Riyadh:
SAGIA, (2000), p. 2. For more discussion on foreign ownership see chapter 1 supra and chapter 2 supra for
ownership under Shari'a.
12 The monopoly control of major export industries by SABIC (The Saudi Arabian Basic Industries
Corporation), was not seen as in the interests of fair and transparent international competition. There have been
disputes with the European Union over feedstock pricing for petrochemical exports, the position on which could
be clarified through benchmarking if alternative foreign-owned industries existed in the kingdom.
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Arabia saw the benefits Bahrain and Dubai had obtained from inward investment and wanted
to see more similar business generated in Saudi Arabia. 13
The Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs, established in February 2001,
has confirmed that it is not seeking foreign investment in upstream oil-related activities,
which will remain the responsibility of ARAMCO. Rather it is in downstream activities that
foreign investment is welcomed, as an alternative to more SABIC joint ventures. 14
,
6.1 Economic Strategy
In view of the shape of the Saudi economy detailed previously, and in particular the
increasing role played by privatisation and foreign investment, it is important to examine the
extent to which the role of private participation is encouraged in the economic strategies of
the government. Generally, the government has accepted the argument that it is advantageous
. .
to open the economy to private sector involvement. Its application to joinlS the WTO was part
and parcel of this new approach.l'' Negotiations focused on the degree to which Saudi Arabia
was willing to increase market access to foreign goods and services and the timeframe for
becoming fully compliant with WTO obligations.l" To this end, in April 2000, the
government established SAGIA to encourage foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia. The
government maintained a "negative list" of sectors in which foreign investment is prohibited,
13 Wilson, R., Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, Routledge, (2004), pp. 34-35.
14 Ibid, p. 35.
IS For more discussion on Saudi's membership to some Multilateral Investment Treaties and Economic
institutions, including the WTO see chapter 5 supra.
16 The Working Party on the accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO was established on 21 July 1993. Bilateral
market access negotiations on goods and services are underway on the basis of revised offers. Multilateral
discussions on the terms of entry are ongoing and the latest revision of the draft Report of the Working Party
was circulated in June 2004. The last meeting of the Working Party was held in September 2004. See WTO at
http://www.wto.org/englishithewtoe/acce/alarabiesaouditee.htm (2/3/06).
17 Saudi Arabia is now a member of the WTO since Dec. 2005.
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but there were plans to open some closed sectors, such as telecommunications, insurance, and
power transmission/distribution, over time.18
The following is an overview of the developmental plans that were adopted to
accelerate economic growth. The plans focused mainly on the distribution of the oil wealth of
the country. Private enterprise was encouraged, and foreign investment in the form of joint
ventures with Saudi public and private companies was welcomed and the private sector
b . 19ecame more Important.
The government's 5-year economic development plans sought to allocate petroleum
income to transform the relatively undeveloped, oil-based economy into that of a modern
industrial state while maintaining the Kingdom's traditional Islamic values and customs.i"
Although economic planners have not achieved all of their goals, the economy has progressed
rapidly. Oil wealth has increased the standard of living of most Saudis. However, significant
population growth has strained the government's ability to finance further improvements in
the country's standard of living. Heavy dependence on petroleum revenue continues, but
industry and agriculture now account for a larger share of economic activity. The mismatch
between the skills of Saudi graduates and the needs of the private employment market at all
levels remain the principal obstacle to economic diversification and development. To
compensate for this shortfall, around 4.6 million non-Saudis are employed in the sectors of
the economy most in need." It should be noted that, only 15 percent of foreign workers in
Saudi Arabia are engaged in skilled labour industries (oil, healthcare, finance, and trading),
while the majority are employed in industries with a need for low-skilled labour (agriculture,
18 See http://www.sagia.gov.sal(10/6/06).
19 See Economy of Saudi Arabia at http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/economy/saudi-economy.html
(14/10/2008).
20 See Five Year Plans at http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabial37.htm (3/3106)
21 Ibid
216
cleaning, and domestic service). Expatriates from Europe and North America dominate high-
skilled positions; low-skilled workers originate primarily from South and Southeast Asia.22
Prior to 1960, there was very little formal planning in Saudi Arabia. However, in the
early 1960s the nation began to employ deliberate policies and plans to achieve social and
economic development. Initially, planning efforts were not clearly defined, and they were
poorly organised. Continued efforts, however, resulted in the nation's first five-year
economic development plan, covering the period 1970-1975. By the mid-1980s, Saudi
government-business relationships were in a crucial period of'transition.P Saudi Arabia's first
two development plans, covering the 1970s, emphasised the country's infrastructure. The
results were impressive, the total length of paved highways tripled, power generation
increased by a multiple of 28, and the capacity of seaports grew tenfold.i" For the third plan,
covering the period 1980-1985, the emphasis changed. Spending on education, health, and
social services rose markedly, with investment on infrastructure seeing a relative decline_2s
The two industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu began utilising the country's oil and gas
resources to produce steel, petrochemicals, fertilizer, and refined oil products. They
experienced large growth in production to the point where they more or less reached their
optimum size.
In the fourth plan, covering 1985-1990, the country's basic infrastructure was viewed as
largely complete, but education and training remained areas for further investment. Private
enterprise was encouraged, and foreign investment in the form of joint ventures with Saudi
22 Pakkiasamy, D., Saudi Arabia's Plan/or Changing Its Workforce, Migration information source, (Nov. 2004)
available at: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=264 16/10/2008
23 Soufi W., & R. Mayer, Saudi Arabian Industrial Investment, Greenwood Publishing Group, (1991), pp. 13-
14.
24 Wilson, R., supra note 13, p. 52.
25 Ibid, p. 54.
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public and private companies was welcomed. The private sector became more important,
rising to 70% of non-oil GDP by 1987.26 While trade and commerce remained the focus,
private investment did increase in industry, agriculture, banking, and construction companies.
These private investments were supported by generous government financing and incentive
programmes.v' The objective was for the private sector to have 70% to 80% ownership
gained by domestic investors, mostly in the form of joint venture enterprises.
The fifth plan, running from 1990-1995, emphasised consolidation of the country's
defences, improved and more efficient government social services, regional development and
most importantly the creation of greater private-sector employment opportunities for Saudis.
This was to be achieved by reducing the number of foreign workers, a point which might be
seen to have negative implications in attracting foreign investment in the country. Its
implication seems to be that local Saudi labour might have to be employed by the private
companies rather than skilled foreign labour. However, where Saudi workers with the
necessary technical proficiency or academic qualifications are not available, the Ministry of
Labour may provisionally reduce the percentage'" of Saudi citizens to be employed by the
investment enterprise. But, as skilled workers are scarce in Saudi Arabia, it is usually not
necessary to invoke this ministerial discretion and foreign investors are usually compelled to
hire not only foreign labourers, but also administrative personnel. However, in view of the
policy of the Saudi government to 'Saudize' several jobs, foreign investors will be faced with
limited options to hire foreign administrative personnel." In other words, the hiring of
foreign labour will be limited to some sectors - e.g. industrial sectors - where there is labour
shortage and employment is inevitable.
26 See note 2, supra.
27 Ibid.
28 Saudi workers engaged by the employer shall not be fewer than 75% of his total workforce.
29 EI-Sheikh, F., infra note, 53, p. 66.
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The plan covering 1996-2000 focused on lowering the cost of government services
without compromising quality, and also sought to expand educational and training
programmes. The plan called for a reduction in the kingdom's dependence on the petroleum
sector by diversifying economic activity, particularly in the private sector, with special
emphasis on industry and agriculture. It also, as mentioned above, continued efforts to
increase the balance of the labour force in favour of Saudi nationals.i"
The seventh plan, running from 2000-2005, focused more on economic diversification
and a greater role for the private sector in the Saudi economy.t' For the period 2000-2005, the
Saudi government targeted an average GDP growth rate of3.16% per annum, with projected
growths of 5.04% for the private sector and 4.01 % for the non-oil sector. The government
also set a target of creating 817,300 new jobs for Saudi nationals, consolidating the process
started in the fifth plan to increase the proportion of Saudi nationals to foreign nationals
ki . h S di 32wor mg in t e au 1economy.
The Eighth Development Plan of 2005-2009 represents a major landmark in the social
and economic development path of Saudi Arabia, as it is the first five-year plan prepared in
the context of a long term development strategy with definite targets and objectives, This
strategy was prepared to provide the framework for the four successive five-year plans until
30 Ibid
31 In terms of water supply, Saudi Arabia will need a capital investment averaging nearly $2 biIIion per year for
the next 20 years in order to meet projected water demand, This figure assumes a net reduction from 286 litres a
day to 250 litres per day consumed per head of population. Loay AI-Mussallam, deputy minister for planning in
the Ministry of Water and Electricity (MOWE), gave the figure during a review of Saudi Arabia's efforts to
bridge the gap between future supply and demand. He outlined the main objectives of the MOWE as providing
access to clean water for all at a reasonable price, connection of sanitary services to all households and safe
disposal of wastewater to protect the environment and water resources. Al-Mussallam said that there were
considerable challenges to overcome apart from water scarcity. Rapid demographic growth, which he said was
at three percent, and a huge investment requirement needed to build a vast infrastructure, Over the next five
years, Saudi Arabia wiII require 4,500 kilometres of new pipeline for freshwater transport and over 22,000
kilometres for wastewater disposal pipes. See http://www.fact-index.com!e/ec/economy of saudi arabia.html
(23/2/06),
32 Ibid.
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2024, which together constitute four integrated and combined stages, according to the
Ministry of Economy & Planning." Two of the main features of this plan are the
establishment of the industrial cities and SAGIA lOx 10prcgramme"
The Saudi Arabian economy continues to be characterised by a duality between what
are referred to as the non-oil sector and oil sectors. However, what is clear is that, as has been
stated earlier in this study, despite attempts to diversify and to reduce the economy's
dependency upon it, the oil sector is of central importance to the economy of Saudi Arabia."
6.2 Saudi Arabia's Privatisation Programmes.
The achievement of social and economic development is a standing goal for all the
governments of the Middle East region. However, the ways in which these various countries
go about achieving this goal differ widely. Some achieve results through central planning;
others embark on partnerships with the private sector. Continued social and economic
development is essential to meet the challenge of ensuring that the quality of life improves
and that disposable incomes for families are increased. With a high rate of population
increase in the region, the countries have to achieve ever higher rates of economic growth just
to maintain the same standard of living, let alone improve on it. Social and economic
development affects the public sector in many ways. It produces the framework for financing
33 See Ministry of Economy and Planning, Saudi Arabia: long-term Strategy 2024, (2005. The Plan document
says: "The methodology of the Eighth Development Plan is different from that of the previous plans, (including
the Seventh Development Plan, which included long term strategic directions). It consists of a clearly articulated
vision, policies and programmes to achieve this vision, and long term targets to ensure effective follow up and
implementation." see Ministry of Economy and Planning, Saudi Arabia's 8th Development Plan 2005-2009,
(2005).
34 For more details see Saudi Embassy in Washington website at: http://www.saudiembassy.net/aboutlcountry-
information/economy global trade/industrial cities.aspx. SAGIA 10 x 10 Programme see SAGIA website at:
www.sagia.gov.sa.
35 Oil GDP: 55%, non oil private sector: 28.5%, non oil government 16.5%, see SAMA" 420d Annual Report
2006. Non-oil GDP reported a 5.1% growth in 2006, its highest level in 10 years. This growth came mainly as a
result of attracting foreign investment and encouraging the private sector, see the National Competitiveness
Centre, The Competitiveness Review, Vol. 1, Riyadh: SAGIA, (September 2007), p. 59.
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resource development, operation and maintenance. Only the oil-enriched countries in the
region can afford to finance development projects out of their own treasuries. Other countries
need to call upon the contribution of financing agencies and friendly governments to help
finance these projects in their public sector.
An equally important consideration of social and economic development is the ability
of consumers to meet the real cost of services. So far, none of the countries in the region have
managed to impose tariffs suitable for the recovery of the entire costs. Even the oil-enriched
countries subsidise their project heavily" Consumers pay only a fraction of the cost of
operation and maintenance of services in Saudi Arabia, to give just one example.l"
The Saudi government has a history of being very innovative in its approach to private
sector participation. As stated earlier, In May 1933 the Saudi government contracted out its
oil operations to the Standard Oil Company via the formation of ARAMCO. This policy of
acquiring technology and foreign expertise by using foreign companies has been pursued
since 1973 through the encouragement of joint-ventures in a wide spectrum of sectors,
including construction, manufacturing, banking, shipping and petrochemical processes.
For example, by May 1995 there were 287 joint-venture manufacturing projects in the
Kingdom involving the public and private sector with foreign capital and expertise. Of those
36 In the case of Saudi Arabia, interest-free loans of up to 50% of project costs are provided by the Saudi
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) , for industrial projects, see its website at:
http://www.sidfgov.sa/englishlindex.htm. Similar financial support is given for agricultural projects by the
Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank, http://www.saabserver.comIFrontEndiindex.aspx. (Arabic version only), there
are also two additional funds, the Saudi Credit Bank, http://www.mofgov.sa/enldocs/ests!subtsleef.htm. and
the Public Investment Fund, http://www.mofgov.salenldocs/ests/subinvbox.htm. which both grant interest-free
loans to public or semi-public firms - e.g. Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) - that enter into
joint ventures with foreign investors.
37 See IDRC Books at http://web.idrc.cales/ev-29775-201-I-DO TOPIC.html (12/6/06).
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projects, 72% of the capital was in the chemicals and plastics sector." The Saudi government
had already sold 30% of its shares in SABIC (the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries
Corporation) to the public in the early 1980s. It also sold 30% of its share in the Saudi
Telecom Company in 2002 after five years of preparation and restructuring. The government
has also assigned the maintenance and operation of many government agencies to the private
sector. Examples of this include the Port Authority is under the supervision of the Railway
Organisation, as well as the operation and maintenance of some hospitals, and the
maintenance and construction of roads. The government has also used other methods of
privatisation, including liberalisation from legal monopolistic control and permitting the
private sector to work and compete in a sector run by the government. Permission for SNAS,
DHL and other companies working in fast mail delivery and parcels to compete with the
state-owned post enterprise is a clear example of this. The government is concerned with
setting up appropriate legal and regulatory structures for the privatisation process in the Saudi
economy to ensure competition and to avoid monopolistic tcndenciesr"
The Council of Ministers Decree No. 60 (August 6, 1997) was the starting point to
establishing the eight objectives of privatisation in Saudi Arabia and the principles to be
taken into account in order to achieve these objectives. The Council of Ministers Decree No.
257 of (February 5, 2001) stated that the SEC would be responsible for supervising the
privatisation programme and monitoring its implementation. This was to be in coordination
with competent government organisations, and both parties would determine which activities
were to be privatised. Decree No. 6/22 issued by the SEC on (August 2, 2001) provided for
the reorganisation of the Privatisation Committee within the SEC, under the chairmanship of
38 Al-Sarhan, M., & 1., Presley, Privatisation in Saudi Arabia: an attitudinal survey, Managerial Finance, Vol.
27, Issue io/u. (2001), pp. 114-122.
39 Whinney, M. & Co, Business Structures, in Shoult, A., (edit.), Doing Business with Saudi Arabia, London:
Kogan Page Ltd, (1999), p. 203.
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the Council's secretary-general. The new committee consisted of members representing the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Electricity, the Ministry of Commerce, and
the Ministry of Planning and National Economy and two members from the Advisory Board
for Economic Affairs. SEC No.1I23 dated (4th, June, 2002) approved a new privatisation
strategy comprising eight basic objectives, each of which required the adoption of a number
of policies. 40The new privatisation strategy was prepared in accordance with the provisions
of the Council of Ministers Decision No. 60 dated (6th, August 1997) which stated,
"expanding the private sector's participation in the national economy and enabling it to
undertake its role in investment and financing should be in line with the national development
plans, and positive for both the government and private sector".41
The privatisation process constitutes an important part of the government's long-term
strategy to enhance opportunities for the private sector and to improve the efficiency and
competitiveness of the national economy by enhancing the participation of the private sector
in economic development. This will be undertaken by adopting the best available methods,
including transferring certain types of economic activity to the private sector, and enabling it
to accomplish its investment and finance role in accordance with the national development
plan. The privatisation strategy defines a number of administrative and implementation
procedures related to privatisation, whereby the Economic Council will be responsible for
supervising privatisation programmes and monitoring their implementation.f
40 Draft report on study on business cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Europe, prepared
for SAGIA by IFO Institute and Saudi German Development and Investment Company Ltd (SAGECO), pp. 62-
84.
41 See Saudi Supreme Economic Council (SEC) website at:
http://www.sec.gov.salPrivatization StrategylPrivatization Objectives and Policies,aspx?lang=en-US. See also
Ibid, pp. 127-153
42 Al-Nimir, S., Attitude of Some Beneficiaries from the Services Given by Some Government Agencies in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia About Privatising these Services, Majalat AI-Edarah Al-ammah, 34(2), (Sep. 1994), p.
172. (In Arabic).
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To carry out the required activities and functions necessary for the discharge by the
SEC of its duties and responsibilities with respect to privatisation, the Privatisation
Committee is involved in designing the privatisation strategy. Determining and
recommending the public enterprises, projects, and services to be privatised, determining the
regulatory and implementation procedures for the privatisation process, and monitoring and
supervising the implementation of privatisation activities are all within its remit. Although
the strategy clarifies the steps that are to be taken, a specific timetable for the process has yet
to be established."
The definition of privatisation, as stated in the privatisation strategy, is "the process of
transferring the ownership or management of public enterprises, projects and services to the
private sector, relying on market mechanisms and competition, through a number of methods,
including contracts for managing, operating, leasing, financing, or selling all or part of the
governments' assets to the private sector". Privatisation has been seen as offering a means of
increasing the efficiency with which scarce public resources are used, and of improving the
delivery of services to the public. These beneficial results may come about in a variety of
ways. For state enterprises which are incurring losses in their operations, a transfer of
ownership can end the subsidies or subventions required to avoid those losses."
6.2.1·Objectives and Policies for Privatisation.
On 6th, August, 1997, the Council of Ministers Decree No. 60 specified eight objectives
for privatisation in Saudi Arabia and determined the principles to be taken into account in
order to achieve these objectives. They are as follows:
43 Badkook, G., Is it Time for Privatisation in Saudi Arabia? Saudi Cairo Bank Publications, Riyadh: Saudi
Arabia, (June, 1992), p. 19. ..
44 Pritchard R., & others eds., Privatisation and Private Provision of Infrastructure, in R., Pritchard, (Ed.),
Economic Development. Foreign Investment and the Law 76, (1996), p. 68.
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1. Rationalising public expenditure and reducing the burden on the government budget
by giving the private sector opportunities to finance, operate, and maintain certain
services that it is able to provide.
2. Improving the efficiency of the national economy and enhancing its competitive
ability to meet the challenges of regional and international competition.
3. Encouraging private sector investment and effective participation in the national
economy, and increasing its share of domestic production to achieve growth in the
national economy.
4. Enlarging the ownership of productive assets by Saudi citizens.
5. Encouraging national and foreign capital to invest locally.
6. Increasing employment opportunities, optimising the use of the individual work force,
and ensuring the continued equitable increase of individual income.
7. Providing services to citizens and investors in a timely and cost-efficient manner.
8. Increasing government revenues instruments such as the proceeds of participation in
activities to be transferred to the private sector, financing compensation accruing from
granting concession rights, and revenues generated from privatising part of the
government's share.45
Generally speaking, the Saudi government plays the predominant role in the economic
and social welfare of the country. Government spending, therefore, is not only the major
economic engine of the economy, but it represents the source of primary funding for all
projects, programmes and services that are essential for national economic development.
Although, the government has taken many steps to encourage and enhance private sector
participation in the economy, it is only in the last few years that the private sector has been
45 SAG lA, The Legal Guide to Investment in Saudi Arabia, (2005), p. 22.
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strong enough to playa significant role. Therefore, more research should be done to in the
area of private sector readiness and capabilities in general. Specifically, the market's ability
to finance the privatisation programme is of extreme importance.
6.2.2 Methods and Principles governing Privatisation
In 2002 the SEC issued Resolution No. 1123 dated 4/6/2002 and confirmed the
privatisation strategy. According to this resolution, the methods for privatisation are:
Management contracts;
Leasing contracts;
Finance contracts
Sale contracts • consisting of direct sales to the private sector through public
subscription, or sales to a principal investor.
The privatisation strategy also foresees rules for implementing the privatisation process.
First, the process should be transparent and all information relating to the privatisation must
be disclosed to the public. Second, excessive delays in the process should be avoided by
expeditious implementation, with the aid of timetables. Finally, one of the primary aims of
the privatisation process is to bring about changes in the approach and methods of
management by improving performance and implementing private sector management
• 46practices.
Further steps to be taken under the privatisation strategy include the creation of a
regulatory framework for the privati sed sector, essentially consisting of the establishment of
one or several autonomous regulatory agencies, levying fees for public services provided, as
46 SAGIA, Legal Background for Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia, (2003), pp. 20-21.
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well as the financial, technical and operational restructuring of the sectors and public
enterprises to be privatised." The process of privatisation in Saudi Arabia is currently in its
early stages. The government, having taken significant measures, plans to continue the
process prudently and systemically, providing even greater opportunities in the future for
potential targets for investment in Saudi Arabia."
6.3 Licensing and Legal Incentives and Reforms for Foreign
.Investment.
6.3.1 Licensing and Admission
After the commencement of privatisation policies in the 1990s, opening the public
sector to the private sector (including national and foreign investors), the Saudi government
established SAGIA in 2000 to provide information and assistance to foreign investors. The
Authority operates under the umbrella of the SEC and is headed by a Governor. Its duties
include formulating government policies regarding investment activities and proposing plans
and regulations to enhance the investment climate in the country. It also evaluates and issues
licences for investment proposals. All foreign investment projects must obtain a licence from
SAGIA before they can operate in the country. Local investors continue to apply to the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Foreign Capital Investment Committee for licences."
It should be noted that SAGIA has removed previous bureaucratic procedures which were
considered a significant obstacle to attracting foreign investments. Foreign investors in the
past had to experience a long process of application to gain the licence to invest in the
Kingdom, which the establishment of SAGIA has removed.
47 Ibid, p.21.
48 See for example, Shoult, A., Privatisation and Economic Reforms, in Doing Business with Saudi Arabia, 3rd
ed., London: GMB Publishing Ltd, (2006), pp. 73-84.
49 For more information on SAGIA see: http://www.sagia.gov.sa/english/index.php. accessed 03/07/08.
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With regard to admitting investment from outside Saudi Arabia, the first basic
requirement is that it must be a 'foreign investment' of the kind that falls within the scope of
the policy embodied in investment laws and treaties.i" Foreign investment ultimately involves
three parties: the capital exporting country - of which foreign investors are usually nationals,
the foreign investors themselves, and the capital importing country.i'
6.3.2 Legal Incentives and Reforms
This part of the chapter deals with incentives and reform policies in Saudi Arabia,
which are relevant to the Kingdom's long term of surplus in finance over the last three
decades. This has enabled the country to adopt very generous incentive policies to
accommodate foreign capital and attract foreign investments. It should be mentioned that
policies work to both offer positive incentives and to reduce negative disincentives. Positive
incentives include tax concessions, free custom duties and export zones which are provided
by the government. Removal of disincentives to investments means reducing lengthy and
bureaucratic systems resulting in delay in issuing visas, travel restrictions and the complexity
associated with the licensing and registration of a project or activity. In addition, attempts
have been made to reduce the lengthy and complicated procedures associated with settling
investment disputes. Saudi Arabia has implemented recent changes to improve the foreign
. 1" th t 52Investment c imate In e coun ry:
50 A foreign investor under Saudi law is a natural or judicial person who has not acquired Saudi nationality in
accordance with the nationality laws of the country.
51 This is the situation in the case of foreign private investment. In the case of foreign public investment, the
problem is not so complicated, because the investment transactions involve only two parties, namely the capital-
importing and capital-exporting countries thereof. As mentioned previously, this thesis deals only with legal
aspects of foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia.
52 For more details on the promotion of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia see Saudi Commerce and Economic
Review, Gas Projects: New Business Horizons, May 2004, No.121, and Foreign Investors: New taxation
System/or the Natural Gas, pp. 10-12.
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Review of its 48 year old Foreign Investment Law to allow, inter alia, granting
foreign investors the same rights as are authorised to Saudi nationals. This is referred
to as "national treatment" in modem parlance.
Review of its 48 year old Income Tax Law to impose lower taxes on foreign business
profits and provision of greater legal protections for investors.
A new legal framework was instituted for the banking and insurance sectors to make
the investment environment more attractive to foreign capital. S3
To sum up, the new Foreign Investment Law passed on April 2000, provides for foreign
investors: S4
1) The possibility of 100% ownership of projects, giving international companies full
ownership of the property required for the project or for housing company personnel,
(Article 5);
2) Enables them to retain the same incentives given to national companies, (Article 6);
3) Permits them to invest in all sectors of the economy, except for specific activities
contained in the negative list, (Article 3).
On February 11th 2001 Saudi Arabia's SEC approved a "negative list"SS of economic
sectors barred to majority-foreign-owned firms, thus clarifying the issue of where in the
economy foreigners may invest. The list was published as secondary legislation to the 2000
Foreign Investment Law and earmarked for annual revision. It is also, in the words of the
government, to be interpreted "flexibly". Those sectors not included on the list should be
53 Detailed analysis of the Tax reforms see Mazzanti, M., Saudi Gas Supplies and Investment Taxation
Legislation, OGEL, vol2 - issue 1, (Feb. 2004), p 5, at: www.gasandoil.com/ogel
54 See generally SAGIA website: www.sagia.gov.sa. accessed: 03/07/08.
55 It includes oil exploration and production, wholesale and retail trade, printing, transport, fishing, some
medical services and real estate in two holy cities Makkah and Maddenah.
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regarded as legally open to majority-foreign-owned companies. However, few foreign
companies are in these sectors because of the poor business environment, which includes
regulatory and labour problems.56
4) Foreign investors are no longer required to have local partners, and may own real
property for individual or company business activities, (Article 8).
5) They also can transfer money from their enterprises outside of the country and can
pay their foreign employees, (Article7).
6) The corporate tax rate for foreign companies with annual profits over SR 100.000 is
reduced from 45% to 20%. Companies are also allowed to carry forward corporate
losses for an unspecified number of years. Projects that are 100% foreign owned are
also eligible for loans from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF).
7) Similarly, investors are also entitled to hold investment licenses in more than one type
of activity (Article 7 of Procedural Rules).
In the same vein, the Saudi Arabian Tax Law is based on Royal Decree No. (Mil)
dated 06/03/2004 which lowered the 20031457 corporate tax rate to a flat rate of 20% of the
tax base of a resident capital company. A non-Saudi resident who does business in the
country, and a non-resident person who does business in the country through a permanent
establishment will pay this rate. The tax rate is 30% of the tax base of a taxpayer engaged in
natural gas investment activities, and 85% where the taxpayer is engaged in oil and
hydrocarbon production. A net operating loss may be carried forward to the tax year
56 For more details see:
http://www.zawya.com!marketing.cfm?zp&p=/countries/sa/macrowatch.cfm?eiusection=Investment
57 SAGIA, supra note, 36. The Saudi Arabian Tax Law also introduced the Saudi Arabian Income Tax Law (the
"Income Tax Law") and by Ministerial Resolution 1535 of the Ministry of Finance (dated 28/07/2004). The
Preliminary Tax Appeal Committee (PTAC) and the Appellate Committee for Zakat and Tax Appeals (ACZTA)
provide rulings and interpretations on questions raised by taxpayers. See also Arab News,
www.arab.netlsaudi/sa shariabiz.htm visited 04/07/08.
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following the year in which the loss is incurred, to be deducted in determining the tax base of
future tax years until the cumulative loss is fully offset.58
Income tax or Zakat, which is a religious wealth tax, is assessed on the taxable income
of joint stock companies, limited liability partnerships, foreign branches, partnerships,
contractors and professionals. Foreign entities are subject to income tax on their share of
profits from business entities, but are not subject to Zakat. Saudis and Gee nationals and
interests owned by them are subject to Zakat (which is applied on a fonnu1a basis) but not to
income tax. Individuals are not taxed on salaries or wages. Indirect taxes consist of customs
duties levied on imported goods. Saudi Arabia does not impose sales tax; value added tax,
ift 59estate tax or gi tax.
Conclusion
This chapter, based on a country profile approach, has dealt with selected issues of
Saudi Arabia's economic and legal environment. The criterion for selection was their
relevance to foreign engagement in investment activities in Saudi Arabia. The following
issues have been dealt with: economic policies between 1960 and 2009, development
prospects, development incentives, the tax system and customs and import regulations.
With respect to privatisation, the Saudi government has already taken steps by
establishing pilot institutions such as SAGIA. It has also ventured into a new system of
private-public partnership. These steps cover both the privatisation of public enterprises and
the increasing involvement of the private sector which should be intensified in order to
58 For taxation regime see Saudi Commerce and Economic Review Gas Projects: New Business Horizons,
No.I21, May 2004, see also www.the-saudLnetibusiness-center/regu!ation-other.htm accessed 08/07/08.
59 Bartlett, S., & W. Murray, Doing Business with Saudi Arabia, Business Taxation, (1999), p. 67.
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accelerate the restructuring process. This should also be supported by further liberalisation of
the capital market.
Economic performance in Saudi Arabia, i.e. the growth of its GDP, has been moderate
since the 1990s. Compared with the oil sector, the non-oil sector including petrochemicals
gained considerable momentum. There has been tendency, on the one hand, towards
diversifying the production structure and on the other towards import substitution and
production for export. The most dynamic factor was, and continues to be, an increasing
domestic market resulting from a fast growing population. The government is focusing its
efforts on the enhancement of the private non-oil sector. The negative list outlines areas
which are considered by SEC to be of strategic importance for the protection of the economy
and national security against globalisation. However, it is expected that the list will be
shortened, especially since joining the WTO. Such restrictive provisions would be considered
as interfering with the market forces.
As far as incentives for the private sector are concerned, taxes on company profits have
been lowered, capital goods and other industrial inputs are exempted from customs duties,
loans are subsidised and foreign ownership is extended to real estate...
Unfortunately, these incentives are neutralised by the obstacle of unnecessary
procedural technicalities. These requirements emanate from a deficiency in the existing
investment administrative machinery which is characterised by overlapping of jurisdictions
between different bodies and bureaucratic red-tape. These problems are addressed by recent
investment codes and some improvements have been made, especially with respect to the
screening and licensing of projects. All signs are that these procedures are now completed
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more quickly than in the past." It is by no means certain, however, that the new investment
laws will succeed in the short term in halting Saudi Arabia's decline in relation to other Gee
countries. It has to be said that the flow of foreign capital into the Kingdom has increased
because of political stability. With regard to legal stability, the next chapter will examine the
stability of investment agreements under Saudi law.
60 EI Sheikh, F., The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge University Press, (2003), pp. 439-440.
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(7) CONCLUSION and SUGGESTED REFORMS
The goal of the thesis has been to examine the legal problems associated with foreign
investments in Saudi Arabia. Although the focus of the research was mainly on the petroleum
resources sector development, the analysis throughout was applicable to other economic
sectors generally. The intention was to examine what has been or is being done to improve
the Saudi investment climate as viewed by foreign investors. In particular, the study
attempted to address in details, the following main issues:
The research investigated legal, legislative and policy issues related to FDI in Saudi
Arabia, and what the government has been doing to reduce or diffuse the perception of
political risks in these manifestations. We also undertook an exploration of how Shari'a
interacts with the conventional system of law in order to facilitate better understanding of the
similarities and differences between the two systems. In addition, the research focused on
how the status of contracts in Saudi Arabia interferes with the development of relationships
with foreign investors. A final area to investigate was to discover how investment and
commercial disputes are settled in the Kingdom and how this impacts on foreign investment.
These issues encompassed the key problems that have a direct effect on the
development and volume of foreign direct investments in Saudi Arabia. In order to identify
the lessons emerging from the issue of legal security of foreign direct investments in Saudi
Arabia, each chapter should be revisited to demonstrate what it has offered. Chapter one
brought out the substantive legal issues surrounding the topic of FDI. The primary purpose of
this chapter was to place foreign investment within the constitutional and legal environment
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in which it operates. It has been found that the interpretation of the Shari'a by different
judicial bodies may often not be consistent. This is because the main two sources of Shari' a-
the Quran and the Sunnah - do not specifically cover the large variety of commercial
transactions which are now in use in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, more attention should be given
to the /jma (consensus) among the religious scholars, and to the Quiyas (analogy) in order to
increase the make use of the flexibility of Shari' a.
Chapter two examined the stability of investment agreements and the status of
contracts in Saudi Arabia. The issue of contracts was examined in the light of their status and
role where Shari'a does not require a formal written form of contract, but merely stresses the
importance of the act of an offer and acceptance to establish a contractual relationship. The
aim of this section was to better inform foreign investors of fundamental principles of Shari' a
in the field of contracts, which should in tum attract more foreign investment. The second
part of the chapter addresses the concept of ownership of minerals under Shari' a. The issue of
ownership of minerals was dependent upon many factors. These included land ownership,
and whether minerals were above or below the surface of the land. Views of Muslim jurists
of the four schools of thought were highlighted. According to the Hanbali School, which is
the prevailing system, followed by the Saudi Legal system, the state reserves the ownership
of the minerals in the sub-soil, and holds title as a trust for the benefit of the society at large.
This view was found compatible with most modem concepts of mineral title. This is reflected
in the revised Saudi Investment Law of 2000. It was concluded that since Shari' a asserts the
sanctity of all types of contracts, and imposes upon Muslims the duty to faithfully observe
their contractual obligations, the stability of investment agreements is assured and contracts
are deemed to be secured.
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Chapter three examined the important issue of dispute settlement and the applicable law
in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia disputes of commercial nature, especially those occurring
between the state and foreign investor are resolved by a special judicial body known as the
Board of Grievances. However, an issue arises as to the independence of the Board in dispute
settlements. This is because the Board is directly linked to the king, which may be considered
as a form of government intervention. In addition, the chapter also addressed international
requirements under conventions such as the United Nations Commission for International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the New York Convention (NYC). In the course of analysis of
the issues covered by this research work, as highlighted in the previous section, some
challenges were identified. It was concluded that these challenges include the perception that
the commercial system in the Kingdom was too regulated and not privatised, and that the
dispute settlement mechanism was not open, and needed to be more independent and
delocalised. Chapter four highlighted the history and development of contractual
relationships between the government and ARAMCO. The main aim of this chapter was to
show the observance of the Saudi government of its contractual obligations under the
Concession Agreements between 1933 and 1980. The secondary aim was to address the
difficulties experienced by the Saudi government through its relations with ARAMOC during
its efforts to exercise control over its natural resources. This is the reason that the Kingdom
encourages foreign investments only in downstream energy rather than the upstream.
Chapter five examined the protection of foreign investment under Saudi law,
international law and through bilateral and multilateral agreements on the promotion and
security of foreign investments. The aim of the chapter was to demonstrate whether the
guarantees provided under Saudi domestic law are sufficient for the protection of foreign
investments or not. The chapter also discussed the protection of foreign investment under
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international law and particularly the standards of treatment of foreign investments there
under. The role of bilateral and multilateral conventions to which the Kingdom is a party was
also dealt with. The purpose of this section was to show Saudi efforts in providing effective
guarantees to foreign investment, as well as the basic provisions of. these investment
agreements. In light of these bilateral and multilateral conventions, it was concluded that
bilateral and multilateral treaties and international organisations that Saudi is party to have
played a major and important role in providing effective protection to foreign investment in
the country.
Chapter six highlighted the privatisation policy of the Saudi government, the admission
and the legal incentives of foreign investments in the Kingdom. The aim of this chapter was
to study the wave of privatisation and liberalisation in Saudi enacted in order to attract
foreign investments. A competitive economy projects a positive image of the private sector
which helps to convince foreign investors and even bring back migrating capital investment.
The chapter also highlighted the government's attempts to enhance legal incentives and
investment licences. It was observed that although privatisation has given the private sector
and foreign investors a chance to be a partner in the planning of Saudi Arabia's economic
development, the government should speed up the privatisation process as activities that
proceed slowly are more susceptible to failure.
It was discovered, that although these challenges were often levelled against the
Kingdom, they were in fact also faced in other Muslim countries that have adopted Islamic
Law System, but perhaps to a lesser extent. This is because, it was observed, there has been
more adaptation of the legal systems of those other countries. The intention there was to
attempt a greater accord with international law of investment. The researcher, however,
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pointed out that these negative assumptions were not entirely correct, and where they were,
they had little or nothing to do with the Shari'a Legal System. In addition to the above and
with the introduction of the Foreign Investment Law in 2000, the Kingdom is also exhibiting
a marked improvement in conforming with international practice in resolving investment
disputes and thereby providing protection to foreign investors in the country. There is a
growing practice of dispute settlement between foreign investors and national governments
by international commercial arbitration which offers efficient cost and time effective
solutions. When contracts are being designed, the factor of international commercial
arbitration is now routinely built in.
Following on from this extensive analysis and observation, my conclusions encompass
political engagement, a substantive legal framework, economic liberalisation and greater
transparency in relation to dispute settlement and the judiciary.
Political and legal engagement:
Much has been done, and is still being done by the Kingdom to review its laws and
policies related to foreign investment. Yet much is still needed to equip the country to partake
and play its full role in global trade especially in the energy market. Joining the WTO, for
instance was most welcome. It will go a long way towards consolidating Saudi membership
of other multilateral conventions and organisations in the field of international trade. WTO
membership is seen as a factor which strengthens the harmonisation of investment laws and
regulations with regard to international standards. It is also helps to boost world trade and
therefore improve conditions for both business cooperation and FDI. Saudi Arabia should go
ahead and make its mark in the WTO by moving away from its past history of limitation,
restriction and opacity. It needs to transform itself into a more flexible, open and transparent
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state. The government should also eliminate the delay between the adoption of new
regulations and their implementation rules. It has been stated earlier that old regulations are
still being used by some of courts instead of the latest amendments or revisions. This must be
done by improving communications between government and judicial staff in order to resolve
interpretation problems and uncertainty for both local and foreign investors.
Saudi Arabia faces the challenge of instituting reforms without compromismg the
principles of its beliefs and traditions of its culture. The country should review policy and
legal frameworks concerning mineral development and investment to reflect concepts and
methods that could harmoniously be accommodated by both Shari'a and conventional
systems. Restrictions on local and foreign ownership and development of commercial and
industrial land in Saudi Arabia have eased in recent years, but more work needs to be done to
further encourage a responsive land regime in Saudi. The researcher believes that if the rules
that form Saudi international public policy were codified 1, the Saudi legal system would be
more transparent and this would eventually increase the flow of FDI to the country. Also, for
the sake of transparency, commercial statutes need to be included in a single commercial
code, thereby obviating the need for scattered royal decrees, resolutions of the Council of
Ministers and relevant statutes and rules.
Economic liberalisation
The privatisation programme is a great opportunity for large scale investment. Again, it
is up to the political decision makers to open up more fields to privatisation and therefore to
FDI. Large scale potential foreign investors carefully monitor privatisation programmes all
IVogel argues that codification would redress many evils: differences and contradictions among qadis (judges)
and appellate court judgements. See Vogel, F., Islamic law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia, Leiden,
Brill, (2000), p. 350.
239
over the world for feasible opportunities. There may also be an underlying political
component in the lack of interest in investing in the country. The Saudi government,
however, offers very specific incentives for foreign investors. Among these incentives are
low tax and customs rates, and interest-free loans of up to 50% of the project cost provided
by SIDF. Other financial support is given for agricultural and housing projects. All these
incentives demonstrate an increasing commitment on the part of the government to place the
Saudi market on solid legal and economic foundations. Bilateral and multilateral investment
agreements with a number of countries to avoid double taxation, and for the promotion and
protection ofFDI have been signed by the Kingdom.
With regard to labour issues, the government should review dismissal policies to protect
all employees. The dismissal policy should be altered to require legitimate reasons for
dismissal. It is also necessary to define at least some of those legitimate reasons, without
being too rigid. Compensati~n should also be granted in the case of illegitimate employee
dismissal. The Saudisation policy should be made more flexible by creating incentives rather
than penalties to encourage companies employ Saudi nationals. This could be implemented
by giving tax breaks or special access to public markets to companies with a certain number
of Saudi employees. The government should also offer subsidies for the training of Saudi
nationals, as well as overhauling the educational system to bring it into line with private
sector employment needs.
Given the Kingdom's commitment to opening the economy for FDI, much can be
achieved by the liberalising of administrative barriers that currently detract from its appeal as
a location for FDI. These barriers include the procedures involved in obtaining visas, work
and residency permits, obtaining investment licences, dealing with commercial disputes and
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delays in obtaining approval for imports and major delays in appeals related to tax
assessment. These areas can all be addressed and improved. The government should further
improve administrative procedures by continuing to facilitate the institutional and
administrative procedures for licensing foreign projects in the Kingdom as well as providing
the necessary support to SAGrA as a one stop shop for other government departments and
ministries by implementing investor-friendly reforms at administrative level.
Judiciary and dispute settlement
Even though the law confirms the independence of the judiciary, the relationship
between the latter and the executive is open to question. In other words, although the personal
independence of judges in Saudi is guaranteed by the constitution of Saudi Arabia', their
structural independence needs to be addressed. Therefore, one can suggest that in order to
achieve the standard of independence required for adequate dispute settlement, Saudi Arabia
should do more to clearly establish the independence of the Board of Grievances in order to
allow it to execute its functions as a neutral body, and to ensure transparency in its decision
making process.' Government involvement in appointment of members and financing should
be ended to ensure an effective, transparent and indeed independent body which will
undoubtedly attract more foreign investors.
2 Article 48 of the Basic Law (Constitution).
3 It should be noted that the new Law of the Judiciary clearly acknowledges the doctrine of separation of
powers. The new law stressed the authority of judges in making decisions independent of outside influence,
especially the influence of the "Executive Branch." The most prominent feature of the new law is its practical
application of the judicial independence principle, as evidenced by the limiting of the Ministry of Justice's
administrative control over the judiciary. Under the new law, the right to supervise all courts and judges was
transferred from the Minister of Justice to the Supreme Judicial Council. See the Law of the Judiciary (2007),
Articles 6 & 58.
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The reforms taking place within the judiciary include the establishment of commercial
courts to meet a long standing demand from both national and foreign investors." This
demonstrates a potentially remarkable development in the area of law and the administration
of justice in the country. This is a major step forward, because these commercial courts will
decide on commercial disputes. Until very recently, details of this development have not been
available, but the question which must be asked is whether they will have autonomy from the
previous position oflinks with the king. Reforms should also consider the substantial absence
of meaningful judicial review of governmental action, and the continuing difficulty of
predicting judicial results. It is advisable that all commercial judgements should be in a stored
in a depository for future reference' These judgements should then be available for those
who are interested. In order to overcome confusing jurisdictions, there is a need to introduce
new legislation especially designed for international arbitration. It needs to be compatible
with the UNCITRAL Model law to incorporate a doctrine of separability, widen the scope of
arbitrability and abrogate legal restrictions to submit to arbitration. The importance of the
UNCITRAL Model Law does not only derive from the fact that it would facilitate
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, but that it would also improve the standing ofFDI.
The government should also increase training, communication and information so that
judges are kept up to date on all new regulations, international agreements and conventions.
The next generation of judges and lawyers should acquire such knowledge during law school
and in their initial training. This will ensure consistency within the judicial system. Once this
occurs, judges will be able to deliver legal decisions in a consistent manner using the same
legal framework. Communication needs to be developed within the judiciary in order to
4 Saudi Gazette Newspaper April71h 2005.
S It should be noted that the Council of Ministers issued a decision No. 162 dated on 17/06/1423H of the
formation of a permanent judicial committee for the codification and dissemination of court judgements. So far
there are 3 editions of court judgements. For more information see Ministry of Justice website at:
htw:llwww.moj.gov.salmdona moj/default.aspx. (Arabic version only).
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increase the awareness of similar cases in different courts. Seminars, training programmes
and user guides to legal procedures should be developed in order to inform the
administration, the legal community and the public. Again, this would create consistency
with regard to the implementation of rules and regulations. In addition, as soon as a
regulation is issued or a treaty or bilateral agreement is ratified, copies should be sent to all
jurisdictions.
At the moment, many of these developments are in progress or undergoing amendment
so it is not possible to ascertain in detail what the legal situation will be in the future, and
some of the current difficulties focussed on in this thesis may be resolved.
To sum up, although Saudi Arabia has achieved tremendous progress in the field of the
settlement of investment disputes, it is expected to further improve the legal environment for
businesses and to increase its objectivity and transparency. In line with the political stability
that exists in Saudi Arabia, there is still need for further improvement in the rule of law in the
terms discussed in the thesis. The improvements need to be centred on increasing confidence
in legal rules, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of
contracts. The globalisation of world trade exerts ever greater demands of competitiveness on
energy exporting countries and Saudi Arabia still needs to implement more strategies and
reforms to maximise economic development potential for its people by removing remaining
obstacles in the way of foreign investors.
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APPENDIX
Foreign Investment Law
Royal Decree No Mil
5 Muharram 1421 / 10 April 2000
Article One:
The following tenus and expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them, unless the
context requires otherwise:
(a) The Council: The Supreme Economic Council.
(b) Board of Directors: The Board of Directors of the General Investment Authority.
(c) The Authority: The General Investment Authority.
(d) The Governor: The Governor of the General Investment Authority and Chairman of
the Board of Directors.
(e) Foreign Investor: A natural person who is not of Saudi nationality or a corporate
person whose partners are not all Saudi.
(f) Foreign Investment: Investment of foreign capital in an activity licensed by this Law.
(g) Foreign Capital: For purposes of this Law, foreign capital shall mean, for example,
but not limited to, the following assets and rights so long as they are owned by a
foreign investor.
. .
(1) Cash, securities and negotiable instruments.
(2) Foreign investment profits, if invested to increase capital, expand existing
projects, or establish new ones.
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(3) Machinery, equipment, furnishings, spare-parts, means of transport and
production requirements related to the investment.
(4) Intangible rights, such as licenses, intellectual property rights, technical know-
how, administrative skills and production techniques
(h) Commodity Firms: Projects for the production of industrial and agricultural goods
(crops and livestock).
(i) Service Firms: Service and contracting projects.
(j) Law: The Foreign Investment Law.
(k) Regulations: The implementing regulations of this Law.
Article Two:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the laws and agreements, the authority shall issue a
license for foreign capital investment in any investment activity in the Kingdom, whether
permanent or temporary.
The authority shall act on the investment's application within thirty days of the submission of
all the documents required by the regulations. If the specified period lapses without the
authority acting on the application, it shall issue the required license to the investor.
If the authority rejects the application within the prescribed period, the decision must be
justified, and the party whose application has been rejected shall have the right to appeal such
decision according to laws.
Article Three:
The council shall have the authority to issue a list of activities excluded from foreign
investment.
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Article Four:
Subject to the provisions of Article 2, the foreign investor may obtain more than one license
for different activities, and the regulations shall specify the necessary requirements.
Article Five:
Foreign investments licensed under the provisions of this Law may be in either of the
following forms:
(1) Firms jointly owned by a national and foreign investor.
(2) Firms wholly owned by a foreign investor.
The legal form of the firm shall be determined in accordance with laws and directives.
Article Six:
A project licensed under this Law shall enjoy all the benefits, incentives and guarantees
extended to a national project, according to laws and directives.
Article Seven:
A Foreign Investor may repatriate its share that is derived either from the sale of its equity,
the liquidation surplus, or from profits generated by the firm, or to dispose of it in any other
lawful manner. The foreign investor may also transfer the amounts required to settle any
contractual obligations related to the project.
Article Eight:
A foreign firm licensed under this Law may acquire necessary real estate as needed for
operating the licensed activity, or for housing all or some of its staff, subject to the provisions
governing real estate ownership by non-Saudis.
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Article Nine:
The foreign investor and its non-Saudi staff shall be sponsored by the licensed firm.
Article Ten:
The authority shall make available to all interested investors required information,
clarifications and statistics as well as provide them with all services and carry out all
procedures to facilitate and complete all investment related transactions.
Article Eleven:
The foreign investor's investments may not be confiscated, wholly or partially without a
court judgment. Moreover, they may not be subject to expropriation, wholly or partially,
except for public interest, against a fair compensation according to laws and directives.
Article Twelve:
(1) The authority shall notify the foreign investor in writing of any violation of the
provisions of this Law and its regulations, in order to rectify such violation within
the period of time the authority deems appropriate for the rectification of the
violation.
(2) Without prejudice to any harsher penalty, the foreign investor shall be subject to any
of the following penalties if the violation persists:
(a) Withholding all or some of the incentives and benefits given to the
Foreign Investor.
(b) Imposing a fine not exceeding 500,000 (Five hundred thousand
Saudi riyals).
(c) Revoking the foreign investment license.
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(3) The penalties referred to in paragraph (2) above, shall be imposed pursuant to a
resolution by the board of directors.
(4) The resolution issued may be appealed before the Board of Grievances In
accordance with its Law. .
Article Thirteen:
Without prejudice to agreements to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is party:
(1) Disputes arising between the government and the foreign investor in relation to its
investments licensed in accordance with this Law shall, as far as possible, be settled
amicably. Failing such settlement, the dispute shall be settled according to the
relevant laws.
(2) Disputes arising between the foreign investor and its Saudi partners in relation to its
investments licensed in accordance with this Law shall, as far as possible, be settled
amicably. Failing such settlement, the dispute shall be settled according to relevant
laws.
Article Fourteen:
All foreign investments licensed under this Law shall be treated in accordance with
applicable tax provisions and amendments thereto in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Article Fifteen:
The foreign investor shall comply with all laws, regulations and directives in force in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as international agreements to which the Kingdom is party.
280
Article Sixteen:
The implementation of this Law shall be without prejudice to acquired rights of the foreign
investments, legally existing before this Law comes into force. However, such projects shall
be governed by provisions of this Law, as far as conducting their activities, or increasing their
capital is concerned.
Article Seventeen:
The authority shall issue the regulations and they shall be published in the Official Gazette
and shall become effective as of the date of its publication.
Article Eighteen:
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall become effective thirty days
after its publication. It shall supersede the Foreign Capital Investment Law, issued by Royal
Decree No. (M/4), dated 2/2/1399 H, as well as any provisions inconsistent therewith.
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